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When Aristotle makes his case that time is a property of motion, he not only
argues that time depends for its existence on motion, but that it derives its
structural properties from motion as well.  But if this is to avoid a vicious
circularity, then motion cannot presuppose time, and the order of motion must be
definable in abstraction from the order of time.  I argue that Aristotle is able to do
exactly this, based upon his theory of act and potency (energeia and dunamis),
and upon the theory that all natural change is teleological.  I propose that a linear
order may be defined on the phases of a change, using the relation “x is
potentially y,” where x and y range over different phases of an Aristotelian natural
substance (e.g., Socrates-as-a-boy, Socrates-as-a-man, etc.).  This is possible, I
claim, because a special asymmetric potentiality is involved which marks out the
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stages of a change as prior and posterior based upon their proximity to a given
goal, rather than upon their order in a temporal sequence.  I also argue that if x
and y appear in states of affairs that obtain at different times, then the “x is
potentially y” relation provides a criterion for diachronic identity, since it relates a
single entity at one time to itself at another time.  Moreover, I argue, based on an
account that takes forms to be individuals that persist over time, that the forms
which give substances these special potentialities are early analogues of the
individual essences proposed by the Stoics and by Duns Scotus as criteria for
identity, and by contemporary metaphysicians such as Kaplan and Plantinga to
secure identity across possible worlds.  I look at two ancient puzzles about
persistence, viz., the Growing Argument by Epicharmus, and a similar puzzle
about alteration mentioned by Aristotle in Phys. 4.11, and assess the adequacy of
Aristotle’s criterion of identity for solving them.  As a point of comparison, I also
assess the solution to the Growing Argument proposed by the Stoic philosopher
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Introduction
In the first three books of the Physics, Aristotle sets forth a metaphysic of change
that has three important features.  First, he claims that change consists in the
passage between contrary termini.  Second, he claims that the terminus ad quem
of a change is a goal, which either constitutes, or contributes to the perfection of
the nature of the changing thing.  And third, he claims that the termini of a change
are related by the concept of potentiality, where the changing thing in the
terminus a quo is potentially the changing thing in the terminus ad quem.
In the sequel, I will consider a few of the virtues and shortcomings of this
metaphysical scheme.  In particular, I will show how the teleological aspect of it
can be used to account for the order and direction of time, and how the concept of
potentiality may be used to supply a criterion of identity.  I will also show how
the idea that change consists in the passage between contrary termini makes it
difficult for Aristotle to account for how motions come to be and pass away, and
to conceive of continuous changes in velocity.
In Chapter 1, I prove that Aristotle has the resources within his philosophy
to answer a common criticism of his theory of the order and the direction of time.
In the 4th book of the Physics, Aristotle appears to derive the order of time from
the order of change in something like a one-one, structure-preserving mapping
from the phases of a change to the instants in which those phases occur.  Aristotle
thinks that he can do this, because he claims that time is a property of motion, and
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is ontologically dependent upon motion.  I refute the claim that this derivation is
viciously circular.  Now, if we took the modern “at-at” view of motion, in which
motion consists merely in being in different places at different times, then clearly,
the derivation is circular.  And although most scholars would agree that Aristotle
thinks that motion is more than being at different places at different times, there
is, nonetheless, a widely held belief that, no matter what Aristotle thinks that
change is, he cannot, in principle, separate time from change even in thought.
Now, I think that the “at-at” view is an excessively abstract way to think
about motion, especially if we want to be fair to Aristotle, which is to say, if we
want to allow Aristotle the full resources of his own philosophy to answer such an
objection.  The resource that I have in mind, in particular, is Aristotle’s view that
moving things have natures.  Now, for Aristotle, a nature is something that
governs the characteristics of a motion of a thing that possesses it.  In Aristotle’s
universe, moving things behave the way they do, not because they have certain
common properties such as mass, or need to obey certain universal mechanical
laws, but because they have individual, substance-specific natures, which entail
certain characteristic potentialities, developmental and behavioral potentialities,
as well as an impulse or a drive to fulfill those potentialities.  For instance, fire
has a special teleological potentiality to be at the periphery of the universe, as
well as a drive that will move it there, if nothing hinders it.  Similarly, earth has a
special teleological potentiality to be at the center of the universe, and it has an
inner drive that will move it there, if nothing hinders it.  And the same can be said
for more complex organisms.  Take a chicken, for instance.  Why does a chicken
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cross the road?  Well, Aristotle would say that it is probably because it sees a pile
of chicken feed on the other side, and has formed the goal to go over and eat it.
Why do chickens eat chicken feed?  Because their nature is such as to require a
certain sort of nourishment.  And why is that?  Because this sort of nourishment is
required for their biological development, or the perfection of their substantial
form.  In other words, Aristotle claims that chickens are born, as biological
natural substances, with a nature, which entails certain developmental
potentialities, and if those developmental potentialities are to be realized, then a
certain nourishment is required, and if a certain nourishment is required, then
certain behaviors are required to procure it.  So that is why the chicken crosses the
road.  Now, what this means is that, in Aristotle’s world, things, in general, have
teleologies.  They have things that they want to do, and things that they will do if
you do not hinder them.  The way that this helps Aristotle is that he can order the
phases of a change with reference to a given goal instead of with reference to a
temporal series.  The phases of an Aristotelian change, in other words, have a
normative order, and this normative order can be relied on when deriving the
order of time from the order of change.  And since the normative order has no
explicit time references, then Aristotle’s derivation is not circular.
In Chapter 2, I deal with another philosophical problem that is suggested
by a device that I use to think about the order of time.  The modern way to think
about orders is in terms of domains and relations, and in order to make what I
have been outlining more perspicuous, I define a relation on Aristotle’s behalf.
The relation is x is potentially y, where x and y range over the phases of an
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Aristotelian natural substance.  Phases might be something like Socrates-as-a-boy
or Socrates-as-a-man.  If x is Socrates-as-a-boy and y is Socrates-as-a-man, then
the relation holds because Socrates as a boy has the potentiality to develop into
Socrates-as-a-man.  Now a question arises because, if x and y are phases of a
change of an Aristotelian substance, and x and y exist at different times, then the
holding of the relation “x is potentially y” also seems to be a sufficient condition
for diachronic identity or identity over time.  The reason for this is that the
relation x is potentially y relates a substance to itself at another phase.  It relates
Socrates-as-a-boy to Socrates-as-a-man, for instance.  And this makes sense
because we would probably think that Socrates-as-a-boy has the potentiality to
become Socrates-as-a-man, but not Plato-as-a-man.  And why is that?  It is
because Socrates’ potentiality is constrained somehow to prevent this.  There are
certain things that Socrates-as-a-boy has the potentiality to become and Plato-as-
a-man is not one of them.  This seems reasonable, but why it should be so is not
entirely clear.  What is needed is a proper criterion for diachronic identity; one
that appears to justify the identification of Socrates-as-a-boy and Socrates-as-a-
man.
The criterion that I offer on Aristotle’s behalf is a variation on one
suggested by Michael Frede.  Frede suggests that Aristotle should use the
continuity of spatio-temporal histories as a criterion of diachronic identity.  I
suggest, rather, that it is the accumulation of time-indexed properties that serves
this function.  I claim that to have a spatio-temporal history is just to have a
collection of time-indexed properties, and to have a unique spatio-temporal
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history is just to have at least one property contained in that history that is not
shared with any other individual.  What is attractive about this proposal is that at
one stroke it provides a criterion for both individuation and identity over time.  If
Socrates and Callias have type-identical species forms that are instantiated at
different places at time t, this fact not only differentiates them at that time, but
because they continue to possess the property at future times of having been in
distinct places at time t, then they are also differentiated at all future points in
time.  Moreover, the fact that they possess this property at all future points in
time, allows them to be reidentified as the individuals with these particular spatio-
temporal histories.  This makes spatio-temporal histories individual essences, not
in the Aristotelian sense of something that expresses what sort of thing one is
dealing with (for instance, a man or a horse, etc.), but an essence in the sense of a
property that a thing has in every circumstance in which it exists.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I show how the idea that motion is simply the
traversal from terminus A at time t to terminus B at time t + 1, combined with
Aristotle’s strict mathematical finitism, makes it impossible for Aristotle to
account for how motions come to be and pass away.  In particular, I argue that
since Aristotle rejects instantaneous velocities, he is faced with a dilemma in
accounting for the way in which a moving body comes to rest, for instance, at the
end of a period of motion.  Either he must say that the moving body must traverse
the whole of an infinite sequence of non-instantaneous velocities in the course of
coming to rest, or he must say that it must traverse a finite sequence of non-
instantaneous velocities and then transition to the period of zero velocity
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discontinuously.  Accepting either horn of the dilemma would be devastating for
Aristotle.  If he accepts the traversal of an infinite sequence he must abandon the
view that finite human minds are up to the task of understanding the universe,
which rests on the assumption that the universe, in its essence, is a finite place
containing finite things.  If he accepts a discontinuity in the passage between a
period of motion and a period of rest, however, I will argue that he must accept a
similar discontinuity in the passage between any two velocities, and this will
result in motion being pervasively discontinuous, not just at its beginning and end.
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Chapter 1: The Order and Direction of Time
1.0 THE ORDER OF CHANGE
This chapter is about an aspect of time that has interested philosophers since at
least Aristotle, and that still generates a large amount of scholarship.  It is the
problem of the order and direction of time, and it arises because certain processes
seem only to proceed in one direction.  For instance, when one pours milk into a
cup of coffee, it always spreads out rather than concentrating in one spot.  And if
one heats up a pan and immerses it in cold water, the water always becomes
warmer, and the pan always becomes colder.  It is never the other way around.
Philosophers have long suspected that apparently lawlike asymmetries in changes
like these imply an asymmetry in time itself, and some have even argued that this
asymmetry in time derives from an asymmetry in changes.  In other words, the
claim is that one time is before or after another because one event or state is
before or after another.  Aristotle takes precisely this view in the 4th book of the
Physics, where he says that  “The distinction of ‘before’ and ‘after’ holds
primarily, then, in place; and there in virtue of relative position. Since then
‘before’ and ‘after’ hold in magnitude, they must hold also, in an analogous
fashion, in movement. But also in time the distinction of ‘before’ and ‘after’ must
hold, for time always follows movement.”  The claim that time follows
movement, here, amounts to the claim that one time is before or after another
because one phase of a change is before or after another.
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I will not go into Aristotle’s justification for this, except to say that it is
based upon the view that time is a property of change, which makes it dependent
upon change in all of the ways that a property is dependent upon its subject.
What I am going to address here is the common criticism that Aristotle’s view
contains a vicious circularity.  Now, if we take the view that motion consists
merely in being in different places at different times, then the derivation
obviously is circular, because, in that case, the order of change is defined in terms
of the order of time.  Gwil Owen argues that Aristotle has no choice but to define
the order of change in this way, and tries to prove this by envisaging motion along
a linear magnitude between points A and B, for instance.1  He claims that one can
define two orders on the magnitude, either from A to B, or from B to A, but one
cannot select one of the two orders as the order of the change without importing a
time reference.  In other words, to say that the motion begins at point A is just to
say that the moving body is at position A prior to the time at which it is at position
B.
1.1 The normative order of change
There is a widespread consensus today, and perhaps even an orthodoxy, that this
argument, or others like it, succeed in convicting Aristotle of a vicious circularity.
One sees this view, for instance, in articles by Julia Annas, Sarah Broadie, Denis
Corish, and Richard Sorabji, and I am not aware that anyone has tried to challenge
it.2  As a matter of fact, however, Owen’s objection only appears to succeed
because he has already assumed a very abstract picture of motion.  And I think
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that if we look closely at some of Aristotle’s more concrete discussions of how
changes get their orders, we will see that he has the resources to specify an order
of change without a reference to times.
This seems to be the case, for instance, in three passages dealing with the
biological development of a boy into a man.  The first is at Metaphysics Delta 11,
1018b19-21, where Aristotle explains what it means to be prior in a change:
“Other things are prior in change; for the things that are nearer the first mover are
prior (e.g., the boy is prior to the man); and the prime mover is also a beginning
absolutely.” He distinguishes, here, two senses in which the term “prior” might be
taken; one in the sense in which the prime mover is prior, that is, as the ultimate
final cause of all change, and another in the sense that the boy is prior to the man.
The second passage is at Generation of Animals 724a22-3, where we see that the
boy is prior to the man in the sense of an order of succession, and that we can also
express this priority by saying that the man comes from the boy, using the Greek
preposition †h:
“Now we speak of one thing coming from (†h) another in many senses; it
is one thing when we say that night comes from day or a man becomes
man from a boy, meaning that the one succeeds the other (qÏab jbqà
qÏab); it is another if we say that a statue is made from bronze and a bed
from wood.”
But if we look at a third passage, at Metaphysics 994a22-994b3, it is clear
that this order is not a temporal succession:
One thing comes from another in two ways—not in the sense in which
“from” means “after” (as we say “from the Isthmian games come the
Olympian”), but either (i) as the man comes from the boy, by the boy’s
changing, or (ii) as air comes from water. By “as the man comes from the
boy” we mean “as that which has come to be from that which is coming to
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be” or “as that which is finished from that which is being achieved” (for as
becoming is between being and not being, so that which is becoming is
always between that which is and that which is not; for the learner is a
man of science in the making, and this is what is meant when we say that
from a learner a man of science is being made); on the other hand, coming
from another thing as water comes from air implies the destruction of the
other thing. This is why changes of the former kind are not reversible, and
the boy does not come from the man (for it is not that which comes to be
something that comes to be as a result of coming to be, but that which
exists after the coming to be; for it is thus that the day, too, comes from
the morning—in the sense that it comes after the morning; which is the
reason why the morning cannot come from the day); but changes of the
other kind are reversible.
The boy precedes the man in time, but that is not the point, as is clear from
the phrase “not in the sense in which ‘from’ means ‘after’ (as we say ‘from the
Isthmian games come the Olympian’).”  The point, rather, is a metaphysical one
about the relationship between boyhood and manhood.  Aristotle says “by ‘as the
man comes from the boy’ we mean ‘as that which has come to be from that which
is coming to be’ or ‘as that which is finished from that which is being attained (for
as becoming is between being and not being, so that which is becoming is always
between that which is and that which is not.’”  Evidently, the point of identifying
“that which has come to be” and “that which is finished” with the man, and “that
which is coming to be” and “that which is being attained” with the boy, is to mark
the man off as something complete and to mark the boy off as something in
process and not yet complete.  If the man is complete, then manhood must be the
goal or culmination of the boy’s development, and if incompleteness is assessed
negatively, then manhood will be a normative goal.  Indeed, identifying manhood
with a state of being and boyhood with a state between being and non-being
seems to confirm this negative assessment by making boyhood a state of
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privation.  Manhood is a better or more perfect state than boyhood, and that is
why it has the status of a goal.
Now clearly, if we can order the phases of human biological development
in terms of “good,” “better,” and “best” we need not also give them a temporal
ordering.  It may be the case that the good state is always earlier, and the best
state is always later, but the charge of circularity rests on our alleged inability to
conceive of this ordering in anything but temporal terms.  If we can conceive of
this order abstractly, attending only to the normative relationships between the
phases, then I think that Aristotle will have escaped the charge of circularity.
There are similarities between what I am suggesting and Leibniz’s causal
theory of the temporal order.  Leibniz sought to reduce time to the order of non-
contemporaneous events, and he sought to derive this order from the non-
temporal order of cause and effect: “When one of two non-contemporaneous
elements contains the ground for the other, the former is regarded as the
antecedent, and the latter as the consequent.  My earlier state of existence contains
the ground for the existence of the later.”3  Leibniz, based upon certain
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of individual substances, claims a
certain asymmetric and necessary relation between causes and effects.  Likewise,
Aristotle, based upon his theories of nature, final cause, actuality and potentiality,
asserts a certain asymmetric and necessary relation between the phases of a
change.
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1.2 The relation x is potentially_ y
The metaphysical basis for this normative order lies in Aristotle’s concepts of
nature and potentiality.  The important discussions of nature are in Physics, book
2, chapter 1 and  Metaphysics book Delta, chapter 4.  In the latter chapter,
Aristotle tells us that a nature, in the primary sense of the word, is a form or
essence, and then he identifies the form or essence with a source or a principle of
change that is innate in a natural substance.  In De anima, book 2, Aristotle
identifies the human form with a person’s soul, and he also claims that the soul is
the efficient cause of a person’s movements, so one can see how the soul might be
the boy’s nature in the sense of his form or essence, as well as in the sense of the
innate impulse that drives his development.  But Aristotle also says, and this is the
part that is relevant to a normative ordering, that a nature is a form that is attained
or realized through a process of growth or development.  Now obviously, if the
boy’s nature just consists in having a human form or soul, then there is no need
for him to attain what he already has.  And if we assume that the attainment in
question is growing to manhood, then the boy’s nature must consist in having a
human soul that is distinguished in some way from a man’s, and this difference
must be a deficiency if becoming a man is to be an attainment.  And, indeed, this
appears to be the case, since, according to Aristotle, a boy has an underdeveloped
rational faculty.  Aristotle claims in Nicomachean Ethics book 4, chapter 12, that
boys “live at the beck and call of appetite” and it is their tutor that assumes the
role of their rational faculty, while their own is not yet developed.  And we can
see from Politics 7.15, 1334b15-25 that the soul of a man with a fully functioning
13
rational faculty is the end toward which the boy’s nature is striving, and that this
attainment is always preceded by the development of the irrational faculties:
Now, in humans reason and mind are the end toward which nature strives.
… As the body is prior in order of generation to the soul, so the irrational
is prior to the rational. The proof is that anger and wishing and desire are
implanted in boys from their very birth, but reason and understanding are
developed as they grow older. (Pol. 7.15, 1334b15-25)
The nature of the boy, then, is exemplified in a human soul that is partially
developed relative to the goal state of manhood.  A nature, then, sets the
normative order in the biological development of the boy by specifying the goal
state of possessing a fully functioning rational faculty, and supplying the efficient
cause, in the form of a principle of motion, for moving this development along.
Now the way that this notion of incompleteness, or partial development
relative to a goal gets cashed out in Aristotle is in terms of special teleological
potentialities.  A boy has many potentialities.  He has the potentiality to win a
marathon or to die in battle, for instance, but the only potentiality that makes him
a partially developed man is the potentiality to have a fully functioning rational
faculty.  In the Generation of Animals book 2, chapter 3, Aristotle tells us that the
unfolding of the process of biological development represents the realization of
special teleological potentialities that were present in prior stages of the process.
For instance, the nutritive soul exists potentially in the semen (pmùoj^) and in
the dormant4 embryo (h·ej^: GA 32.3 736b8-10).  The sensitive/appetitive soul
exists potentially in the active5 embryo (h·ej^) but actually in the infant and
child.  And the rational soul exists potentially in the boy, but actually in the man,
which is the end toward which the whole process is directed.
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Further light is shed on these teleological potentialities in the following
passage from the Metaphysics:
But we must distinguish when a thing exists potentially and when it does
not; for it is not at any and every time. E.g. is earth potentially a man?
No—but rather when it has already become sperm, and perhaps not even
then. … In the cases in which the source of the becoming is in the very
thing which comes to be, a thing is potentially all those things which it
will be of itself if nothing external hinders it. E.g. the seed is not yet
potentially a man; for it must be deposited in something other than itself
and undergo a change. But when through its own motive principle it has
already got such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially a
man; while in the former state it needs another motive principle, just as
earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must first change in order to
become brass.) (Metaph. Book W, chapter 7 1048b37-1049a18)
Now the first thing that Aristotle does, in this passage, is to deny that earth
or sperm is potentially a man, because, as he explains a little further on, first
“[sperm] must be deposited in something other than itself and undergo a change.”
As I just noted, the nutritive soul exists potentially in the semen (pmùoj^), but it
appears that this is not enough to make the semen potentially a man.  “But,”
Aristotle continues, “when through its own motive principle [the semen] has
already got such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially a man;
while in the former state it needs another motive principle.”  The idea, here, I
think, is that when the sperm acquires “such and such attributes” and “its own
motive principle,” it acquires a nature in the sense of an actualized form and an
innate principle of motion.  Although an active embryo has only a nutritive soul in
actuality, and, as Aristotle says in the Generation of Animals book 2, chapter 3, it
lives the life of a plant, it has a nature in the form of a partially developed human
form or soul.  This soul, due to its nature and partial development, has certain
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characteristic developmental potentialities, and because it has an innate impulse
of change that is directed at realizing these potentialities, then it is “potentially all
those things which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders it.”
Now since the nutritive soul exists potentially in the semen (pmùoj^) and
in the dormant embryo (h·ej^) prior to the stage in which it acquires a nature
and begins to develop, it seems that we can make a distinction, here, between two
types of potentiality.  On the one hand, the potentiality of the semen would appear
to be a fitness to be endowed with a nature.6  On the other hand, the potentiality of
the developing embryo to acquire a sensitive and appetitive faculty and the child
to acquire a rational one, would appear to be the potentiality, once endowed with
a nature, to perfect it.  Let us call the fitness to be endowed with a nature
potentiality^ and the potentiality, once endowed with a nature, to perfect it
potentiality_.  Potentiality_ is the basis for the ordering of the phases in the
biological development of a boy into a man.  Or to put it more formally, if the
relation x is potentially_ y holds of two phases of this change, where phases are
things like Coriscus-as-a-boy and Coriscus-as-a-man, for instance, then the phases
of the change are in their correct normative order.  If the relation does not hold,
then the phases are not correctly ordered.  And going back to the claim in passage
one that the order of time is derived from the order of change, we can see that
what Aristotle is basically saying is that if the relation x is potentially_ y holds of
two phases of this change, then the x will be the earlier phase and the y will be the
later one, and that, moreover, the relation x is earlier than y holds in virtue of x is
potentially_ y holding.
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So where y represents a phase of a substance with a perfected substantial
form, saying that x is potentially_ y means that x is a phase of that substance that
is incompletely actual relative to y, and that, moreover, x is moving toward
becoming y by means of an innate impulse of change that is specifically directed
to this purpose.  This also means that something that is potentially_ y, has all of
the stages in its development — that is, “all those things which it will be of itself
if nothing external hinders it” — defined in terms of its eventually being y.  In
other words, Coriscus-as-an-infant is potentially_ Coriscus-as-a-toddler, as well as
potentially_ Coriscus-as-a-teenager, but since these are all stages on the way to
Coriscus-as-a-man, they are potentialities_ for incomplete actualities (incomplete
because they fall short of being Coriscus-as-a-man), and thus are, in a way,
incomplete potentialities_ themselves.  Thus, on the assumption that becoming y is
to be identified with the stages passed through on the way to this goal,7 Aristotle
makes the claim that “change is thought to be a sort of actuality, but incomplete,
the reason for this view being that the potentiality whose actuality it is is
incomplete” (Phys. 201b31-33).
Accordingly, Aristotle’s full-dress definition of change, in Physics book 3,
chapter 1 (“change is the actuality of what exists potentially, qua existing
potentially”), may be interpreted as follows:  Change is an actuality of what exists
potentially_.  And an actuality of what exists potentially_ is an incomplete
actuality of y or an actuality that is still potentially_ y (that is, an incomplete
actuality of an incomplete potentiality_).  Thus, it is an actuality qua existing
potentially_ (that is, qua still potentially_ y and not yet actually y).8
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1.3 Conditions to be satisfied
In order for the relation x is potentially_ y to order the prior and posterior in
change in a strict linear order, it must be transitive, asymmetric, and connected.
According to the standard definitions of these properties, a relation is transitive if
and only if: if x is potentially_ y, and y is potentially_ z, then x is potentially_ z; a
relation is asymmetric if and only if: if x is potentially_ y, then y is not potentially_
x; a relation is connected if and only if, for every x and y, if x ≠ y, then either x is
potentially_ y or y is potentially_ x.  A familiar example of a strict linear order is
the domain of the real numbers ordered by the “less than” relation.  Transitivity
and asymmetry should be familiar, but connectedness, perhaps, less so.
Connectedness ensures that no elements in the domain are left out of the order,
and that no branching occurs.  For instance, suppose we have three distinct real
numbers a, b, and c, and that b and c are related to a by the “less than” relation.
In this case, the connectedness of the “less than” relation ensures that either b is
less than c or c is less than b.
Presumably, the relation should also hold necessarily, not in the sense that
there must necessarily be some y for every x such that x is potentially_ y (since a
boy may die and fail to become a man, or if x is a man, he is not also potentially_
a man), but in the sense that if x and y are distinct phases in the development of a
single subject, these phases must necessarily be related by this relation.  It cannot
be a contingent matter that this relation holds of the phases of changes, since, if
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the temporal order is to be derived from the order of change, this would introduce
contingency into the temporal order.
We have already seen that the relation x is potentially_ y, where x and y are
a boy and a man respectively, is asymmetric, but is it also transitive and
connected?  The worry here is that if the “y” in “x is potentially_ y” is always the
ultimate goal of the process, such as Coriscus-as-a-man, the relation will order the
phases of the change relative to the goal but not relative to each other.  In short,
the answer is that y need not always be the goal, but to see this, it is useful to note
that Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of necessity: absolute
necessity and hypothetical necessity.  Absolute necessity just means “incapable of
being otherwise,” in the sense, for instance, in which it is necessary for a human
to have such and such characteristics (Metaph. 1006b31-2).  Hypothetical
necessity, by contrast, applies to things that must be if such and such a condition
is to hold.  Aristotle’s most common examples of hypothetical necessity figure
into answers to questions like “Why is it necessary for axes to be made of metal?”
Answer: “If an axe is to chop wood, it must be made of a material that is suitably
hard.”  But he also speaks of hypothetical necessity in connection with the phases
of natural processes:
Thus we should say, because man is an animal with such and such
characters, therefore the process of his development is necessarily such as
it is; and therefore it is accomplished in such and such an order, this part
being formed first, that next, and so on in succession; and after a like
fashion should we explain the construction of all other works of nature.
(PA 640a33-b4)
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When an event takes place always or for the most part, it is not incidental
or by chance. In natural products the sequence is invariable, if there is no
impediment. (Phys. 199b24-6)
What I take this to mean is that if a boy is to develop into a man, the
process of this development is necessarily “in such and such an order,” because
the actuality of posterior stages of the process presuppose the actuality of prior
stages; that is, if the posterior stage is to be actual, it is necessary for the prior
stage to be actual.  Since the goal state of the change is to be accomplished “in
such and such an order,” it is clear that the relation ordering the phases of the
change is meant to be asymmetric, connected and transitive since the phases
apparently line up in a sort of hypothetical syllogism, i.e., if the actuality of the
goal state presupposes the actuality of state b, and the actuality of state b
presupposes the actuality of state a , then the actuality of the goal state
presupposes the actuality of state a.  It is also fairly clear that the relation x is
potentially_ y holds necessarily of phases of a change if the domain of x and y is
human beings.  Aristotle thinks that if x is a human, then it necessarily has the
nature and characteristics of a human being (Metaph. 1006b28-34; PA 642a34-5),
which will either be manhood for a man, or the potential for manhood and the
motive force to realize it for a boy.  Thus, if x is a human, and it is undergoing its
natural development, it cannot fail to have manhood as the goal of this
development, and if manhood is the goal of his development, then the order of his
development must necessarily be thus and such.
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1.4 Broadening the account
Even if the stages in a boy’s development do, in fact, play out over time, the
relation of prior and posterior in these stages may be described without an explicit
reference to a temporal order: the prior is simply the necessary condition of the
posterior, just as the fitness of an axe for chopping presupposes that it is made out
of metal.  Thus, Aristotle’s metaphysical account of the development of natural
substances such as humans gives us the resources to talk about the change from a
boy to a man in abstraction from time.  But what about change as such?  In other
words, can we generalize from the case of the boy growing into the man to say
that any change whatever is ordered by the x is potentially_ y relation?  I will
argue that it can, with some caveats, which I will come to shortly.  The key point
is that Aristotle thinks that everything that exists, at least in the sublunary realm,
possesses an innate impulse of change that drives it toward some definite end or
ends.  Sometimes the end will be simple and immediate, like “being at the center”
for earth.  Sometimes the end will be complex and remote, like “being a man” for
a boy or “being b‰a^÷jsk” for a man.  Finally, sometimes the end will be
consciously intended, like the possession of a cloak, or the taking of a walk in the
case of a man, or it will be determined unconsciously and automatically, like
“being at the center” in the case of a lump of earth.
1.4.1 Natural Substances and Artifacts
A strong indication that Aristotle takes all change to be teleological is his
insistence in Physics book 2, chapter 1 (Phys. 192b9-23) that the category of
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substance can be partitioned into two classes: natural substances,9 and artificial
creations or artifacts.  Natural substances include “animals and their parts …, and
the plants and the simple bodies (earth, air, fire, and water).”  The criterion for
this division is that natural substances possess a nature, that is, “a principle of
change and of rest (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of
alteration)” while artifacts qua artifacts do not.  Nonetheless, artifacts, qua the
natural substances that they are made of, do have an “innate impulse of change”
(Phys. 192b18-19: oj™k jbq^_li´t ¢jcrqlk).  For example, Aristotle alleges
that the wooden bed might sprout a tree, or the clay jug might fall when dropped,
reflecting the “innate impulse” of its material.
1.4.2 The lifeless and the living
1.4.2.1 The lifeless
The invariable tendency of earthy materials such as clay to move downward
reflects the fact, in Aristotle’s view, that the four elements are necessarily
impelled toward a single characteristic end.  Aristotle tells us in De caelo book 1,
chapter 2, that “there is one sort of motion natural to each of the simple bodies,”
including the aether (Cael. 269a8-9).  Thus, while we saw at Metaphysics
1048b37-1049a18 that earth does not possess an innate impulse of change that
will transform it into a man, it does have the potentiality to be at the center of the
universe and an innate impulse of change that drives it there, if nothing hinders it.
Likewise, fire has the potentiality to be at the periphery of the universe, and will
realize this potentiality if nothing hinders it.  In De caelo 1.2, this point is
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generalized for compounds of elemental bodies, whose natures, and therefore,
whose “innate impulses,” are taken to be simple functions of their elemental
compositions:
Bodies are either simple or compounded of such; and by simple bodies I
mean those which possess a principle of motion in their own nature, such
as fire and earth with their kinds, and whatever is akin to them.
Necessarily, then, motions also will be either simple or in some sort
compound—simple in the case of the simple bodies, compound in that of
the composite—and in the latter case the change will be that of the simple
body which prevails in the composition. (Cael. 268b26-a2)
At Physics 255a30-b31, Aristotle distinguishes the potentiality for air to
perfect its nature by moving “high up” from the potentiality of water to acquire
such a nature by being transformed into air, and this appears to be directly
analogous to the distinction between the potentiality_ for a boy to perfect its
nature by becoming a man and the potentiality^ of a “seed” to acquire such a
nature by being deposited in the uterus and “undergoing a change.”  Hence, the
potentiality for air to perfect its nature by moving “high up” appears to be a
potentiality_, and assuming we can generalize this to earth and fire and
compounds of earth, air, fire, and water (viz., to all sublunary inorganic bodies),
then the phases of all natural changes involving these bodies are ordered by the
asymmetric x is potentially_ y relation.
Now one might think that a problem arises since at Posterior Analytics
94b35-95a9, Aristotle says the falling of a stone is due to necessity in the brute
sense of necessity (i.e., “incapable of being otherwise”) instead of in the sense of
hypothetical necessity.  Recall that hypothetical necessity is intimately bound up
with teleology in that it relates goal states to their necessary conditions, and we
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saw at Parts of Animals 640a33-b4 that, in this capacity, hypothetical necessity is
indispensable in ordering the developmental phases of a living organism.  But if
Aristotle means, in these passages, to deny that hypothetical necessity applies to
simple bodies, how can he claim that certain phases in the motion of these bodies
are necessarily prior to others?
We need not assume, however, that Aristotle means to deny that
hypothetical necessity applies to simple bodies, since he makes it clear in the
immediately preceding passage, at Posterior Analytics 94b27-34, and also at
Parts of Animals 642a1-b2, that teleology and brute necessity are not mutually
exclusive.  Moreover, it is clear that earth and fire do have characteristic
tendencies to move toward a certain goal, and Aristotle even says that these
tendencies are like desires (Phys. 192a16-25) and that change itself is like life
(Phys. 250b14).  In fact, Aristotle claims in De caelo book 3 that movement for
the elements is movement towards form — earth is only properly earth when at
rest in its natural place.
Perhaps Aristotle’s idea is that a lump of matter is not formally complex
enough to determine the order, as well as the goal of its local motions.  Perhaps
the order of the phases will be determined, instead, by the structure of the spatial
continuum through which the elemental body moves.  Suppose, for instance, that
we have Owen’s linear magnitude from A to D, and say that A is higher up than
D, and that a lump of earth moves from higher to lower positions according to its
nature.  Suppose also that the line segment A-D is bisected at C and the line
segment A-C is bisected at B.  I claim that because of the structure of the
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magnitude A-B-C-D, we must say that if the posterior stage of being at D is to be
actual, it is necessary for the prior stage of being at C to be actual.  But since
intermediate position B is “higher up” than intermediate position C, in order for
the posterior stage of being at C to be actual, it is also necessary for the prior stage
of being at intermediate position B to be actual.  So in order for the posterior stage
of being at D to be actual, it is necessary for the prior stage of being at B to be
actual.  And if we assume that the magnitude A-B-C-D is a continuum, a similar
necessary conditional will hold between any two distinct points along the line.
Thus, as in the case of the development of the boy into a man, we can specify an
order of the points on A-B-C-D with the relation x is potentially_ y, where x and y
range over this-lump-of-earth-at-position-A, this-lump-of-earth-at-position-B, etc.
1.4.2.2 The living
Aristotle also tells us, at Metaphysics 1047b35-1048a21, that living beings which
possess only irrational potencies must act in a single characteristic way when the
appropriate stimulus is present, much like a lump of earth when a hindrance to its
falling is removed.  Living beings, however, whose  innate impulse of change is
guided by a iÏdlt, have the ability to choose multiple, and often mutually
exclusive ends, and this choice is determined by either rational desire
(mol^÷obpft) or irrational desire (Òobgft).  But provided that some rational or
irrational desire is dominant, action seems to follow necessarily:
For whichever of two things the animal desires decisively (hro÷st), it
will do, when it is present, and meets the passive object, in the way
appropriate to the potency in question. Therefore everything which has a
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rational potency, when it desires that for which it has a potency and in the
circumstances in which it has the potency, must do this. (Metaph.
1048a11-5)
The discussions of what commentators call the practical syllogism at
Nicomachean Ethics 1147a24-31 and De motu animalium 702b20-25 confirms
this point — action follows necessarily when a particular desire (either rational or
irrational) becomes dominant and when there is an opportunity to act.  In fact,
since the act is the conclusion of the practical syllogism, Aristotle appears to
assimilate the necessity of natural phenomena to the necessity of logical
entailment:
I need a covering, a coat is a covering: I need a coat. What I need I ought
to make, I need a coat: I make a coat. And the conclusion I must make a
coat is an action. And the action goes back to the beginning or first step. If
there is to be a coat, one must first have B, and if B then A, so one gets A
to begin with. Now that the action is the conclusion is clear. But the
premises of action are of two kinds, of the good and of the possible. (Mot.
701a17-25)
Aristotle did not maintain a sharp distinction between the practical
syllogism  qua explanatory model and qua an actual piece of practical
deliberation.  In De motu animalium, it is used to explain action in animals as well
as to literally describe pieces of rational deliberation in humans.  These shifts
between literal description and explanation are too obvious to be mistakes.  It
seems more likely that the practical syllogism is a very general psychological
model whose broad applicability is based on an assumed continuity between
ratiocination and natural phenomena.  Indeed, for Aristotle, ratiocination is a
natural phenomenon that can be used to explain itself.
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The “premises” of the action are its goals, and goals may be either “of the
good” or “of the possible,” where the good is the very general objective of
procuring clothing (or, more basically, warmth), and the possible is the proximate
goal of obtaining a coat, or the means to make a coat.  Notice the parallel here,
between rational deliberation, and the unconscious, goal-directed change of a boy
developing into a man:  If the person is to get a covering, he must go about it “in
such and such an order,” because the actuality of posterior stages of the process of
making a coat presuppose the actuality of prior stages; that is, if the posterior
stage is to be actual, it is necessary for the prior stage to be actual.  The point is
not that everyone who wishes to procure a coat must go about it in the same way,
but rather that any of the ways that one might go about it have a certain
irreversible order (one cannot weave the fabric before shearing the sheep, or
picking the cotton, for instance).  Hence x is potentially_ y holds of the phases of
the coat’s production, whatever the method of production.
This relation holds, in fact, because the form of the finished coat and the
motive force to make it are in the mind of the tailor.  In an analogous case at
Metaphysics 1048b37-1049a18, building materials are said to be potentially a
house in the sense of potentiality_ since the form and the motive force to realize it
are in the mind of the builder.  Thus the relation x is potentially_ y holds of the
phases of the change as long as “the agent has willed it” and “if nothing external
hinders:”
The delimiting mark of that which as a result of thought comes to exist in
complete reality from having existed potentially is that if the agent has
willed it, it comes to pass if nothing external hinders, while the condition
on the other side—viz. in that which is healed—is that nothing in it
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hinders the result. It is on similar terms that we have what is potentially a
house; if nothing in the thing acted on—i.e. in the matter-prevents it from
becoming a house, and if there is nothing which must be added or taken
away or changed, this is potentially a house; and the same is true of all
other things the source of whose becoming is external. (Metaph. 1049a5-
12)
Of course, the ability to choose multiple, and often mutually exclusive
ends will make the goal-directed activities of animals more complex than that of
inorganic substances.  Nonetheless, Aristotle thinks that humans, for instance, still
have an overarching single goal that is characteristic of the type of natural
substance that they are, viz., happiness (b‰a^fjlk÷^).  And although many may
mistake it for an apparent good like wealth or honor, happiness is, in fact, an
active life of the soul, and in particular, an active life of its rational principle in
accordance with excellence (EN 1.7).
This raises the problem of how to work out an account of the relationship
between general and specific goals for an organism.  Waterlow suggests that
specific and general goals of an organism may be related on the analogy of matter
to form, and this seems plausible and Aristotelian.10  But what is required for the
purpose at hand, i.e., for the relation x is potentially_ y to hold necessarily of the
phases of a change of a biological organism, is merely that all of the actions and
modifications of such an organism are characteristically goal-directed, regardless
of how they are inter-related.  If every action or modification of a biological
organism can be explained in terms of a goal (whether complex or simple,
immediate or general, conscious or unconscious) then the order of the prior and
posterior in change can be determined by this teleology, combined, perhaps, with
certain aspects of the medium in which the change takes place (e.g., the structure
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of the space, magnitude, or range of qualities, which the changing body must
traverse).
Aristotle assures us, quite generally, that “nature does nothing without
reason or in vain” (Cael. 291b13; cf. GA 744a36, b16; PA 686a22), but he clearly
thinks his strongest case for teleology is in the biological realm.  In De anima 2.2
and 2.3 Aristotle tells us that living things are distinguished from the lifeless by
the possession of a soul, and souls are defined and classified in terms of certain
characteristic developmental and behavioral potentialities.  Even plants have souls
which have the goal of nutrition and growth, and this is the common denominator
of all biological teleology.  Since animals do not find their food automatically in
the soil as plants do,  their souls also have the functions of motility and
sensitivity; sensitivity to identify food sources, and motility to go and acquire
them.  Finally, the soul of the human has the further function of reasoning well, or
acting in accordance with a rational principle, and this serves, as I have said, the
characteristically human goal of happiness or b‰a^fjlk÷^.
Hence, we may extend our earlier conclusion about humans to apply, in
the sublunary realm, at least, to natural substances as well as to artifacts (insofar
as they are made of natural substances), to the living as well as to the inorganic,
and to simple as well as compound bodies.  Since Aristotle thinks that (a) all the
activities of these natural substances are characteristically goal-directed, and that
(b) if something is a natural substance of a certain sort, then it necessarily has the
nature and characteristics of that sort of substance, we may conclude that (i) if
something is one of these natural substances (or an artifact composed of them),
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and it is engaged in a natural change, it cannot fail to have some specific goal as
the goal of this change, and (ii) if x and y are phases in a natural change of one of
these natural substances, then the order of the phases of this change must
necessarily be ordered by the relation x is potentially_ y.  Hence, the relation x is
potentially_ y must hold necessarily of the phases of a change of such a substance
in the sense that if x and y are distinct phases in one of its changes, these phases
must necessarily be related by this relation.
1.5 The definition of change
This is consistent with the fact that that the definition of change in Physics book
3, chapter 1 (“change is the actuality of what exists potentially_, qua such [viz.,
existing potentially_]” (Phys. 201a10-1)) is offered as a general definition of
change, and not simply as a definition of the process of maturation for biological
organisms.  It is also consistent with the fact that Aristotle holds at least sublunary
change to be always change toward a particular terminus of some definite type
(i.e., according to one of the categories; see Physics 200b33-201a8).  He argues
for this point at Physics 241a26-b12, in the process of establishing the claim that
“no process of change is infinite:”
Our next point is that no process of change is infinite: for every change,
whether between contradictories or between contraries, is a change from
something to something. Thus in contradictory changes the positive or the
negative, as the case may be, is the limit, e.g. being is the limit of coming
to be and not-being is the limit of ceasing to be: and in contrary changes
the particular contraries are the limits, since these are the extreme points
of any such process of change, and consequently of every process of
alteration: for alteration is always dependent upon some contraries.
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Similarly contraries are the extreme points of processes of increase and
decrease: the limit of increase is to be found in the complete magnitude
proper to the peculiar nature of the thing that is increasing, while the limit
of decrease is the complete loss of such magnitude.  (Phys. 241a26-b2)
Aristotle goes on to argue that locomotion is always finite, even though it
is not always between contraries.  Locomotion must come to an end, he argues,
since “it is inconceivable that that which cannot complete a change should be in
process of changing to that to which it cannot complete a change.”  Although this
argument begs the question, by assuming that every locomotion must be
locomotion to some definite end, it illustrates Aristotle’s commitment to this
principle, at least in the sublunary realm.11  An important exception to this is the
circular motion of the heavens, which is infinite precisely because it does not take
place between contrary termini, at least in any normal sense of contrariety.  The
circular motion of the heavens poses a special challenge to the interpretation I
have been developing, and I will take this up in Section 1.7.  But first, I need to
address the relationship between my distinction of potentiality^ and potentiality_
and a more familiar distinction Aristotle makes in De anima 2.5.
1.6 Potentiality^ and potentiality_ vs. first and second potentiality
In De anima 2.5, Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of potentiality,
which he does not name, but which the ancient commentators call “first” and
“second” potentiality.  This distinction is related to, but is not identical to the
distinction that I have made between potentiality^ and potentiality_.  The best way
to explain the relation between these distinctions is to use an illustration, but as a
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preliminary, let us first recognize another distinction implicit in De anima 2.5,
viz., between an actuality of a potentiality and an actualization of a potentiality.
In English, “actuality” denotes the state of being actual while “actualization”
denotes the change of state of becoming actual.  In the Greek of De anima 2.5, the
state of being actual is denoted in a number of ways: with the nouns †kqbiùubf^
and †kùodbf^,12 with the verb “to be” combined with the dative of manner
†kqbibub÷& and †kbodb÷&,13 and with the articular infinitive qÌ †kbodbÿk.14  The
change of state of becoming actual is called an †m÷alpft bŸt †kqbiùubf^k  at
417b6-7, and is also indicated by the phrases bŸt †kqbiùubf^k ådbfk (417b10)
and †kbodb÷& d÷klkq^f x (417a30), where x is the sort of thing that the subject
becomes †kbodb÷& .  Thus, the actuality (†kqbiùubf^  or †kùodbf^) of a
potentiality to c  is the act of c-ing, while the actualization (†m÷alpft bŸt
†kqbiùubf^k) of a potentiality to c is the coming to be of the act of c-ing.
For our example, let us suppose that to c is to know how to build a house.
(This is one of Aristotle’s examples, at De anima 417b9.)  The potentiality
corresponding to this actuality, then, is the condition of being able to know how to
build a house, and the actualization of this potentiality is the process of learning
how to build a house (i.e., the coming to be of the state of knowing).  The
condition of being able to know how to build a house (or the ability to learn
housebuilding) is what the ancient commentators call first potentiality.  The
actuality of this potentiality, i.e., knowing how to build a house, is called a first
actuality.  But once a person knows how to build a house, he has the ability to go
out and start building, unless something hinders him.  Hence, this ability, i.e.,
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knowing how to build a house, which we have already identified as the first
actuality of the first potentiality of being educable in the art of housebuilding, is
also a potentiality, because to know how to build a house represents the
potentiality to go out and start building a house.  The ancient commentators call
this second potentiality.  The actuality corresponding to this potentiality, i.e., the
activity of housebuilding, is called a second actuality, and it is actualized in the
coming to be of the process of building a house.
De anima 2.5 tells us that the first potentiality consisting in the ability to
know how to build a house is present because its subject, or the thing that has the
potentiality, is a certain sort of thing, or as Aristotle says, because “its kind is such
and such and its matter” (DA 2.5 417a27).  Now there seems to be two ways to
interpret the phrase “and its matter”: either as a genuine conjunct, or as an
epexegesis.  If the former, then a first potentiality exists in a subject because the
subject is a member of a certain natural kind, and because its matter is such and
such.  If the latter, then the point is just that a subject has a first potentiality
because it is a member of a certain natural kind, and that natural kinds bear a kind
of similarity to matter.  In favor of the latter reading is the fact that Aristotle does
say, in at least three passages in the Metaphysics, that the kind is the matter of the
species, and in each case, the point of identifying kind with matter seems to be
metaphorical.15   At Metaphysics 1038a6-7, Aristotle seems to argue that genera
do not exist independently of species, just as matter does not exist independently
of form.  Likewise, at Metaphysics 1024b8-9, where he says that a genus is matter
in the sense of a “substratum … to which differentia or qualities belong,” he
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seems to be arguing that just as qualities are predicated of matter, differentiae are
predicated of genera.
Yet the examples used in these two instances can easily be read to refer to
matter as a particular substrate rather than as a universal one.  At Metaphysics
1024b8-9, Aristotle mentions genera “in the sense in which plane is the kind of
plane figures and solid of solids,” and following Mueller, it is possible to take
Aristotle to understand points, lines, surfaces and solids to be the intelligible
matter of particular geometrical objects, i.e., as a sort of indeterminate particular
substratum upon which the properties of individual geometrical objects are
imposed.16  Similarly, at Metaphysics 1038a6-7, “voiced sound” or csk©, which
is said to be the genus and matter of types of sounds, could be taken as the
universal substrate of these types, as at Metaphysics 998a20-5, or as their
particular substrate and what they are made of, as at Generation of Animals
786b21.
In the light of this, it seems that one could make the argument that
Aristotle refers indiscriminately to both universal and particular substrata when he
refers to “genus and matter,” and that what is meant at De anima 2.5 417a27 is
that a first potentiality exists in a subject because the subject is a member of a
certain natural kind, and because its matter is of a certain kind.  This is basically
the position taken by Philoponus and Simplicius,17 who interpret Aristotle to be
claiming that to have a first potentiality is to be a substratum, either particular or
universal, that is receptive to the relevant form or quality specified in the
potentiality.  What I take this to mean is that humans, for instance, are able to
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learn how to build houses because this is characteristic of them as a species,
which essentially means that their minds are of a sort that can receive a certain
formal content.  But equally, earth and “seed” are able to become the flesh and
bones of an animal, because they are capable of receiving the formal structure of
such an organism.  If one takes this reading of De anima 2.5 417a27, then what I
have called potentiality^, insofar as it represents the bare fitness to be endowed
with a form or quality, corresponds to first potentiality.
Now insofar as potentiality_ is the potentiality of a thing, once endowed
with a form, to perfect that form, it does resemble second potentiality, since
second potentiality is the potential, once endowed with the knowledge of
housebuilding, for instance, to make it actual by going out and building a house.
There is a problem, however, partly because in De anima 2.5, the focus is on the
housebuilder instead of on the house, and partly because in De anima 2.5, using
one’s skill to build a house (DA 417b9) is thought of as an example on all fours
with using one’s wisdom, and merely contemplating a bit of knowledge.  Like the
ability to contemplate the art of housebuilding, the ability to engage in the activity
of housebuilding is thought, in De anima 2.5, to be fulfilled instantaneously, as
soon as the activity commences.  But clearly, if potentiality_ were only the
potentiality of a thing to start perfecting a form that it is endowed with, it could
not order the phases of the process of perfecting this form.  So potentiality_ is not
the same as second potentiality.
To say that that the activity of housebuilding is achieved as soon as it
commences is to treat it as an †kùodbf^ in the sense in which †kùodbf^f are
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defined in contradistinction to hfk©pbft in Metaphysics book W chapter 6.  The
problem, however, is that housebuilding is adduced as an example of a h÷kepft in
Metaphysics book W  chapter 6 1048b29-31.  Metaphysics book W chapter 6
claims that an †kùodbf^ is characteristically complete, and the test of this is being
able to say, at the same time, where c-ing is the relevant activity, both that one is
c-ing and that one has c-ed.  Aristotle claims that everything that is moving has
moved in Physics 6.6, but the point made in Metaphysics book W chapter 6 is
different.  In Physics 6.6, Aristotle says this to make the point that in continuous
motion, there is no first moment of being away from an origin.  In Metaphysics
book W chapter 6, however, he is making the point that certain activities always
have the perfect verb tense because they always represent a complete
achievement.  One can say that one sees and, at the same time, has seen, or thinks,
and at the same time, has thought, because the activities of seeing and thinking are
achieved as soon as they commence.  But Metaphysics book W chapter 6 implies
that in the case of housebuilding, one cannot do the same because at the time
when one starts building, one has not finished building a house yet.
In De anima 2.5, however, Aristotle grants himself the license to speak
loosely:  “First, let us speak as though qÌ mápubfk, qÌ hfkbÿpv^f, and q Ì
†kbodbÿk are the same thing; for h÷kepft is a sort of †kùodbf^, although an
incomplete one, as has been said elsewhere” (DA 2.5 417a14-17).  Since h÷kepft
is a sort of †kùodbf^, in other words, we may speak as though qÌ hfkbÿpv^f is the
same as qÌ †kbodbÿk, when it is not.  Aristotle is telling us that, to achieve a
certain level of generality, we can, for the moment, ignore the distinction between
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agent and patient and the fact that a h÷kepft is incomplete.  This does no harm in
De anima 2.5 because, there, the focus is on the potentiality of the agent to build,
which is, in a sense, fulfilled as soon as he starts building.  But if we consider the
object of the housebuilding, i.e., the bricks that get built into a house, the
unachieved qùilt , and therefore, the incompleteness of the process of
housebuilding comes sharply into view, and this requires a further analysis.  That
further analysis, I believe, is found in Physics 3.1-3.
1.6.1 The further analysis
An influential interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of motion in Physics 3.1 is
that of L. A. Kosman.18  Kosman argues that Aristotle’s characterization of the
motion of housebuilding, for instance, as an incomplete actuality, or an actuality
that exists “qua potentiality,” viz., qua still potentially and not yet actually a
house, requires a distinction between differing degrees of potentiality much like
the distinction between first and second potentiality.  Kosman makes the
distinction between what he calls “potentiality1” and “potentiality2” as follows:
The potentiality1 of bricks to be a house is a double potentiality to be a house, or
the potentiality to be potentially a house.  The idea is that, when bricks are being
built into a house, or are part of some partially constructed house, their potential
to be a house is more actual than when they are lying in a heap on the ground.
Kosman expresses the etiolated sense of being potentially a house (when the
bricks are lying in a heap) by the notion of a double potentiality, so that what is
potentially potentially a house (i.e., what is “potentiality1” a house) is less actual
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than what is actually potentially a house.  What is actually potentially a house is
in motion toward being a house, but is not yet a house.  It is the “actuality of what
exists potentially” (viz., an incomplete actuality of an incomplete potentiality),
“qua existing potentially” (viz., qua still potentially and not yet actually a house).
It is what Kosman calls “potentially2” a house, to distinguish it from the double
potentiality of what is potentiality1 a house.  Finally, “potentiality2,” or the
actuality of what is potentially potentially a house, is also called an “actuality1” to
distinguish it from the actuality of what is actually actually a house (a fully
constructed house), viz., an “actuality2.”
Note that the first potentiality of being able to know how to build a house
is also a double potentiality, i.e., it is the potentiality to be a potential
housebuilder in the sense of someone who knows how to build houses and can go
out and do so, if nothing hinders him.  In fact, Kosman’s entire scheme of single
and double potentialities fits perfectly with the distinction of first and second
actuality:  The first actuality of knowing how to build a house is the actuality of
the double potentiality to be able to know how to build a house, and the actuality1,
of being in the process of becoming a house is the actuality of the double
potentiality to be able to be in motion toward househood.  And just as the second
potentiality of the knowledgeable housebuilder for the second actuality of
building a house is identical to the first actuality of being a knowledgeable
housebuilder, the potentiality2 of the bricks in the process of becoming a house for
the actuality2 of being a house, is identical to the actuality1 of being in the process
of becoming a house.  What this shows, I believe, is that, at a certain level of
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abstraction, Kosman’s scheme of single and double potentialities fits both the
phenomenon of motion and the acquisition and exercise of a disposition.  But, as
Kosman demonstrates, when we consider the substance of what Aristotle is
talking about in Physics 3.1-3 and De anima 2.5, i.e., when we start thinking
crpfh¬t instead of ildfh¬t,19 as Aristotle would say, we see that we cannot
identify potentiality1 with first potentiality and potentiality2 with second
potentiality.  The first thing Kosman points out is that the actualization of a first
potentiality will differ from the actualization of a potentiality1 in that the latter
will happen instantaneously while the former will take time.  This is because the
actualization of the ability to learn how to build is the process of learning how to
build, while the actualization of the potentiality1 of the bricks to be in motion
toward becoming a house is the inception of the process of building.20  The
problem is that in the scheme of De anima 2.5, the first actuality/second
potentiality is a disposition, e.g., the disposition, once one has learned
housebuilding, to build a house.  In Kosman’s interpretation of Physics 3.1,
however, the actuality1/potentiality2 is the state of being in motion.  Dispositions
and motions are disanalogous in the way that they come about (the one takes time;
the other does not).
Moreover, the second actuality of building needs, in any event, to be
identified with what Kosman calls the actuality1/potentiality2 of the bricks being
built.  This is because Aristotle claims in Physics 3.3 that the process of
housebuilding in the housebuilder is numerically identical, but different in
definition, to the process of being built into a house undergone by the bricks.
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This identification, I believe, is the key to understanding the relationship
between De anima 2.5 and Physics 3.1.  In De anima 2.5 Aristotle looks at
housebuilding from the point of view of the housebuilder, and from this vantage,
housebuilding is just an activity in which a knowledgeable housebuilder has the
potentiality to engage.  Hence, there is no need, in De anima 2.5, to worry about
the incompleteness of this activity, since the incompleteness is in the partially
built house.  When we get to Physics 3.1, however, the focus is on the house, and
so Aristotle gives us a further analysis of housebuilding, viz., an analysis which
emphasizes the fact that housebuilding and being built into a house have the
further goal of a completed house.  This further analysis is possible because the
activity of building is the same in substrate as the process of being built, though
different in definition.  So, there is no question of an identification of the
distinction between first potentiality and second potentiality in De anima 2.5 with
the distinction between potentiality1 and potentiality2.  The latter is a new
distinction intended to apply to processes, not to dispositions.
1.6.2 What about potentiality^ and potentiality_?
But what about my distinction between potentiality^ and potentiality_?  How does
it fit into all of this?  To answer this, let us turn away from housebuilding and
consider an example of a natural change.  To keep it simple, let us consider the
case of something becoming fire and then, qua fire, rising, which Aristotle
explicitly assimilates to the De anima 2.5 scheme of first and second potentiality
in Physics 8.4 255a30-b31.  After recounting this scheme using the example of
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the acquisition and exercise of knowledge, Aristotle goes on to say “In regard to
natural bodies also the case is similar. Thus what is cold is potentially hot: then a
change takes place and it is fire, and it burns, unless something prevents and
hinders it” (Phys. 8.4 255a5-7).  So the idea seems to be this:  just as a human has
the ability to know about housebuilding, a pile of kindling (“what is cold”) has the
ability to be fire (it is “potentially hot”).  Each of these are first potentialities.  The
first potentiality to be fire is actualized by the ignition of the kindling.  The first
potentiality to be a knower about housebuilding is actualized by the process of
learning how to build a house.  In the passage under consideration, Aristotle goes
on to the case of what is heavy being potentially light, but switches his example to
water becoming air.  Since this would equally apply to kindling becoming fire,
however, let us stick to Aristotle’s original example.  Aristotle implies that there
are two senses of being potentially light, viz., the first potentiality of the kindling,
which is heavy, yet can become light if it is turned into fire by being burned, and
a second potentiality of the fire which is still potentially light because it is
prevented from actualizing its lightness by some impediment.  So, the second
potentiality/first actuality disposition of knowing about housebuilding
corresponds to the second potentiality/first actuality disposition of being
potentially light, but being prevented from actualizing one’s lightness by some
impediment.
So far so good, but then Aristotle’s exposition becomes confusing.  Based
on De anima 2.5, he should say that the second actuality of the second
potentiality/first actuality disposition of being potentially light, in the sense of
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being prevented from actualizing one’s lightness by some impediment, is the
activity of rising.  Then, a further analysis of the activity of rising, in the manner
of Kosman’s interpretation of Physics 3.1, would show that rising involves the
further goal of “being high up.”  Instead, Aristotle confuses matters by saying
both that the second actuality of the second potentiality/first actuality disposition
of being light is “rising” (255b21) and that it is “being high up” (255b11).  Armed
with our analysis of housebuilding, however,  we can fill in the lacunae.  Just as
the bricks lying in a heap are potentially1 or potentially potentially a house, the
fire when prevented from rising is potentially1 or potentially potentially high up.
And just as the bricks in a house under construction are potentially2 or actually
potentially a house, the fire, as it is rising, is potentially2 or actually potentially
high up, where the rising is the actuality of the potentiality to be high up, qua still
potentially high up.  Finally, just as the bricks, when incorporated in a fully
constructed house are actually2 a house, the fire, when high up, is actually2 high
up.
Notice that by switching from the example of a transitive activity like
housebuilding to an intransitive activity like rising, not only is the second
actuality the same in substratum, yet different in definition, as
potentiality2/actuality1, but also the second potentiality/first actuality is the same
in substratum, but different in definition, as the potentiality1.  In housebuilding,
the knowledge of housebuilding (= second potentiality/first actuality) and the
suitability of the bricks for building (= potentiality1) were located in separate
subjects.  In the case of fire rising, however, the disposition to rise (= second
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potentiality/first actuality) and the potential to be rising (= potentiality1) are in the
same subject.  But it is the same thing to say that something has the disposition to
rise and the potential to be rising, and since these potentialities are in the same
subject, they are numerically identical as well.
Now the point of the distinction I found in Metaphysics 1048b37-1049a18
between potentiality^ and potentiality_ was to distinguish between the bare fitness
to be endowed with a nature (potentiality^) and the potentiality, once endowed
with a nature, to perfect it (potentiality_).  I said, above, that if one interprets
Aristotle to be claiming at De anima 2.5 417a27 that a thing has a first potentiality
because the subject is a member of a certain natural kind, and because its matter is
of a certain kind, one can identify first potentiality with potentiality^.  As for
potentiality_, since it applies to the tendency of a natural substance to move
toward a certain goal, while the tendency is both latent and active, potentiality_
would appear to incorporate the second potentiality and potentiality1 to rise as
well as the potentiality2, once rising, to be “high up.”
1.7 Caveats and exceptions
An exception to the generalization that the phases of all sublunary natural changes
are ordered by the asymmetric x is potentially_ y relation, perhaps, is the case of
an elemental transformation, such as when air changes to water, or vice versa.
We have already seen from Metaphysics 994a22-994b3 quoted above in Section
1.1, that elemental transformations are reversible.  But this just reflects the fact
that there is no nature common to air and water that is capable of guiding the
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transformation.  When transforming in this way, elemental bodies are, in a sense,
between natures, and thus have no single innate impulse of change.  What they
have throughout the transformation is a potentiality^, as matter, to bear properties
and be endowed with this or that elemental nature, but since matter can
indifferently bear any elemental nature, the relation x is potentially^ y is not
asymmetric.
Another possible exception is the case of an accidental confluence of the
changes of separate natural substances (for instance, one substance hindering or
altering another’s change).  It seems to me that each of the actions involved in the
confluence may be explained entirely in terms of individual teleologies.  When a
creditor and a debtor go to the market, for instance, and the creditor collects his
debt, both the creditor and the debtor intended to go shopping, and this is “cause
without qualification” of their actions (Phys. 2.5 197a8-15).  But the fact of the
confluence and its outcome, viz., the collection of the debt, has no cause, strictly
speaking, and can only be accounted for as a coincidence.  The problem, as I see
it, is that it must be a spatio-temporal coincidence, if anything, and one must
appeal to a temporal order to describe it.
The case of biological decay would seem to be another exception, since
this type of change obviously proceeds from a more perfect state to a less perfect
state, and it does not obviously have a goal.  But I think that biological decay can
be subsumed under accidental change.  The idea is that while this type of decay
might seem to be simple in nature, as just the falling apart of organized systems, it
is actually the compound of at least two teleological motions.  Take the
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progressive deterioration of a biological organism due to ageing, for instance.  In
this case, decay is merely the losing battle fought by the organizing life force of
the organism against the reassertion of the natural teleologies of its material body.
The old man stoops to the ground, for instance, because the downward-tending
earthy components of his body are overpowering the vital force exerted by his
muscles to keep him upright.  The case of non-biological decay is even easier to
accommodate.  Consider artifacts, for instance, like the temples of ancient Greece.
Once they were endowed with the form of a temple and stood upright.  But now
they lie on the ground in ruins because they were composed of stone — an earthy
material with a downward-tending drive, and a drive that meets with no active
opposition since, unlike the old man, a temple has no innate teleological impulse
to hold the stones in place.
1.7.1 The problem of celestial motion
A third, and probably more serious exception may be the case of celestial
motion.21  I have claimed that x is potentially_ y orders the phases of a natural
change in the sublunary realm according to the degree to which these phases
attain a qùilt.  A qùilt is a goal as well as a formal perfection, and insofar as
phases of a change fall short of a qùilt, they are formally incomplete and
imperfect.  But consider the circular motion of the heavens.  It is a natural motion,
because circular motion is the natural motion of the fifth element, of which the
celestial spheres are made (Cael. 269a5-7, b2-5, 272a5-7, 289a15-6).  Each of the
simple bodies, including the fifth element, has a nature, and, therefore, a motion
45
that is natural to it (Cael. 268b14-6, 269a8-9), and indeed, there is no movement
without natural bodies (Cael. 279a15-6).  The eternality of the celestial rotations,
in fact, depends on their being natural (Cael. 286a16-8).  But the natural motion
of the heavens, at first sight, does not seem to be teleological.  In Physics 8.9
Aristotle distinguishes the circular motion of the heavens from sublunary
rectilinear motion as follows:
In rectilinear motion we have a definite beginning, end (qùilt), and
middle which all have their place in it in such a way that there is a point
from which that which is in motion can be said to start and a point at
which it can be said to finish its course (for when anything is at the limits
of its course, whether at the whence (Úvbk) or at the whither (lÎ), it must
be in a state of rest). On the other hand a circular motion is unbounded.
(Phys. 265a29-32)
In De caelo 2.1, he says that the circular motion of the heavens has “no
beginning or end (qbibrq©k), but [is] unceasing through the infinity of time”
(Cael. 284a8-10), and in De caelo 2.6 he says that circular locomotion, having no
beginning or limit or middle simpliciter (ãmi¬t), has neither whence (Úvbk) nor
whither (l‡) nor middle: for in time it is eternal, and in length it returns upon itself
without a break” (Cael. 288a22-4).
This certainly seems like a denial that celestial motion is teleological,
which should disqualify the relation x is potentially_ y from ordering its phases,
and deprive Aristotle of the means to define the order of celestial motion in
abstraction from the order of time.  I could claim that Aristotle’s theory of the
order of change is essentially a theory of the order of sublunary change that just
fails to account for celestial motion, but since Aristotle claims that the order of
time is derived from the order of change without qualification, this would saddle
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Aristotle with a philosophical mistake.  And since my original intention was to
acquit Aristotle of such a mistake, albeit a different one, I would just be trading
one problem for another.  Indeed, this mistake of failing to account for the order
of celestial change might seem more serious, since, although celestial motions are
not explicitly invoked in Physics 4.11 where Aristotle derives the order of time
from the order of change, Aristotle does give them very critical roles in his overall
theory of time.  In Physics 4.14, he tells us that uniform circular motion is above
all the measure of motion because it is best known, and that it is the measure of all
other motions as well as time (Phys. 223b12-21).  We are also told, later in the
Physics, that celestial motion is the primary motion because it is the measure of
all motions, and it is the measure of all motions because it is the primary motion
(Phys. 265a13, b8-9).  Finally, at Generation and Corruption 337a22-33,
Aristotle seems to suggest that since only the circular motion of the heavens is
“continuous with itself” (i.e., the “in which” and the subject of change is eternally
constant), it alone can ensure the eternal continuity of time.
1.7.2 Is the natural motion of the heavens an †kùodbf^?
An obvious explanation for the apparent lack of teleology in the circular motion
of the heavens would seem to be that it is an activity (†kùodbf^) instead of a
process (h÷kepft), in the sense in which these two terms are distinguished in
Metaphysics book W chapter 6.  The criteria for †kùodbf^f laid out in Metaphysics
1048b18-36 make it clear that †kùodbf^f are not teleological in the sense that
hfk©pbft are, and celestial motions seem to meet a number of these criteria.  First,
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we are told that hfk©pbft have limits while †kùodbf^f have none.  And in Physics
8.9, we are told that rectilinear h÷kepft is bounded and has limits which are its
beginning and end but h÷kepft along a circumference is unbounded and has no
limits which are its beginning and end (Phys. 265a27-32).  Second, Metaphysics
book W chapter 6 tells us that actions which are ends in themselves, or in which
an end is present are †kùodbf^f, otherwise, they are hfk©pbft  (Metaph. 1048b18-
36).  If limits are to be identified with äou^÷ and qùie, as Physics 265a27-32
seems to suggest, then De caelo 2.1 seems to imply that celestial motions have no
äou^÷ or qùie, and themselves are äou^÷ and qùie, of other motions:
There is some immortal and divine thing which possesses movement, but
movement such as has no limit and is rather itself the limit of all other
movement. A limit is a thing which contains; and this motion, being
complete, contains those incomplete motions which have a limit and a
stopping point, having itself no beginning or end, but unceasing through
the infinity of time, and of other movements, to some the cause of their
beginning, to others offering the stopping point.” (Cael. 284a3-11)
Third, Metaphysics book W  chapter 6 tells us that since hfk©pbft have
limits while †kùodbf^f have none, hfk©pbft must cease while †kùodbf^f need not
(Metaph. 1048b26-7).  Physics 8.8 tells us that since circular celestial motion has
no limit, it is the only locomotion that need never cease (Phys. 265a10-12).
Fourth, Metaphysics book W  chapter 6 tells us that †kùodbf^f are complete
(qùibflt) while hfk©pbft are not.  Both the Physics and De caelo tell us that
circular locomotion is complete (qùibflt; Phys. 264b28, 265a17, Cael. 284a7).
Finally, Metaphysics book W chapter 6 tells us that if to c is an †kùodbf^, then
saying that something is c-ing must always be compatible with saying, at the
same time, that it has c -ed, where having c-ed represents a complete
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achievement.22  And Physics 8.9 implies that the circular motion of the heavens
always meets this test because a revolving celestial body is always “in its end” (†k
qùibf; Phys. 265a32-b1), i.e., at every point the celestial body "has completed" a
circuit.
Another sign that Aristotle takes circular motions of the heavens to be
†kùodbf^f seems to be that he uses the words †kbodb÷& and †kbodbÿk to describe
the way in which the celestial spheres and their motions exist, and that he denies
that they exist potentially.  At Metaphysics 1050b18, Aristotle says that
imperishable things exist †kbodb÷&, and then proceeds to say:
Nor does eternal movement, if there be such, exist potentially; and, if there
is an eternal mobile, it is not in motion in virtue of a potentiality, except in
respect of “somewhence” (mlvùk) and “somewhither” (ml÷) (there is
nothing to prevent its having matter which makes it capable of movement
in various directions). And so the sun and the stars and the whole heaven
always act (äb◊ †kbodbÿ), and there is no fear that they may sometime
stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they may. Nor do they tire in
this activity; for movement is not for them, as it is for perishable things,
connected with the potentiality for opposites, so that the continuity of the
movement should be laborious; for it is that kind of substance which is
matter and potency, not actuality, that causes this. (Metaph. 1050 b20-8)
1.7.3 Possible revision of the definition of “x is potentially_ y”
Note that in this last passage, Aristotle does not deny all potentiality to celestial
motion, but, rather, he claims that the “eternal mobile [is] not in motion in virtue
of a potentiality, except in respect of ‘somewhence’ and ‘somewhither’ (there is
nothing to prevent its having matter which makes it capable of movement in
various directions).”  A few lines before this passage, in fact, he says that “there is
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nothing to prevent [imperishable things] being [potentially existent] in some
respect, e.g. potentially of a certain quality or in a certain place” (Metaph.
1050b16-8).  At Metaphysics 1069b24-6, he says, “Now all things that change
have matter, but different matter; and of eternal things those which are not
generable but are movable in space have matter—not matter for generation,
however, but for motion in respect of ‘somewhence’ and ‘somewhither,’” and at
Metaphysics 1044b6-8, “But in the case of natural but eternal substances another
account must be given. For perhaps some have no matter, or not matter of this sort
but only such as can be moved in respect of place.” (cf. Metaph. 1042b5-6)
What is a potentiality for motion in respect of “somewhence” and
“somewhither?”  Since “somewhence” (mlvùk) and “somewhither” (ml÷) are the
indefinite forms of “whence” (Úvbk) and “whither” (l‡), which Aristotle uses to
refer to the termini of rectilinear movement (e.g., Cael. 288a22-4), perhaps it is
best to think of the potentiality to move in respect of “somewhence” and
“somewhither” as a potentiality to move non-teleologically, i.e., a potentiality for
merely moving in some unspecified direction or of being at unspecified different
places at different instants.  Perhaps this sort of potentiality — let us call it
“potentialityd” — can be used to define a new relation x is potentiallyd y, which
can order the phases of circular celestial motions.  In this case, we can rely on
Aristotle’s claim that “no potential relates to being in the past, but always to being
in the present or future” (Cael. 1.12 283b13-14), to secure the required
asymmetry.  There is, of course, a circularity here, if we define potentialityd in
terms of past, present, and future, but perhaps not a vicious circularity, if we can
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restrict the relation to hold only between phases that are sufficiently close in the
kinetic sequence.23  And one might even take the position that definitions, quite
generally, cannot avoid being circular in some ultimate sense, and that our
objective is just to avoid circularities that are obvious or vicious.
What, then, is the relationship between potentiality_ and potentialityd?  If
we identify first potentiality with potentiality^, and take potentiality_ to
incorporate second potentiality as well as Kosman’s potentiality1 and potentiality2,
as I suggested in Section 1.6, then potentiallyd will incorporate nothing like
potentiality^, but only part of what I call potentiality_.  Kindling, for instance, has
the first potentiality or potentiality^ to transform into fire, but the fifth element
does not have the potentiality to transform into any of the other elements.  So the
fifth element has no first potentiality or potentiality^.  Fire has the second
potentiality/first actuality disposition of being potentially light, when it is
prevented from actualizing its lightness by some impediment.  The actuality of
this disposition (i.e., its second actuality) is the activity of rising.  But the
potentiality of the fifth element to move “in respect of ‘somewhence’ and
‘somewhither’” is never impeded (Cael. 279a33-5), so it is not quite the same as
the second potentiality/first actuality disposition of being potentially light.
The activity of rising, in the case of fire, can be further analyzed in the
manner of Kosman’s interpretation of Physics 3.1, in terms of the goal of being
“high up” (viz., the fire when prevented from rising is potentially1 or potentially
potentially high up; the fire, as it is rising, is potentially2 or actually potentially
high up; the fire, when high up, is actually2 or actually actually high up).  But the
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movement of the fifth element “in respect of ‘somewhence’ and ‘somewhither’”
cannot be further analyzed in terms of the ultimate qùilt of being in a natural
place like “high up” because the fifth element, unlike fire, is already in its natural
place when it is moving, and, indeed, cannot change its place in this sense (Cael.
278b28-9).  Aristotle says that “the celestial sphere moves and rests in some way
(mst)+ for it continues to occupy the same place” (Phys. 265b1-2), so, perhaps,
the fifth element “rests in some way” in the same sense that fire rests when it
arrives “high up.”
So if potentiality_ refers, in the case of fire, to a second potentiality to
move in a certain way, as well as to a potentiality1, and a potentiality2 that defines
this movement in terms of the definite qùilt of being in a certain natural place,
the potentiality to move in respect of “somewhence” and “somewhither,” or
potentialityd, might be a stripped down version of potentiality_ consisting of a
second potentiality only, i.e., a second potentiality for an open ended †kùodbf^
similar to thinking or seeing, but which is and can only be uninterrupted,
unimpeded, and eternal, i.e., a potentiality for being at (unspecified) different
places at different instants.  If potentialityd is as I have just described it, then there
is no difference between the phases of a circular motion and no such thing as
being closer to some qùilt.  The revolving sphere is not potentiality_ at a qùilt.
It is always, rather, with full actuality exercising its potentiality for uninterrupted
activity.
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1.7.4 Or is the natural motion of the heavens a h÷kepft?
The notion of potentialityd, or the potentiality to move in respect of
“somewhence” and “somewhither,” may be useful in describing an order of
change in abstraction from the order of time, but we should be cautious about
concluding that the circular motion of the heavens is an †kùodbf^.  First of all
Aristotle’s use of the words †kùodbf^, †kbodbÿk , and h÷kepft  is at best
inconclusive, and at worst, seems to suggest that the circular motion of the
heavens is a h÷kepft instead of an †kùodbf^.
At Metaphysics 1050b18-22, we saw Aristotle saying that imperishable
things exist †kbodb÷& (b18), and that the sun and the stars and the whole heaven
äb◊ †kbodbÿ  (b22).  But then he goes right on to apply the same words to earth
and fire and their motions, which are clearly hfk©pbft, by saying:
Imperishable things are imitated by those that are involved in change, e.g.
earth and fire. For these also äb◊ †kbodbÿ; for they have their movement of
themselves and in themselves. But the other potencies, according to our
previous discussion, are all potencies for opposites. (Metaph. 1050b28-
32).
And we already saw in Section 1.6 that at De anima 417a16-7 and Physics
201b31 Aristotle says that h÷kepft is a sort of an †kùodbf^ (†kùodbfá qft),
although incomplete.  So the mere use of the words †kùodbf^ and †kbodbÿk is not
decisive.  Moreover, Aristotle calls celestial revolutions locomotions (clo^÷;
which are the paradigmatic sort of h÷kepft24) or hfk©pbft25 in Physics 4.5 and
throughout Physics book 8.  In fact, Aristotle calls the circular motions of the
heavens hfk©pbft, even while he is saying that they have no limits (Phys. 265a27-
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32), which would at least be odd if their lack of limits is intended to make them
†kùodbf^f in contradistinction to hfk©pbft.
Further doubt is cast on the status of celestial motions as †kùodbf^f by
several instances where Aristotle seems to implicitly classify them as hfk©pbft.
At Physics 223b13 and 265b8-9, Aristotle says that circular motion is the measure
of all motions.  But if it is to be the measure, it must be the same sort of thing of
which it is a measure.  As Aristotle says, “the measure is always of the same kind
(prddbkùt),” so the measure of hfk©pbft must be a h÷kepft (Metaph. 1053a24-
30).  In addition, we saw that actions which are ends in themselves, or in which an
end is present are †kùodbf^f, otherwise, they are hfk©pbft.  But at Physics
265b14-6, Aristotle tells us that circular locomotion (≠ h·hiø cloá) has no
beginning or qùilt in itself (†k ^‰q∂) but is determined from elsewhere (†hqÏt).
And finally, in Nicomachean Ethics 10.4 Aristotle distinguishes between hfk©pbft
and †kùodbf^f by claiming that the parts of hfk©pbft differ in kind from the whole
while the parts of †kùodbf^f do not.  “Differing in kind,” here, means having
different termini, and, in the case of parts of hfk©pbft, the difference amounts to a
formal incompleteness.  The example he gives for a h÷kepft is walking a
racecourse, where “the ‘somewhence’ and the ‘somewhither’ are not the same in
the whole course and in a part of it, nor in one part and in another” (EN 1174a32-
4).  Seeing, and feeling pleasure, on the other hand, are “at any moment
complete.”  Now a celestial revolution is “at any moment complete,” because at
every moment a celestial revolution has been completed, but one cannot divide up
a celestial revolution and still get complete revolutions.  So celestial revolution
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fails this test of being an †kùodbf^, and if Aristotle’s stroll on the racecourse is a
a÷^rilt, or a walk around the post and back, then it is directly analogous to a
celestial revolution.
The fact that the parts of celestial motions must “differ in kind” from the
whole can also be seen from the following:  We saw that celestial motion is
qùibflt (Phys. 264b28, 265a17, Cael. 284a7), which is consistent with its being
an †kùodbf^ instead of a h÷kepft (Metaph. 1048b22), and we saw that it meets the
test that “c-ing” is compatible with “has c-ed” (Metaph. 1048b23-36) because at
every point a star "has completed" a circuit.  But a star does not satisfy this
condition just by being at (unspecified) different places at different instants.  It
does this by satisfying the much stronger condition of, at every instant, “having
traversed” a circuit that terminates at the point that it happens to occupy on the
circumference, and it does this by having occupied a specific sequence of
positions along the circumference of the circle.  So while the circular motion of
the heavens does not move toward a normative completion of its nature, it is
wrong to think that it has no developmental structure or order.  At any rate, if
circular motion is the measure of other motions (Phys. 223b12-21, 265a13, b8-9),
it must have some internal structure to provide a basis for marking off units.  This
structure, of course, is the circuit, i.e., the procession of the celestial body from an
arbitrarily chosen point, around the circumference, and back to the same point.
By contrast, pleasure or seeing has no such internal development.
Finally, why settle for implicit classifications when an explicit
classification is at hand?  In Nicomachean Ethics 10.3, Aristotle distinguishes
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between hfk©pbft and †kùodbf^f by pointing out that quickness and slowness are
proper (lŸhbÿlk) to hfk©pbft, even if they are not h^v~ ^ÂqÏ, as in hfk©pbft of the
cosmos, whose quickness and slowness is relative to another (moÌt åiil; EN
1173a32-4).  The hfk©pbft of the cosmos are clearly adduced, here, as an example
of hfk©pbft in contradistinction to †kùodbf^f.
1.7.5 The teleology of celestial motion
And the issue of the (lack of) teleology of celestial motion is not as clear cut as
we have made it out to be either.  Recall that, in Aristotle’s view, circular
locomotion (≠ h·hiø cloá) has “no beginning or limit or middle simpliciter
(ãmi¬t)” (Cael. 288a22-4).  This “simpliciter” seems to leave the door open for
some qualified sense in which celestial motion is teleological, and indeed
Aristotle appears to make at least three unrelated attempts to introduce teleology
into celestial motion.  At De caelo 277a23-6, he says “Even in circular movement
there is a sort of opposition between the ends of the diameter, though the
movement as a whole has no contrary: so that here too the movement has in a
sense an opposed and finite qùilt.”  What this means, I believe, is that there is a
potential contrariety between points on a circle, insofar as, if an object moving
along a circumference were to start or stop, the chord connecting the starting and
stopping points would have contrary termini.  Then there is an obscure passage at
Physics 265b2-4, where Aristotle suggests that in the case of a rotating sphere,
“the center is alike a beginning, middle, and qùilt of the magnitude traversed.”
Since this point is not a point on the circumference, “there is no point at which
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that which is in process of locomotion can be in a state of rest as having traversed
its course, because in its locomotion it is proceeding always about a central point
and not to an extreme point” (Phys. 265b4-7).  Therefore the revolving sphere
“remains still, and the whole is in a sense always at rest and moves continually.”
Finally, there are passages that make the much more reasonable
suggestion that while there is no starting point or finishing point simpliciter in
eternal circular motion, every point is a starting point and a finishing point in a
way.  Aristotle says that “any one point as much as any other is alike a beginning,
middle, and a qùilt, so that we can say of certain things both that they are always
and never in their beginning and in their end (†k qùibf)” (Phys. 265a32-b2).  The
point seems to be that the potentiality for movement in respect of “somewhence”
and “somewhither” is a potentiality for returning to a place which is the same in
one sense but not the same in another.  The sense in which the place is the same is
given in the following series of passages: “That which is in motion from A will in
virtue of the same impulse (moÏvbpft) be simultaneously in motion to A (since it
is in motion to the point at which it will finally arrive)” (Phys. 264b10-12).
“Circular motion is motion of a thing from its place to its place, whereas
rectilinear motion is motion from its place to another place” (Phys. 264b18-9).
“In these [rectilinear] motions the beginning and the limit do not coincide,
whereas in motion over a circle they do coincide, and so this is the only perfect
motion” (Phys. 264b27-8).  “The body whose path is the circle starts (Æog^ql)
from the same place at which it finishes (qbibrqî)”  (Cael. 279b2-3).  On the
other hand, the sense in which the potentiality for movement in respect of
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“somewhence” and “somewhither” is a potentiality for returning to a place which
is different turns on the fact that the termini of circular motion are always †k
åiiø h^◊ åiiø (Phys. 264b19-27).  The point seems to be that celestial
revolutions always return to the same place, but there are many of these “same
places” to which they return, and each of these “same places” is at once the end of
a previous circuit, and the beginning of a succeeding one.
1.7.6 The order of celestial motion
1.7.6.1 Asymmetry
This, I believe, gives us an opening to claim that a teleological potentiality_
applies to celestial motion, and I intend, now, to offer an alternative to the option
of holding that celestial motion is ordered by something like potentialityd.  In
Section 1.7.4, I argued that the circular movement of the heavens, though it does
not move toward a normative completion of its nature, nevertheless has a
developmental structure or order, and now we can say that it is directed at a
qùilt of sorts.  Consider the following diagram of a star that is fixed upon the
celestial sphere, and that is revolving clockwise from position a to position b, then
from position b to position c, then on to position a:
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According to the analysis of the previous section, at any instant when the
star is at position a, it is at the goal of a previous circuit and at the beginning of a
succeeding one.  Since it has just completed a circuit, it is “at its goal” in the
sense that it has just realized a potentiality_ to reach position a by means of
passing through positions b and c in sequence.  But now it has the potentiality2 to
reach position a again by means of passing through positions b and c in sequence
again.  And it is clear that this “sequence” need not be a temporal one, since it is
determined, at least within a given circuit and assuming that the direction of
revolution is always clockwise, by the proximity to a goal.
The fact that the star starts out at position a and returns to position a does
not, in itself, imply a reversibility that would destroy the asymmetry of the x is
potentially_ y relation.    First of all, talking about a return to position a implies
the existence of numerically different but type-identical circuits of a circular
motion.  In order to distinguish types from tokens, let us say that the upper case
letters A, B, and C denote phase types of a circular motion, that the lower case




phase types, and that subscripts denote numerically different tokens of a given
phase type.  Thus, the sequence A1, B1, C1, A2, B2, C2, A3, B3, C3 … will be a
sequence of phase tokens that represents successive revolutions of the star.  Now
as long as the star revolves in a clockwise direction, for instance, it cannot reach
position a again without passing through positions b and c again in sequence, and
its phases will be in this sequence.  When the star is in phase A2, it has just
realized the potentiality_ it had to reach phase A2 when it was at phase A1, and
now it has a new potentiality_ to reach phase A3.  What becomes of the goal of
reaching phase A2 when the star moves from phase A1 to B1?  Nothing.  It is
merely joined by the goal of reaching phase B2, so that when the star is in phase
B1, it has the goals of reaching both phases A2 and B2.  And it cannot realize either
of these goals without first passing through phase C1.  What this means is that the
sequence of the phases C1 and A2 falls within two teleological motions, one from
phase A1 to phase A2, and one from phase B1 to phase B2, so that, in a sense, the
order of the phases C1 and A2 is overdetermined by the relation x is potentially_ y.
The relation x is potentially_ y holds between phases C1 and A2 because they fall
within teleological motions from phase A1 to phase A2, phase B1 to phase B2, and
phase C1 to phase C2.  In fact, since the positions along the circumference are
densely ordered, the order of any two phases within a single circuit is infinitely
overdetermined by the relation x is potentially_ y.
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1.7.6.2 Permanence of the asymmetry of celestial motion
1.7.6.2.1 Why there can be no direction reversals in circular celestial motion
In the foregoing account, the asymmetry of the relation x is potentially_ y
obviously depends on circular celestial motion being either consistently clockwise
or counter-clockwise.  The star, for instance, cannot go from position a to position
b, and then turn around and go back to position a without first passing through
position c.  Although there are some inconsistencies in Aristotle’s account, I
believe that, in the final analysis, Aristotle does not allow this to happen.  The
difficulty is with De caelo 1.4 (271a19-33), which argues that clockwise and
counter-clockwise motions around the same circumference are not contrary
because contrary locomotions (clo^÷) must have contrary termini, and both
motions have the same terminus, viz., a, as both a beginning and an end.  This
conclusion, which is repeated at De caelo 277a23, and 286a3, would seem to
imply that either counter-clockwise and clockwise motion could be natural to any
particular rotating sphere, and if this is the case, there seems to be no reason why
a celestial sphere should rotate in only one direction.  But Aristotle appears to
contradict himself at Physics 262a8-12, where he says that a (clockwise) h÷kepft
along a circumference from position a to and through position b to position a is
contrary (†k^kq÷^) to a (counter-clockwise) h÷kepft from position a to and
through position c to position a because “even if they are continuous and there is
no reversal (äkáh^j`ft) they arrest each other, because contraries annihilate or
obstruct one another.”  At Physics 264b13-7, Aristotle makes the potentially
useful distinction that clockwise and counter-clockwise motions are opposite
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(äkqfhbfjùke) but not contrary (†k^kq÷^), but he fails to make any further use of
it.
The key to this puzzle, I believe, is the fact that if the star goes from
position a to position b, and goes back to position a without first passing through
position c, it must perform a direction reversal or an äkáh^j`ft.  Aristotle tells
us at Physics 262a12-7 that, if there is an äkáh^j`ft, then a motion cannot be in
a circle (h·hiø cùobpv^f), but merely along the path of a circle (h·hilk
cùobpv^f).  The difference between h·hiø cùobpv^f and h·hilk cùobpv^f,
respectively, is the distinction between genuinely circular motion, and what is
essentially rectilinear motion.  In De caelo 1.4, any motion along an arc segment
is not only treated as a non-circular motion, but it is even assimilated to rectilinear
motion since “we invariably regard the distance between two points as the length
of the straight line which joins them” (271a12).  Therefore, if a star moves from
position a to position b, and then turns around at b and goes back to position a
without first passing through position c, it will have performed, in essence, two
contrary rectilinear motions: one from a to b, and one from b to a.  And if this is
the case, the star will have come to a stand at b (cf. Phys. 262b22-263a3), and the
motion will be discontinuous (cf. Phys. 264b23-6).  An äkáh^j`ft, then,
converts a circular motion into a rectilinear motion, and the result is a loss of
continuity.  But circular motion (≠ h·hiø h÷kepft) is infinite, single, and
continuous (Phys. 261b27-8, 265a27-8), and it is the only motion that is
[infinitely] continuous (Phys. 265a7-9).  So in order for circular motion to be
circular motion, there can be no äkáh^j`ft.
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If it is an essential feature of the circular motion of the heavens to be
continuous, then it cannot change direction.  It never has changed direction, nor
could it ever in the future.  In fact, according to De caelo 1.10 and 1.12, it is a
general principle that if something has always been a certain way, it can never fail
to be that same way in the future, because if it had the potentiality to be other than
it is for an infinite stretch of past time, it would have already manifested this
potentiality at some point (this is often called the “principle of plenitude,” see
Cael. 279b21-3, 281b18-24).
1.7.6.2.2 Why have the heavens always revolved in one direction instead of
always revolving in the other?
Now this tells us why a celestial sphere cannot start spinning counter-clockwise if
it has always spun clockwise, but it does not answer the question of why it was
always spinning clockwise in the first place.  Aristotle’s answer, which he gives
in De caelo 2.5, is that one direction is somehow better than the other.  This
chapter, I believe, is worth quoting in its entirety:
Now there are two ways of moving along a circle, from a to b or from a to
c, and we have already explained that these movements are not contrary to
one another. But nothing which concerns the eternal can be a matter of
chance or spontaneity, and the heaven and its circular motion are eternal.
We must therefore ask why this motion takes one direction and not the
other. Either this is itself an ultimate fact or there is an ultimate fact
behind it. It may seem evidence of excessive folly or excessive zeal to try
to provide an explanation of some things, or of everything, admitting no
exception. The criticism, however, is not always just: one should first
consider what reason there is for speaking, and also what kind of certainty
is looked for, whether human merely or of a more cogent kind. When any
one shall succeed in finding proofs of greater precision, gratitude will be
due to him for the discovery, but at present we must be content with a
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probable solution. IF nature always follows the best course possible, and,
just as upward movement is the superior form of rectilinear movement,
since the upper region is more divine than the lower, so forward
movement is superior to backward, THEN front and back exhibits, like
right and left, as we said before and as the difficulty just stated itself
suggests, the distinction of prior and posterior, which provides a reason
and so solves our difficulty.26 Supposing that nature is ordered in the best
way possible, this may stand as the reason of the fact mentioned. For it is
best to move with a movement simple and unceasing, and, further, in the
superior of two possible directions.” (Cael. 287b22-288a12)
What Aristotle is doing, here, I believe, is restoring the normative aspect
to the order of circular celestial motion.  Recall that sublunary substances move
toward the normative goal of completing or perfecting their nature.  The heavenly
spheres do not do this, because they are already perfect.  But the heavenly spheres
move nonetheless, and the puzzle is, if every spot on the circumference is as good
as the other, why should a sphere move at all, or if it moves, why should it move
in one direction rather than another?  The answer is that what the heavenly
spheres do to manifest their perfection is more complex than just being at
different places at every instant, and there is a positive value to this ordered
complexity, i.e., the fact that the celestial spheres move in precisely the ordered
way that they do allows their motion to be the measure of all other motions and
enables them to supply the continuity of time.  Indeed, the fact that the heavens
rotate in one direction rather than another enables Aristotle to claim that there is a
permanent orientation to the universe in terms of right, left, front and back (Cael.
2.2).  If celestial motion has such a normative order, then it would appear that a
teleological potentiality_ applies to it after all, with the result that the order of
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celestial change, as well as the order of sublunary change, can be specified in
abstraction from the order of time.
2.0 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ORDERS OF PLACE, CHANGE AND
TIME
2.1 Aristotle’s derivation of the kinetic order from the spatial order
I have argued that the order of the prior and posterior in change is determined by
the goal-directed character of natural substances, combined with either certain
aspects of the substance’s form, or aspects of the medium in which the change
takes place.  The discussion of the prior and posterior in change in Physics book 4
chapter 11 focuses on an example of the last sort of case, i.e., locomotion.  In
locomotion, while the destination may be determined by the intentions or nature
of the substance that is changing, the order of the stages of the change is
determined by the structure of the spatial magnitude traversed.  In fact, in the case
of locomotion, the order of the change is precisely determined by the “following”
relation, which appears to be a one-one mapping from “the prior and posterior in
place” onto “the prior and posterior in change”:
But what is moved is moved from something to something, and all
magnitude is continuous. Therefore the change follows (ählilrvbÿ) the
magnitude. … The distinction of “prior” and “posterior” holds primarily,
then, in place; and there in virtue of relative position. Since then “prior”
and “posterior” hold in magnitude, they must hold also in motion, these
corresponding to those. (Phys. 219a10-9)
At Metaphysics 1018b9-29, the prior and posterior in place is defined
relative to “some place which is either naturally determined as a starting point,
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e.g., the middle or the end, or simply happens to function in this way.”  The
obvious relativity or conventionality of this “prior and posterior” has troubled
some commentators.  Hussey, for instance, claims that the prior and posterior in
place can only be specified relative to some motion, and, therefore, can only be
derived by arguing back from the prior and posterior in change, which is, by
assumption, supposed to be derived from the prior and posterior in place.27  But
this circularity is only apparent, because, for Aristotle, both the prior and posterior
in place and the prior and posterior in change are derived from substance.  Each
substance, at each phase of a motion, has a prior and posterior in place for it that
is determined by its own goal and innate impulse toward that goal.  Thus, while
there is no single prior and posterior in place that exists for all substances, it is
still true to say of each substance, at each phase of any of its changes, that a prior
and posterior in change exists for it.  Thus, the prior and posterior in place for
Zeno’s runner, for instance, is simply the ordered sequence of positions along the
racecourse that is determined by his intention to run the race.  His prior and
posterior in change, in turn, is the sequence of the run’s phases, viz., runner-at-
position-n (n = 1, 2, 3, …), each representing the incomplete actuality of the
potentiality_ of the runner to finish the race.  Thus, the prior and posterior in place
need not be intrinsic to the place in advance of any change.  Since places are
defined relative to substances, and substances are what they are by having a
nature, that is, an innate principle of change and rest, then both the prior and
posterior in place and the prior and posterior in change can be derived non-
circularly from substance as a common source.  Thus, the sense in which a place
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is prior and posterior is relativized to substances, but this in no way results in a
vicious circularity in the derivation of the prior and posterior in change from the
prior and posterior in place.
Aristotle not only relativizes time and space to substances; he relativizes
the physical laws that govern time and space to them as well.  For Aristotle, the
world’s intelligibility is not located in a four-dimensional space-time and the
mechanical laws that govern it, but rather, in the specific natures of all of the
individual substances that happen to exist in  it.  It has been pointed out that the
loss of abstract generality that this position entails, proved to be a block, for
Aristotle (and many who followed him, including Galileo), in hitting upon the
concept of inertia, since inertia, as we conceive it locates kinetic efficacy in
common properties of substances rather than in the substances themselves.  Plato,
in fact, is closer to the modern view in his search for universal common elements
and principles (e.g., not only the Forms, but also principles like dùkbpft, as
described in the Timaeus, which Aristotle seems to deny when he says that “there
is no such thing as motion over and above the things” at Physics 200b32-3), and,
no doubt, there is an element of anti-Platonism at the root of Aristotle’s approach.
2.2 Aristotle’s derivation of the temporal order from the kinetic order
The passage just quoted continues as follows, claiming that a “following” relation
precisely determines the order of time as well, by mapping “the prior and
posterior in change” one-one and onto the prior and posterior in time:
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The distinction of “prior” and “posterior” holds primarily, then, in place;
and there in virtue of relative position. Since then “prior” and “posterior”
hold in magnitude, they must hold also in motion, these corresponding to
those.  But also in time the distinction of “prior” and “posterior” must
hold, for time and movement always correspond with each other. (Phys.
219a14-9)
A few lines later, Aristotle reiterates, summarizing the relationships
between the orders of place, change, and time: “Change, as was said, follows
magnitude, and time, as we maintain, follows change” (Phys. 219b15-6).  In these
passages, Aristotle seems to envisage three inter-related orders or relational
systems — the order of place, the order of change, and the order of time —, each
consisting of a domain and a relation.  Each order has the same relation, i.e., x is
prior to y (or equivalently, y is posterior to x), but a different domain.  In the order
of place, x is prior to y orders places, in the order of change, it orders kinetic
phases, and in the order of time it orders “nows.”  Moreover, x is prior to y holds
of places primarily, and members of the other domains secondarily, or, to be
exact, the holding of x is prior to y of nows depends on its holding of kinetic
phases, and the holding of the same relation of kinetic phases depends on its
holding of places.
The holding of x is prior to y of a run’s phases, for instance, depends on its
holding of positions along a racecourse.  One can see why Aristotle might think
this, if place specifications are embedded in the definitions of kinetic phases,
since, in his view, for x to have y embedded in its definition is for x  to be
dependent on y for its existence.  In the sense of definitional dependence, then,
one can say that just as the existence of the cultured man depends on the existence
of the man, so the existence of the state of affairs being-at-place-x depends on the
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existence of place-x.  And since the existence of the kinetic relata related by x is
prior to y depends on the existence of spatial relata that are related by the same
relation, the holding of the relation x is prior to y between kinetic relata depends
on its holding between spatial relata.28
It is less clear why Aristotle might think that the holding of x is prior to y
for times depends on its holding of kinetic phases.  It seems to me, however, that
a clue might be found in Physics 219b25 and 28, where Aristotle says that the
now exists “insofar as the prior and posterior [in change] is countable.”  “Insofar
as” translates the Greek relative adverb æ, and may be glossed as “in such
measure or degree as,” or “to such extent that.”  But it seems equally possible to
gloss “x exists insofar as y is F” as “the existence of x depends on y being F.”  If
we take the phrase “the prior and posterior in change” to denote the class of
kinetic phases that are ordered by the relation x is prior to y, and “the now” to
denote the class of instants ordered by the same relation, Physics 219b25 and 28
could be saying that each now is such that its existence depends on some kinetic
phase being countable, or equivalently, on the existence of some countable kinetic
phase.  So just as the existence of the state of affairs “being-in-the-Agora”
depends on the existence of “the Agora,” so the existence of the now at which
Coriscus is in the Agora depends on the countability of the state of affairs “being-
in-the-Agora” (or the existence of the countable state of affairs “being-in-the-
Agora”).29  And since the existence of the temporal relata related by x is prior to y
depends on the existence of kinetic relata that are related by the same relation, the
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holding of the relation x is prior to y between temporal relata depends on its
holding between kinetic relata.
That the existence of the now depends on the countability of kinetic
phases should come as no surprise, since Aristotle defines time as “the number of
motion in respect of ‘prior’ and ‘posterior,’” since Aristotle thinks of number as
something essentially countable (Phys. 206a3-5, Metaph. 1020a7-32; 1057a2-4),
and since it is clear that the focus is on counting nows in Physics 4.11, where he
defines time.  What Aristotle thinks it means to be countable is clear enough from
Metaphysics 10, which discusses the “one” and its relation to number and
counting.  A thing’s countability would appear to be its unity qua an instance of
some sortal concept, which allows it to be taken as a member of a plurality of
units.  A horse, for instance, is countable qua a member of a plurality of horses
because of the unity of its substantial form.  Likewise, a kinetic phase is countable
qua a member of a plurality of kinetic phases because of its unity as a state of
affairs.  But it is still somewhat mysterious how, precisely, each kinetic phase that
is prior and posterior in change gets mapped to each now that is prior and
posterior in time.30
Hussey offers a possible answer, in the form of an interpretative gloss of
Physics 219b25 and 28: “the now is the prior and posterior [in change] considered
as countable” (my italics).  The difference between my more literal reading of this
sentence and Hussey’s gloss amounts to the difference between the following two
claims:  (a) every now depends for its existence on the countability of some
kinetic phase (my translation) and (b) every kinetic phase is such that it is a now if
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and only if it is countable (Hussey’s gloss).  Now if “b,” or Hussey’s gloss, is
Aristotle’s meaning, which seems possible but not mandatory, then the domain of
nows and the domain of instantaneous kinetic phases are what Aristotle would
call “identical in substratum but different in definition,” since “nows,” on this
view, just are kinetic phases under a different description.  And if this is the case,
then the kinetic order is the temporal order, because the spatial, temporal and
kinetic orders, ex hypothesi, only differ in their domains.
2.2.1 A modern objection
The idea that the order of time should reduce conceptually to the order of change
can also be found in some more recent theories of the temporal order of a
reductionist stripe.  And, in fact, the position of some of these theories, that the
relation x is later than y reduces to the relation x is a more entropic state than y
bears a striking similarity to my interpretation of Aristotle on Hussey’s gloss of
Physics 219b25 and 28, since, on this view, the temporal order is the kinetic
order, and the relation x is prior to y, when applied to kinetic relata, essentially
reduces to the relation x is potentially_ y.
There is a common objection to this sort of reductionism, however, which
Lawrence Sklar puts in the form of an analogy:  Suppose we sought to define our
concepts of left and right in terms of an apparently lawlike asymmetry in the
spatial orientation of certain physical systems, like the preferential axial direction
of electron emissions from spinning nuclei.  Then suppose that these processes
should miraculously reverse direction, violating what we had previously taken to
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be a natural law.  Sklar then asks, “Would we then say that the clockwise
direction had become the counter-clockwise? That right-handed gloves had
suddenly become left-handed?”  His reply:
Nothing of the sort. We would indeed be astonished and look desperately
for some explanation of this mirror reversal of a law.  But we would, I
believe, still take it that we could recognize left- and right-handed objects
as before, teach the meanings of orientation terms by ostension, as before,
etc.31
Suppose then, that the tendency of entropic processes to evolve from more
to less ordered states reverses, and also that men begin developing into boys.
Would we say, as a result of this, that the time order has reversed?  Most of us
would not, but since the modern time order reductionist defines the time order in
terms of an entropy gradient, he would have to say that it has, as would Aristotle,
if we assume that Hussey’s gloss of Physics 219b25 and 28 is correct, and he
thinks that the temporal and kinetic orders are the same.  And, indeed, this would
also be the case if we rejected Hussey’s gloss and assumed that Aristotle kept the
temporal and kinetic orders distinct, since a one-one mapping from kinetic phases
onto nows would tie the elements of the two domains together as well as the
identity relation would.
Does this result, then, render the very project of reducing the temporal
order to some non-temporal order prima facie absurd?  Not automatically.  Inter-
theoretic reduction is perfectly respectable when we identify light waves with
electromagnetic waves, and heat with mean molecular kinetic energy, or when we
claim that the essence of water is expressed by the formula “H20.”  Reduction in
each of these cases takes phenomena that were originally thought to be primitive,
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gives them a more articulated conceptual structure, and places them within a
richer theoretical context.  And by being able to claim that what we had known all
along as heat was actually identical to mean molecular kinetic energy, or that
“H20” expresses the essence of what we had known all along as water, we are able
to inoculate ourselves against counter-factual objections in which these identities
or essences do not hold, like Sklar’s counter-example to the anisotropy of space.
This is because, as Kripke has argued,32 if the relation of identity holds, then it
holds necessarily, and likewise, if the essence of water is expressed by the
formula “H20,” then it has this essence in every possible world in which it exists.
One might suppose, then, that any project of reducing the temporal order
to some non-temporal order succeeds to the degree to which one can assimilate
this reduction to one of the more respectable cases just mentioned.  And this, in
turn, depends on whether we can plausibly say that what we had known all along
as the temporal order was actually identical to, or had its essence expressed by
some non-temporal order.  The plausibility of saying, for instance, that what we
have known all along as heat (i.e., the property of physical objects able to cause
increases in temperature, etc.) was actually identical to the motion of molecules,
is helped by the fact that heat is never found in the absence of molecular motion
and vice versa.  The case, however, for identifying the relation x is later than y
with x is a more entropic state than y is not helped by the fact that the relationship
between the order of entropy and the order of time is statistical and not lawlike.
Although we rarely see an isolated system evolve from a less to a more ordered
state, statistical mechanics does not rule this out, and even holds that it is highly
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probable that there are quite large regions of space-time with their levels of
entropy trending in opposite directions.  It seems unsatisfactory, in the face of
this, to try to save the data by claiming that what we have traditionally referred to
as the “past” and “future” is not globally consistent.
While a circumstance like this would appear to refute the claim that the
temporal order reduces to the order of entropic processes, however, I do not think
that Aristotle’s theory would meet with the same fate.  To see this, consider what
would need to be true if Aristotle’s theory is to be falsified.  Stated generally, we
would need a case where a and b are particular phases of a change of a natural
substance, and where b is potentially_ a, and a is earlier than b.33  Let us first try
to imagine the limiting case, where all processes (including recognitional
processes) reversed their temporal order, that is, suppose that the converse of x is
potentially_ y held for all of the phases of every process in the universe while x is
earlier than y continues to hold.  It seems to me that this state of affairs would be
epistemically indistinguishable from the state of affairs in which the original
relation held.  This is because, if the relation x is potentially_ y is the basis for
every kinetic ordering, as I have argued that it is in Aristotle’s system, it will also
govern all of the perceived asymmetries that mark out the future from the past.  In
this circumstance, our knowledge of the future would become as certain and as
copious as our current knowledge of the past and our knowledge of the past would
become as uncertain and as sparse as our current knowledge of the future.  This is
because the contingency of potential events is the basis for Aristotle’s argument
for an open future and a necessary past in De interpretatione 9.34  In this scenario,
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the causal and explanatory orders would reverse as well, since in Aristotle’s view,
the fact that a was potentially_ b is the cause and explanation of why what was
once a is now b.
Finally, if the epistemic and causal asymmetries were reversed, it is clear
that we would care more about what happened in the past than what will happen
in the future, and would act for the sake of the past instead of the future.  In such a
circumstance, trying to bring about favorable future outcomes would seem just as
irrational as trying to bring about favorable past outcomes under a normal
circumstance because the future would be just as fixed and epistemically
accessible as the past is in the normal circumstance.  What I infer from all of this
is that the limiting case where all processes reverse their temporal order differs
from our current situation only insofar as the names “future” and “past” have
switched their references.
But what about cases other than the limiting case just mentioned, where
the converse of the relation x is potentially_ y held for only some substances while
the relation x is earlier than y continued to hold universally?  Suppose, for
instance, that men begin developing into boys.  But in such a case, since it is in
the essential nature of boys to develop into men and not vice versa, then we are no
longer talking about boys and men.  So men are not developing into boys after all.
If the essence of a thing is defined in terms of characteristic developmental and
behavioral potentialities, then it will exhibit these potentialities in every possible
world in which it exists.  If every thing in the world has such an essence, then
nothing could feature in a counter-example to the claim that the relation x is
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potentially_ y either expresses the essence of the relation x is earlier than y or is to
be identified with it.
Aristotle’s theory is immune, then, from counter-examples of the sort
suggested by Sklar, while the thermodynamic theory of the temporal order is not,
but this immunity comes at a price.  The price is that, when compared with the
thermodynamic theory of the temporal order, Aristotle’s theory ends up looking
decidedly unempirical.  It was an empirical discovery that isolated systems tend to
evolve from more to less ordered states.  It was also an empirical discovery that
boys tend to develop into men.  But it cannot have been an empirical discovery
that it is part of the essence of boys to do this.  Since Aristotle defines the essence
of boys in terms of their position in a normative developmental order, it should
not surprise us that they cannot possibly appear in that order anywhere else but in
their proper position.  By contrast, there is nothing in the definition of entropy that
requires less ordered states to follow more ordered states, and if this did not occur,
we would not be tempted to say that entropy is no longer entropy.  Aristotle
knows a priori that men cannot develop into boys because he has essentially
stipulated it, and this buys him immunity from counter examples, but it also
means that his theory is not testable, falsifiable, or refutable.  And if we accept
Popper’s criterion that a scientific theory is one that makes risky predictions, then
I suppose we would have to say that Aristotle’s theory is unscientific.
On the positive, side, however, Aristotle’s theory does secure a benefit
that we typically look for in an inter-theoretic reduction.  Paradigm cases of inter-
theoretic reduction, like the identification of light waves with electromagnetic
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waves, and heat with mean molecular kinetic energy, take phenomena that were
originally thought to be primitive, give them a more articulated conceptual
structure, and place them within a richer theoretical context.  By taking the
temporal order and reducing it to another type of order for which he already has a
theoretical account, Aristotle takes something that would otherwise be thought of
as an irreducibly basic and primitive fact of nature, and converts it into something
that is explicable in terms of his theories of change, act, and potency.  And this, in
turn, gives him the resources to give a unified explanation of a host of other
temporal asymmetries, like the epistemic difference between the past and the
future.  In sum, Aristotle’s reduction of the order of time to the order of change
achieves his objectives admirably, just not in a way that we would call
“scientific.”
3.0 THE KINETIC CONTINUUM
Waterlow correctly notes that the account of the kinetic order in Physics book 3
does not require the prior and posterior in change to be a dense order, i.e., an
order such that between every two distinct phases of a change there is another
phase.35  Nonetheless, Aristotle claims that the prior and posterior in each of the
four kinds of genuine change, i.e., change of quality, place, or size, and generation
and destruction, have this property.
Denseness, here, is thought of in terms of infinite divisibility.  A motion or
a magnitude is infinitely divisible insofar as the (potential) points at which it is
divisible are densely ordered, i.e., insofar as between any two points on a body
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and any two phases of a change, there is another (potential) point or phase at
which the body or motion could be divided.  Since Aristotle insists that both
motions and magnitudes are infinitely divisible, he implies that the prior and
posterior in place and the prior and posterior in change are dense orders (Physics
6.6 237a17-b3; b9-21).
It is clear from Aristotle’s discussions of these four kinds of change
(change of quality, change of place, change of size, and generation and
destruction), that each of them ultimately derives its infinite divisibility, and
therefore, the dense ordering of its phases, from the infinite divisibility of
magnitude.  In changes between contradictory states which admit no tertium quid,
the infinite divisibility of the change is borrowed from the infinite divisibility of
magnitude.36  For instance, if a body is coming into existence (a change which
admits no tertium quid), Aristotle claims that it must come into existence
piecemeal, and piecemeal according to an infinitely divisible process of addition
(Physics 6.4 234b10-20, 240a19-29, 237b10).  In changes between contrary states
such as colors and tastes, which admit tertia quae, but not infinitely many of them
(De sensu 445b21-9; 446a16-20), infinite divisibility appears to be derived
indirectly from the infinite possibilities for dividing up the proportions of earth,
air, fire, and water in the changing thing.37  Finally, in cases of change of place
and change of size, since the media in which the changes take place are infinitely
divisible, Aristotle argues that the law of non-contradiction requires an infinite
number of tertia quae between any two termini (Phys. 237a17-28).
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The dense ordering of the phases in a change of place also follows from
the fact that change “follows” magnitude, i.e., that “the prior and posterior in
place” may be mapped onto “the prior and posterior in change.”  Aristotle claims
that we may also infer, based on this mapping, from the continuity of magnitude
to the continuity of change (Phys. 219a12-3).  Normally, we think of denseness as
something distinct from continuity, but Aristotle conceives of continuity in such a
way as to make it equivalent to infinite divisibility, and, therefore to denseness.
At Physics 5.3 226b21-227a15, Aristotle defines continuous magnitudes as things
having parts whose description could only be satisfied by other continuous
magnitudes, i.e., they must have distinct boundaries that coincide with boundaries
of other parts that succeed and precede them.  But if a continuous magnitude is
just a thing that has parts that are also continuous magnitudes, albeit situated in a
certain way, this is just to say that being continuous is being infinitely divisible.
Hence, continuity, for Aristotle, is an irreducibly geometrical concept.  On
Aristotle’s view, a continuous magnitude is an entity that has points but is not
composed of them.  Moreover, the relationship between a continuum and a point
is not one of set membership (Phys. 239b5-9, 30-33, GC 316a25-34, b14-16,
320b14-16).  Rather, it is a relation of substrate to property or accident (Phys.
220a22).  A punctual state of affairs is either a bound or a potential bound of a
kinetic continuum, and, as such, it is a property of that continuum, rather than a
constitutive part of it.  Thus, at Physics 219a19-21, Aristotle says that “The prior
and posterior in change is, in respect of its substrate38 change; but its being is
different and is not change.”  “Change,” here, refers to the kinetic continuum, and
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the prior and posterior in change, i.e., the punctual phases of this continuum that
are prior and posterior, are accidents of it.
But given that the prior and posterior in change is a dense linear order, and
indeed, that a distance between any two elements in the order is to be thought of
on the analogy of an infinitely divisible geometrical line, how do we interpret this
distance as anything other than a stretch of time?  It is clear that this distance
cannot be a spatial distance.  Aristotle implies that while the order of prior and
posterior is primarily spatial, it is transposed into the kinetic order by becoming
the order not simply of places, but of states of affairs containing places.  So what
are ordered in the kinetic sequence are categorically different from what are
ordered in the spatial sequence, i.e., states of affairs in the first sequence and
places in the second, and because of this, the distance between things that are
ordered by the prior and posterior in change cannot be simply a spatial distance.
This becomes quite clear when we consider that kinetic distance must also be a
distance between qualities and quantities, as well as between places (Phys.
223a29-b1).  So what else can the distance between two states of affairs be but a
stretch of time?
3.1 A modal interpretation of the kinetic continuum
But perhaps the concept of potentiality_ that I used to order the phases of a change
can also be used to interpret the status of those phases.  The relation x  is
potentially_ y not only relates the phases of a change (i.e., things like Socrates-as-
a-boy and Socrates-as-a-man), but, assuming that there is an underlying, enduring
80
individual (viz., Socrates), it also relates possible states of affairs involving this
individual.  It is natural to think of a phase of a motion as a possible state of
affairs, and we often speak of possible states of affairs in the semantics of modal
logic.  And significantly, if we think of the phases of a change as possible states
of affairs, it is unnecessary to assign them time references.  With this advantage in
view, I propose that with some minor adjustments, the actualist interpretation of
possible worlds semantics developed by Alvin Plantinga can be used to sketch a
modal interpretation of Aristotle’s kinetic continuum, that is, as a densely ordered
sequence of possible states of affairs.
Specifically, I propose that the kinetic continuum is a continuum of
possibilities_ and actualities of states of affairs, and that what are prior and
posterior in motion are distinguished from what are prior and posterior in place,
by being neither places simpliciter, nor even states of affairs simpliciter, but by
being realized and unrealized possibilities_ of occupying certain places.  The
realized possibilities_ form the history of a change, while the ones to be realized
are its “intended” trajectory, i.e., “intended” by the nature of the changing
substance (including any of its conscious or unconscious goals), combined with
the structure of the medium to be traversed.
3.1.1 States of affairs
Aristotle, of course, does not speak of “states of affairs” and “possible worlds,”
but I think that the basis for these notions is present in Aristotle, even if they are
not worked out in comparable detail.  Let us consider, first, states of affairs.
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Plantinga takes states of affairs to be abstract entities, like universals, which,
instead of either being exemplified or not, either obtain or fail to obtain.  On the
modern view, a state of affairs is a structured complex that consists of at least one
particular, at least one universal (i.e., a property, kind, or relation), and one or
more exemplification relation between the particular(s) and the universal(s).  That
a state of affairs is a “structured complex” means that it is more than the sum of
its parts, and has an overall form or organization.
What would Aristotle make of this?  At the most basic level, a state of
affairs is just the way things are, and Aristotle clearly does not doubt that there is
such a thing as the way things are.  But what about the claim that a state of affairs
is an abstract entity like a universal?  If the point of saying this is to ensure that
the same state of affairs is repeatable, then Aristotle still should not have a
problem with it.  Although Aristotle makes universals dependent entities, he is
nonetheless a realist about them.  Since he thinks that it is possible for the
property “white” to be multiply exemplified, it will clearly be possible for a state
of affairs like “a man being white” to obtain more than once.  “A man being
white,” which is a perfectly general and repeatable state of affairs, is one of the
examples Aristotle uses in his discussion of modality in De interpretatione 12.
As for structure, Aristotle would surely agree that a state of affairs is a structured
entity.  One cannot simply think “man” and “white,” he says, and have a thought
with a truth value, and this, presumably, is because the truth makers of thoughts
(viz., states of affairs) have structures themselves (de Int. 1).
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3.1.2 Possible worlds and entailment of states of affairs
Now if a possible world is just a very large and complex state of affairs, or a
“total” way that a world might be, I see no reason why Aristotle should not accept
the concept of a possible world.  On this conception, a possible world is just an
aggregate of all of the compatible states of affairs of all the things that are, where
some states of affairs will include particulars in motion (and, hence, will be
kinetic phases) and some will include particulars at rest.  Plantinga calls this a
“maximally consistent”39 possible state of affairs, and to articulate it, he makes the
interesting claim that states of affairs can entail or preclude one another.  A
maximally consistent state of affairs, or possible world W, is one specified as
follows: for every state of affairs S, W either entails S or precludes S.  The type of
entailment, here, is strictly logical.  A possible world W entails S because S is a
state of affairs that is contained in W.  For example, if W is a world in which
Socrates exists, then W is also a world in which someone exists, or put another
way, it is impossible for Socrates to exist without a person existing.
But what about entailment of the actuality of possible worlds by the
actuality of other possible worlds?  I do not mean logical entailment, where one
world is included within another (in which case, one of them would not be
maximally consistent).  What I mean is the sort of entailment involved in
hypothetical necessity, where if such and such a posterior state of affairs is to be
actual, then such and such prior state(s) of affairs must be actual.  If every change
has a goal state of affairs c, and if the actuality of goal state of affairs c
presupposes the actuality of state of affairs b, and the actuality of state of affairs b
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presupposes the actuality of state of affairs a, then the actuality of goal state of
affairs c presupposes the actuality of state of affairs a.40  Moreover, if world Wa
contains state of affairs a, and world Wb contains state of affairs b, and world Wc
contains state of affairs c, then the actuality of possible world Wc presupposes the
actuality of possible world Wb, and the actuality of possible world Wb
presupposes the actuality of possible world Wa, and the actuality of possible
world Wc presupposes the actuality of possible world Wa.  And if states of affairs
a, b, and c include particulars in motion (and, hence, are kinetic phases) and states
of affairs d, e, and f include particulars at rest, then the states of affairs d, e, and f
will stand in the same relations of priority and posteriority as states of affairs a, b,
and c respectively, if state of affairs d is part of possible world Wa, state of affairs
e is part of possible world Wb, and state of affairs f is part of possible world Wc.
3.1.3 Objections addressed
I can see two objections arising from this, one more subtle than the other.  The
first objection is that I have just described a deterministic universe, whereas
Aristotle rejects determinism.  Note that the only kind of necessity I have invoked
is hypothetical necessity, i.e., necessity that runs from a posterior to a prior state.
Determinism would only result from necessity that ran the other way, from the
prior to the posterior.  As for the more subtle objection, I can see how one might
be suspicious that I am covertly using the temporal concept of simultaneity when
I talk about state of affairs d being part of possible world Wa, for instance.  But a
moment’s reflection on the concept of a possible world and a state of affairs
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shows that this is misguided.  A state of affairs is a structured complex consisting
of particulars, universals, and exemplification relations.  A possible world is just
one or more state of affairs.  Consider a possible world in which the only existents
are two geometrical cubes that share one of their sides.  Each cube is a state of
affairs consisting of six particular geometrical surfaces related to each other in a
certain way and exemplifying a certain shape and size.  Are we required to say
that these states of affairs are simultaneous with each other?  I think not, and this
is true even on the assumption that geometrical objects are not Platonic.  That is,
even if we, as Aristotle does, take geometrical cubes to be abstractions from
concrete cubes, we can still abstract them from their existence in time, as well as
from any of their material characteristics.  And if this is possible, I do not see why
we could not abstract a fully material bronze cube from its existence in time as
well, leaving its material characteristics and removing only its time reference.  A
state of affairs is an abstract entity; it contains no reference to time.  One may
wish to claim that concatenated states of affairs are simultaneous, but one is not
required to do so by the mere fact that one concatenates them.
3.1.4 Plantinga’s Platonism
The “actualism” in possible worlds actualism derives from the claim that only
things that make up the actual world exist.  This is in contrast to possible worlds
possibilism, which claims that things exist other than things that make up the
actual world, viz., other possible worlds that are made up of things that are of
comparable metaphysical standing to things in the actual world.  Plantinga thinks
85
that it is incoherent to suppose things can exist, otherwise than in the actual world.
So in order to say that possible worlds and possible, but not actual, states of
affairs exist, one must say that they exist in the actual world in some sense.  The
way Plantinga does this is to claim that all possible worlds exist in the actual
world in the same way that Platonic forms do.  But in my view, this amounts to
trading one ontological extravagance for another.  Instead of claiming that
possible worlds exist as unobservable self-subsistent concrete entities as Lewis
does, Plantinga claims that they exist as unobservable self-subsistent abstract
entities.  It seems that one could work out a more ontologically conservative
account of how possible states of affairs and possible worlds can exist in the
actual world using Aristotle’s notion of actuality and potentiality.  For Aristotle,
possible states of affairs exist insofar as there are particulars that have an in-
dwelling potentiality to enter into those states of affairs.  So insofar as there are
particulars in the actual world that have certain potentialities to enter into states of
affairs, there will be possible worlds existing in the actual world that feature those
states of affairs.
A drawback of this approach would be that possible worlds would not be
necessary beings, because the existence of a possible world in a world would be
dependent on the contingent existence of a particular in that world.  We would be
prevented from saying, for instance, that possible states of affairs involving
Socrates could exist in a world where Socrates himself doesn’t exist.  Still, it
seems that Aristotle could claim the existence of a Pickwickian Socrates, i.e., one
consisting of lumps of matter fit to be endowed with the form of Socrates, in any
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possible world containing matter.  In any case, it seems that the most important
thing is to be able to entertain possibilities concerning Socrates in worlds where
he does exist, especially in the actual world.
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4 i.e., before it begins absorbing nutriment
5 i.e., when it is absorbing nutriment
6 “The fitness to be endowed with a nature” would seem to be just a property of
matter.  Yet in Aristotelian embryology it is not this simple.  GA 2.3-4 maintains
that the male contributes the formal element, which is conveyed by the sperm, and
the female contributes the material element (the menses) in the formation of the
embryo, and that the sperm takes an active role and the menses takes a passive
role in the process of fertilization.  Yet this chapter of the GA, as well as
Metaphysics Book W chapter 7, also seem to cast the sperm in a material role
insofar as the nutritive soul is said to exist potentially in it.  In GA 2.4, Aristotle
says that the female provides the body and the male provides the soul of the
offspring, but, of course, the sperm is not ensouled, so the soul in the sperm must
be latent or potential.  Hence, I believe that the special features of sexual
reproduction, which involve an agent/patient interaction between the sperm and
menses, cast both the sperm and the menses in material roles, albeit in different
senses.
7 This does not mean that a motion is reducible to its stages in the sense that its
goal need not be taken into account.  Aristotle says in Physics 5.4 that the goal
state supplies one of the identity conditions for a motion.  It is assumed, here,
rather, that each stage is taken as a stage on the way to the goal of being y.
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8 The way that Waterlow puts it (Sarah Waterlow, “Instants of Motion in
Aristotle’s Physics VI,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (1983): 137), is
that that Aristotle’s definition of change as the actuality of that which is
changeable insofar as it is changeable, is not simply a potentiality to be in a
particular state, but rather, it is a potentiality to be in that state that is incompletely
actual and actual in the sense of an “F-wardness.”  In other words, the incomplete
actuality has a direction or a goal.  What makes an at-at ontology of motion
unsuitable for Aristotle is that it can only account for a derivative sense of this
directionality at an instant.
9 In book 2 of the Physics, the extension of the term “substance” appears to be
broader than in the central books of the Metaphysics, where substances, in the
primary sense of the word, are restricted to biological organisms.  In book 2 of the
Physics, a substance is anything that has a nature and “a principle of motion and
of rest (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration).”
10 Sarah Waterlow, Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics, (Oxford:
Oxford Clarendon Press, 1982), 102.
11 Waterlow (Waterlow, Nature, Change and Agency, 122-4) suggests that the
concept of substance as constituted by positive substance constitutive properties,
depends on the assumption that “change ... cannot continue indefinitely towards
an unattainable end.”  Otherwise, privation would be an ineliminable component
of a substance’s essence.  Thus, Waterlow claims, Aristotle’s concept of change
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transition from rest, but it will take time if we define it as a transition to some
partial stage of completion.  See Sorabji, Time, Creation And The Continuum, 405
ff.
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(Cael. 291b12-3)
22 See above, Section 1.6
23 On the assumption that celestial revolutions are †kùodbf^f, this restriction
would allow one to pick out the hfk©pbft that are involved in the †kùodbf^ of
revolving, where any such h÷kepft has a qùilt, though the revolution itself is a
qùilt.  Thus, the †kùodbf^ of revolving contains hfk©pbft.
24 Phys. 265a13-15, 25, 28, b11-12
92
                                                                                                                                      
25 Phys. 212b10, 14, 259b28-31, 261b28-9, 264b9, 18-9, 19-20, 23-6, 26-7,
265b1-2
26 I have capitalized the “if” and “then” of this rather long, compound conditional
to facilitate reading it.
27 Hussey, Aristotle’s Physics III & IV, 147.
28 Note that the dependence claimed here is a metaphysical dependence, not an
epistemological one.  Although it may be true that our knowledge that “x is prior
to y” holds of temporal relata depends on our knowledge that it holds between
kinetic relata, this is not what is at issue.
29 I take a state of affairs, here, to be a particular, not a universal.
30 Cf. Corish, "Aristotle's Attempted Derivation," 244.
31 Lawrence Sklar, “Up and Down, Left and Right, Past and Future,” Nous 15
(1981): 113.
32 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1972), 3, 35-38, 47, 49-50, 100-5, 107-15, 122-34, 137-8, 140-55, 158-60.
33 Aristotle categorically rules out such a possibility at De caelo 283b13-14 where
he says “No potential relates to being in the past, but always to being in the
present or future.”
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34 In this chapter, Aristotle shows that we know so much more about the past than
the future because the truth values of future-tensed claims are not yet settled,
while those of past tensed claims are, and this fact depends on the status of the
future as potential, and the past as necessary.
35 Waterlow, Nature, Change and Agency, 125.
36 He also borrows infinite divisibility of change from the infinite divisibility of
time (e.g., Phys. 237b2), but, as we shall see, the infinite divisibility of time
derives from the infinite divisibility of magnitude.
37 See Sorabji, Time, Creation And The Continuum, 411.
38 Or more literally, following Ross: “The prior and posterior in change is change,
[or rather] that [while] being which the prior and posterior in change are prior and
posterior.”
39 Alvin Plantinga, “Actualism and Possible Worlds” in Essays in the Metaphysics
of Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 107.
40 See above, the example of the falling lump of earth in Section 1.4.2.1.
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Chapter 2: Persistence
1.0 TRANSWORLD AND TRANSTEMPORAL INDIVIDUALS
The fact that Socrates is a member of two or more possible worlds, e.g., an actual
world in which he drinks hemlock, and a possible world in which he does not,
makes him what Plantinga calls a “transworld individual.”  Possible world
actualists like Kripke and Plantinga argue that our pre-philosophical notion of
possibility entails the concept of a transworld individual.  When we entertain the
possibility, for instance, that Socrates might have fled Athens on the eve of his
execution, we do not imagine that a numerically distinct counterpart with a snub
nose and a penchant for philosophy fled Athens.  We imagine that he, this man
Socrates, fled Athens.  Indeed, claim Kripke and Plantinga, the idea that a
concrete, numerically distinct individual named “Socrates” has fled to Thessaly in
some possible world while this other one here is drinking the hemlock, confounds
what it means to exist in a possible world.  Possible worlds, states of affairs, and
their contents are abstract and not concrete entities.  For Socrates to exist in a
possible world is just for a maximally consistent state of affairs to entail Socrates’
existence, viz., in that it is impossible for the state of affairs to exist while
Socrates does not.
It is clear that the modal interpretation of Aristotle’s kinetic continuum I
argued for in Chapter 1 envisages transworld individuals as well, because we took
the states of affairs in which Socrates is a boy and Socrates is a man to be states of
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affairs involving a single individual, viz., Socrates.  And if we re-admit the
mention of time, now, and recognize that the kinetic phases we have been treating
as possible states of affairs are also, in fact, time slices arranged in a temporal
order of before and after, it is also clear that my modal interpretation of
Aristotle’s kinetic continuum implies a theory of persistence as well, viz., one in
which a persisting entity is identical across successive time slices, or is a
transtemporal individual.  (The purpose of resorting to a modal interpretation of
the kinetic continuum in Chapter 1 was to demonstrate that the phases of a change
may be abstracted from temporal references and arranged in a non-temporal order,
or, alternatively, that motion and time can be conceptually disassociated.  With
that objective accomplished, we are now free to think of these phases as arranged
in a temporal order.)
2.0 PUZZLES ABOUT IDENTITY
But what right do we have to believe in transworld and transtemporal individuals?
On the face of it, they seem to violate the law of the indiscernibility of identicals.
There is an abundance of reasons why Socrates-as-a-boy is not identical to
Socrates-as-a-man.  For, presumably, the latter differs from the former not only in
his size but in a myriad of other qualities such as hair color, wisdom, etc.  And in
the light of this, one may ask, quite generally, how an enduring entity can gain
and shed properties, either its size, or its shape, or even just become older, while
still remaining numerically the same entity.
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Scruples like these about the existence of transtemporal individuals are
generally associated, in antiquity, with certain puzzles, like Epicharmus’ Growing
Argument.  The latter challenges our assumptions about personal identity by
arguing that our identities are in constant flux.  It draws this conclusion from the
premises that identity is a strict function of material composition, and our material
compositions are constantly changing.   In what follows, I will look at the
Growing Argument and a similar puzzle, about change of place mentioned by
Aristotle in Physics 4.11, with a view to assessing the adequacy of Aristotle’s
approach to solving them.  As a point of comparison, I will also assess the
solution to the Growing Argument proposed by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus,
which features a reductio ad absurdum of certain premises of the puzzle.
2.1 Change of place
2.1.1 The puzzle at Physics 219b18-22
In Physics book 4, chapter 11, Aristotle tries to account for the paradoxical
feature of the “now,” viz., that in a way it is always the same, and in a way it is
always different.  And at Physics 219b18-22, he claims that the moving thing has
this same feature:
[The moving thing], with respect to its substrate, is the same, … but in
definition it is different, as the sophists assume that Coriscus being in the
Lyceum is different from Coriscus being in the marketplace.  And this
[viz. the moving thing] is different, by means of being in different places.
(Phys. 219b18-22)
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What interests me is the “assumption” that is attributed to the Sophists.
Taken literally, the allusion does not make sense.  Aristotle is making a point
about difference and sameness in substances, yet his example is about difference
and sameness in states of affairs (Coriscus being in the Lyceum and Coriscus
being in the marketplace).  Clearly, states of affairs and substances do not persist
in the same way, and it is hard to imagine what a persisting substrate of a state of
affairs might be.  The most natural interpretation is that, in spite of what Aristotle
actually says, he means to say that it is Coriscus as a moving thing, rather than
states of affairs involving Coriscus, that is the same in substrate but different in
definition.  This is Simplicius’ interpretation, who claims that the sophistical
puzzle is one in which “the same” Coriscus “becomes different from himself” by
changing his place:
[The sophists] said that “the same Coriscus is sometimes in the market-
place and sometimes in the Lyceum. He who is sometimes in the market-
place, sometimes in the Lyceum, becomes different from himself.” (In
phys. 723,14-16)
But this is not quite satisfactory.  First, since the “assumption” is attributed
to the Sophists, one would think that it must have been the subject of a puzzle or a
paradox like the Growing Argument or the case of Achilles and the Tortoise.  But
if “becoming different from oneself” is as Simplicius describes it, then it is hard
to see what is puzzling about it, and why it should be a philosophical topos
worthy of a Sophist.  There is a whiff of paradox in the phrase “becoming
different from oneself,”1 but to say that “the same Coriscus is sometimes in the
market-place and sometimes in the Lyceum” seems entirely straightforward.
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Second, the phrase Ù mlqb Òk, which I gloss as “with respect to its
substrate” here, would seem to suggest that Coriscus, when in place x, is being
thought of as the accidental unity Coriscus-in-place-x.  This is because at Parts of
Animals 2.3 649b20-7, which is the source of this standard gloss of the phrase Ù
mlqb Òk, Ù mlqb Òk denotes the substrate of an accidental unity, viz. blood:
These distinctions, then, being laid down, it is plain that blood is
essentially hot in so far as that heat is connoted in its name; just as if
boiling water were denoted by a single term, boiling would be connoted in
that term. But the substratum of blood and that which it is while it is blood
(qÌ a~ Âmlhb÷jbklk h^◊ Ú mlqb Ûk ^‡já †pqfk), is not hot. Blood then
in a certain sense is essentially hot, and in another sense is not so. For heat
is included in the definition of blood, just as whiteness is included in the
definition of a white man, and so far therefore blood is essentially hot. But
so far as blood becomes hot from some external influence, it is not hot
essentially. (PA 2.3 649b20-7)
The claim, here, is that “blood” refers not to a distinct type of tissue, but
merely to a hot phase of bodily fluid.  “Blood” denotes an essence, but it is the
essence of an accidental unity of the substrate bodily fluid and the property heat,
just as “white man” denotes the accidental unity of the substrate man and the
property whiteness.  Bodily fluid is “that which blood is while it is blood,” which
means that bodily fluid may get hot and be called “blood,” but it is still just bodily
fluid.
There are two other places where Aristotle attributes a puzzle about
Coriscus to the “sophists”:
The arguments of the sophists deal, we may say, above all with the
accidental; e.g. the question whether “musical” and “lettered” are different
or the same, and whether “musical Coriscus” and “Coriscus” are the same
… Metaph. 6.2 1026b15-18
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Generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, [the good
man] is related to himself as Coriscus to good Coriscus.  For it is clear that
some identical portion of them is good; for when they blame themselves,
they kill themselves.  EE 1240b24-27
Coriscus, like Socrates and Callias, is frequently used by Aristotle as a stock
example of an individual human being, so we cannot put too much weight on the
name alone.  Still, I think that it is probably more than a coincidence that on each
of these two occasions where a puzzle about Coriscus is attributed to the sophists,
the puzzle seems to feature accidental unities like “musical Coriscus,” and “good
Coriscus.”  In the light of this, I think that the sophistical puzzle referred to at
Physics 219b18-22 probably posits a difference between a plurality of accidental
unities, viz. Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum and Coriscus-in-the-market-place, not of a
single Coriscus simpliciter who is “sometimes in the market-place, sometimes in
the Lyceum” as Simplicius suggests.  At any rate, just after this passage, at
Physics 220a2-4, Aristotle speaks of the “number of the changing thing,” which
would make no sense unless a changing thing like Coriscus were somehow a
plurality that could be counted.
Accordingly, I think that the sophistical puzzle in question is probably
raising a question similar to the one just quoted from Metaphysics book C, viz.,
whether Coriscus-in-the-market-place is indeed the same individual as Coriscus-
in-the-Lyceum.  And if the Sophists are suggesting that Coriscus-in-the-market-
place becomes Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum, then he clearly does so by being replaced
by Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum.  And just as in the Growing Argument, a change of
size results in a change of identity, so in the puzzle about Coriscus-in-the-
Marketplace and Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum, a change of place results in the
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emergence of a new individual.  The simplest way to get this result is first to
assume the indiscernibility of identicals, viz., if x is identical to y, then for every
property F, object x has property F if and only if object y has property F.  Then
one supposes that Coriscus at time t has the property of being in the marketplace
while Coriscus at time t* does not, because Coriscus at time t* is in the Lyceum.
And then one concludes (by modus tollens) that Coriscus at time t cannot be
identical to Coriscus at time t*, because Coriscus at time t has a property that
Coriscus at time t* does not.  Coriscus at time t and Coriscus at time t* must be
distinct individuals (viz., Coriscus-in-the-Marketplace and Coriscus-in-the-
Lyceum respectively) that succeed each other in time.
2.1.2 Aristotle’s solution
2.1.2.1 One in substrate, two in definition
The solution that Aristotle offers to this puzzle is that Coriscus-in-the-
Marketplace and Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum are identical in one sense but not in
another: “[The moving thing], with respect to its substrate, is the same, … but in
definition it is different.”  The concept of being one in substrate but two in
definition (or equivalently, two in form or in being) is one of Aristotle’s favorite
philosophical tools, and he deploys it to solve a range of problems that require an
account of unity in diversity.  It is applied to problems of change and persistence
in Generation and Corruption 1.4-5 and Physics 1.7, as well as in the passage in
Physics 4.11 that we have just seen.  It is also used in Physics 3.3 and De anima
3.2 to claim that agency and patiency are unified in one sense but diverse in
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another, and in De anima 2.12, 3.2, 3.7, and 3.9 to make a similar claim about the
various faculties of the soul (e.g., the appetitive, the imaginative, etc.).
In Physics 3.3, Aristotle expands on this notion by giving an illustrative
example.  The road from Athens to Thebes is the same in substrate, i.e.,
numerically the same, as the road from Thebes to Athens, but it is not the same in
being, form, or definition.  Being, form, or definition, in this context at least,
depends on the perspective from which these things are viewed, viz., the road
from Athens to Thebes is the road from the point of view of one who is in Athens,
and the road from Thebes to Athens is the road from the point of view of one who
is in Thebes.  The case is quite similar to Frege’s example of the morning star and
the evening star.  The morning star is identical to the evening star, and the
expressions “the morning star” and “the evening star” refer to the same object, but
they do so from different points of view.  “The morning star” means something
like “the celestial object appearing in a certain region of the sky in the morning”
and “the evening star” means something like “the celestial object appearing in a
certain region of the sky in the evening.”  On this account, then, “Coriscus-in-the-
Marketplace” and “Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum” are names for the same object but
they pick out the object in different contexts or under different descriptions.
Being-in-the-Marketplace and being-in-the-Lyceum are merely contexts or
settings in which Coriscus appears.  And this is not difficult to accept, since we
would typically count place or location as part of the context in which a substance
appears.
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But Aristotle clearly wants intrinsic properties like color to be part of this
context as well, and he establishes this point in Physics 1.7, in the course of
solving another puzzle about change.  The puzzle in Physics 1.7-8 is an Eleatic
one, and it seeks to prove the impossibility of change based on the fact that
change under certain descriptions seems to imply generation ex nihilo.  It
becomes clear, however, as Aristotle solves the Eleatic problem, that change
under certain descriptions also seems to threaten the persistence of objects
through changes.  In Aristotle’s treatment, the very same change is described in
the following three sentences:
(i) The man becomes cultured.
(ii) The uncultured becomes cultured.
(iii) The uncultured man becomes the cultured man.
The key point, as regards the problem of persistence, is that sentences (ii)
and (iii) seem to involve the replacement of the thing that changes by the thing it
becomes.  In sentence (ii), the uncultured disappears and is replaced by the
cultured, and in sentence (iii), the uncultured man disappears and is replaced by
the cultured man.  (The uncultured man/cultured man pair is directly analogous to
Coriscus-in-the-Marketplace/Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum, since they both represent
accidental unities.)  Sentence (i), however, does not give this impression, and it is
therefore to be preferred.  Sentence (i), in fact, allegedly reflects the underlying
metaphysics of the change more accurately, since it shows that
… there must always be an underlying something, namely that which
becomes, and that this, though always one numerically, in form at least is
not one. (By that I mean that it can be described in different ways.) For “to
be man” is not the same as “to be uncultured.” One part survives, the other
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does not: what is not an opposite survives (for “man” survives), but “not-
cultured” or “uncultured” does not survive, nor does the compound of the
two, namely “uncultured man. (Phys. 190a14-22)2
Hence, Aristotle’s answer to the Coriscus-in-the-Marketplace/Coriscus-in-
the-Lyceum puzzle may be generalized to claim that accidental properties
(whether intrinsic or not) are to be taken as part of the context in which a
substance appears.  Properties like “cultured” and “uncultured,” as well as
accidental compounds that they form with substances (e.g., cultured man and
uncultured man) come and go, but “man,” or the entity that we properly regard as
identical over time, does not.  “Cultured Coriscus” and “uncultured Coriscus,” as
well as “Coriscus-in-the-Marketplace” and “Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum,” just refer
to Coriscus in different states of affairs or circumstances.
2.1.2.2 Further considerations
I imagine that a sophist who has received this reply to his puzzle of Coriscus-in-
the-Marketplace and Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum might object that this is all well and
good, but unless some further assumptions are spelled out, one cannot see how
change can be possible.  For even assuming that identity claims are only made
about Coriscus simpliciter, one still needs to explain how it is possible for a single
entity to feature in mutually exclusive states of affairs (like being in the
marketplace and being in the Lyceum).  In other words, what is it about the
separation of these mutually exclusive states of affairs in time that allows them
both to hold of the same individual without contradiction?
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I can see one possibility if we assume that states of affairs are abstract
entities or structured complexes consisting of one or more particular, one or more
universal (i.e., a property, kind, or relation), and one or more exemplification
relation between the particular(s) and the universal(s).  If we make this
assumption, we can claim that past and future states of affairs are uninstantiated.
Past and future states of affairs do not conflict with present states of affairs, or
with each other, because they do not exist.
2.1.2.2.1 Presentism?
What I am suggesting, of course, is presentism, which is the temporal analogue of
possible worlds actualism.  Just as the possible-worlds-actualist claims that only
things that make up the actual world exist, the presentist claims that only things
that exist presently exist.  And just as the possible-world-actualist entertains
possibilities about Coriscus by taking his existence in the actual world as given,
and representing the same Coriscus counterfactually in non-actual possible states
of affairs, the presentist represents Coriscus’ past and future by taking his
existence in the present as given, and thinking of the same Coriscus in states of
affairs that no longer, or do not yet obtain.
Presentism, however, is not an attractive doctrine to ascribe to Aristotle.
The most common objection to presentism, in the words of David Lewis, goes
something like this: “No man, unless it be at the moment of his execution,
believes that he has no future; still less does anyone believe that he has no past.”3
In other words, we all assume that the future and the past exist in some sense, and
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this is reflected in the way we talk.  So, it will not do simply to say that the past
and future do not exist — full stop.  Moreover, there are other reasons why
Aristotle, in particular, would have a problem with presentism, which largely stem
from his geometrical notion of the temporal continuum.  Miller, for instance,
points out that since time is an attribute of motion, and motion does not exist at an
instant, time does not exist at an instant.  Therefore, if Aristotle is to say that time
is real, and he does, he must commit himself to the reality of either the past or the
future.4  Owen and Hussey make the slightly different point that the status of the
now as a boundary of the past and future implies the reality of that which it
bounds.  Hussey thinks that this at least implies the reality of the past since,
according to Aristotle, every moment of change is a moment of having changed.5
2.1.2.2.2 Serious tensing?
So presentism is an unattractive solution to our problem.  But there are other
approaches, and one of them is called “serious tensing” or “taking tense
seriously.”6  The idea of serious tensing, basically, is that propositions are always
to be evaluated from the perspective of some now.  This means that any
apparently tenseless proposition like the one expressed by “Coriscus at time t* is
in the Lyceum” must be translatable into a tensed proposition the tense of which
is determined by the context of the (actual or imagined) assertion.  If we choose to
view the puzzle from the perspective of time t, for instance, then we must say that
“Coriscus is now in the marketplace” and “Coriscus will be in the Lyceum.”  The
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payoff, of course, is that these propositions may be asserted jointly without
contradiction.
For my part, I find it implausible that a sentence like “Coriscus at time t*
is in the Lyceum” means anything like “Coriscus always was in the Lyceum at
time t, Coriscus is in the Lyceum at time t, and Coriscus always will be in the
Lyceum at time t.”  We typically say “Coriscus at time t* is in the Lyceum”
intending to make a tenseless claim, and I find it difficult to accept that this is in
any way improper or incoherent.  Perhaps a more promising strategy, which
preserves the idea that propositions change their truth value but better
accommodates sentences like “Coriscus at time t* is in the Lyceum,” is taking
propositions to be true at times in the way that they are true at possible worlds.
The idea is that at time t, the proposition expressed by the sentence “Coriscus is in
the marketplace” will be true and the proposition expressed by the sentence
“Coriscus is in the Lyceum” will be false, but these truth values will reverse at
time t*, so that it will not be the case that both propositions are true at any one
time slice.  So, to claim that Coriscus at time t is in the Marketplace and that
Coriscus at time t* is in the Lyceum is just to claim (tenselessly) that a certain
proposition is true at time slice t, and another proposition is true at time slice t*,
but they do not conflict because they are not both true at any one time slice.
We find no such view elaborated in Aristotle, of course, but there is
evidence that he thought that propositions changed their truth values over time.  In
De interpretatione 9, for instance, Aristotle claims that we can truly affirm the
disjunction that either there will or will not be a sea battle tomorrow, but we
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cannot truly affirm either of the disjuncts individually.  Apparently, the
proposition that there will be a sea battle tomorrow does not have a truth value
until the sea battle takes place or fails to take place, at which time we may
retrospectively attribute a truth value to this future-tensed proposition.  I take it,
then, that we may also talk tenselessly about a sea battle at time t, but if time t
happens to be in the future, then the proposition “there is a sea battle at time t”
will also lack a truth value, but will come to acquire one at time t.
Serious tensing and the view that propositions are true at times are
approaches that focus primarily on propositions in attempting to solve the puzzle
at issue.  Clearly, however, some account needs to be given of the metaphysics of
the truth makers of these propositions.  Sally Haslanger has suggested that at the
core of the serious tensing view is the doctrine that the having of properties is
always tensed.7  But this just tells us that to have a property is to have it in the
past, present, or future.  What does it mean, then, to have a property in the past,
present, or future?  If I am a presentist, to have a property in the present is to have
it, full stop, while to have it in the past or future is not to have it at all.  If I am an
eternalist, and imagine the past and future to have a metaphysical standing that is
comparable with the present, I have the property, but in a very odd sense.  As
Dean Zimmerman points out, I will still have yesterday’s headache, but it will not
be painful any more since it is a past headache.8  But do we really want to admit
ghostly entities like painless, non-present pains into our ontology?
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2.1.2.2.3 Quasi-presentism: the future exists in potentiality
I think that neither of these options are either plausibly Aristotelian or very
attractive philosophically.  Fortunately, a middle way can be found, at least in the
case of the reality of the future, that makes use of the analyses of Chapter 1.  If the
relation x is potentially_ y orders the phases of Coriscus’ movement from the
marketplace to the Lyceum, then to have the property of being in the Lyceum in
the future is the same as to be potentially_ in the Lyceum.  So, being prospectively
in the Lyceum but currently in the marketplace is the same as being actually in the
marketplace but potentially_ in the Lyceum.  Therefore, Coriscus’ being in the
Lyceum does not conflict with Coriscus’ being in the marketplace because, at any
time you care to choose, the way in which Coriscus has these properties differs.
Now the possible worlds actualist would also say that Coriscus is possibly in the
Lyceum when he is actually in the marketplace, but this is just a logical
possibility.  And in the presentist analogue of possible worlds actualism, there is
no suggestion that futurity in any way reduces to possibility.  Futurity and
possibility are modalities the extensions of which happen to overlap in some
instances (i.e., some possible states of affairs are also future states of affairs).  But
for Aristotle, as I have interpreted him, futurity is to be identified with potentiality
in the sense of potentiality_, and the future may be said to exist “in potentiality” in
the same sense.
Now potentiality_ is, I have argued, a special teleological potentiality, or a
potentiality that has a characteristic “F-wardness” associated with it.  The
potentiality_ of a stone to be at a lower altitude, for instance, is not the potentiality
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for just one out of the many logically possible states of affairs the stone can enter
into.  It is a potentiality to enter into a state of affairs that is favored by the stone
as its characteristic goal.  And while its status as a goal might not fix it with
certainty in the stone’s future history, this possible state of affairs is nonetheless
highly probable because the “innate impulse” of the stone is characteristically
directed toward it.  And if all of the world’s natural substances have similar
potentialities_ and similar innate impulses to fulfill these potentialities, then this
should confer on the future at least an etiolated form of existence.  I suggest, then,
that the future exists “in potentiality” in the potentiality_ of natural things to
realize their characteristic goals.
This interpretation of futurity also accords with our intuitions about what
it means to “have a future.”  The man about to be executed has no future in the
sense that he can no longer hope to realize any of his goals or wishes.  The store
of possibilities that stimulate and give content to his desires and aspirations have
dwindled to nothing, and he has, literally, nothing to look forward to.  To have a
future, then, is just to have the potential to realize a goal or a wish.9
2.1.3 Criteria for identity
In summary, Aristotle’s answer to the puzzle we have been considering is to claim
that diachronic identity holds not between accidental unities like Coriscus-in-the-
Marketplace and Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum but rather between instances of an
“underlying something,” viz., Coriscus, considered without his accidental
properties.  Accidental properties, in other words, are to be taken not as part of a
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substance, but as part of the context in which a substance appears.  Moreover, we
saw that it is open to Aristotle to claim that in any case, the properties being-in-
the-Marketplace and being-in-the-Lyceum do not conflict with each other because
at any time when one of them is possessed actually, the other is possessed
potentially.  Yet there is still a difficulty that brings to mind Aristotle’s
assessment of his own initial response to one of Zeno’s paradoxes, viz.,
“Although this solution is adequate as a reply to the questioner, … nevertheless as
an account of the fact and explanation of its true nature it is inadequate” (Phys.
263a15-8).  What Aristotle has done, essentially, is demonstrate that there is no
contradiction in assuming that Coriscus simpliciter is identical over time.  But he
has given us no justification of this assumption.  What is needed is a criterion for
diachronic identity.
2.1.3.1 x is potentially_ y
One possibility might be to think of the relation x is potentially_ y as a criterion
for diachronic identity. That is, if x and y appear in states of affairs that obtain at
different times, and x is potentially_ y, it follows that x is “identical in substratum”
to y, since the relation connects a single entity in one state of affairs to itself in
another state of affairs.  For instance, the relation holds between Socrates-as-a-
boy and Socrates-as-a-man and likewise between Coriscus-in-the-Marketplace
and Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum.  Accordingly, Socrates-as-a-boy and Socrates-as-a-
man are identical in substratum, as are Coriscus-in-the-Marketplace and Coriscus-
in-the-Lyceum.  Since the “is” in the relation “x is potentially_ y” is to be taken
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tenselessly, this relation may be used to identify past, present, as well as future
phases of a change.
At first sight, this approach has some intuitive appeal.  Coriscus-as-a-boy
has the potentiality_ to become Coriscus-as-a-man, but not Socrates-as-a-man.
Why?  Because Coriscus’ potentiality_ is constrained somehow to prevent this.
There are certain things Coriscus-as-a-boy has the potentiality_ to become and
Socrates-as-a-man is not one of them.  Exactly why this is the case is not
altogether clear.
2.1.3.2 Coriscus simpliciter?
But perhaps it will become clearer if we consider what it is that Coriscus
simpliciter (i.e., the “underlying something” that remains identical from time to
time) is supposed to be.  Coriscus, like “the man” in the examples of Physics 1.7,
is a substance.  But in the Metaphysics, Aristotle tells us that there is a primary
and a derivative sense of the word.  In its primary sense, substance refers to “the
form that is in the thing” while in a derivative sense, substance is “the whole
combined from this and the matter” (Metaph. 1037a29-30).  The question is, is it
Coriscus’ form that persists through changes, or is it the combination of Coriscus’
form and matter?
Fortunately, there is a text that is quite specific that it is the form and not
the form/matter composite that persists in living things, viz. Generation and
Corruption 1.5.  Generation and Corruption 1.5 claims that the form of a living
organism persists through growth just as the shape of a tube persists when it is
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inflated by water.  And since Generation and Corruption 1.5 takes a form to be a
shape or morphê, it is clear that it is a particular shape that is supposed to persist.
Physics 1.7-9 might at first sight seem to clash with this conclusion by suggesting
that matter also persists, but this just reflects the different aims of these passages.
Physics 1.7 seeks to establish the general principle that an “underlying
something” persists through every change, while Generation and Corruption 1.5
seeks to establish that this “underlying something” is the form in the case of
biological growth.  At the beginning of Physics 1.7, the focus is on alteration, and
the “underlying something” is a “man,” Aristotle’s paradigm example of a
substance.  But then at 190a31 ff., Aristotle broadens his point to include
substantial change, so that the “underlying something” can be either matter or a
substance, or both, depending on the context.  For instance, at 190b13-17, he
refers indifferently to substances and to matter as “that which underlies”: “By that
which is opposed, I mean the ignorant of music, by that which underlies, the man;
and shapelessness, formlessness, disarray are opposed, the bronze, the stone, the
gold underlie.”  And similarly at 190b23-27: “The underlying thing, however,
though one in number, is two in form.  On the other hand there is the man, the
gold, and in general the measurable matter; this is more of a this thing here, and it
is not by virtue of concurrence that the thing which comes to be comes to be from
this.”  Thus, a consistent reading of Physics 1.7 and Generation and Corruption
1.5 would be that the substance understood as the form persists through growth
and alteration, while the matter persists through substantial change.
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There are also strong philosophical reasons why it should be the form and
not the form/matter composite that persists, and that the form should be an
individual form.  For if the form/matter composite is supposed to have the same
form and the same matter from time to time, it will run up against the common
(and I think correct) objection that the matter of a form/matter composite is
always changing.  This is the assumption behind the Growing Argument, which
dates to Epicharmus in the 5th century B.C.E., and which would have posed a
challenge to anyone who wanted to make material composition part of their
account of persistence.  But if it is the form of Coriscus that remains the same
through a change, the form cannot be a universal.  To see why this is so, imagine
that the form were a universal, so that the form of Coriscus and the form of
Socrates are not individuated in any way, and so that it is the matter that
individuates the form/matter composite at any given point in time.  At time t, for
instance, it would be the matter of each that makes Coriscus and Socrates the
individuals they are, while their form makes them the type of thing they are.  But
if the matter of Coriscus and Socrates changes between time t and time t*, then
they cannot be re-identified as the same individuals they were at time t, since their
identity as individuals was determined by their material composition at time t.  At
best, they can be reidentified as the same type of individual  because they have the
same universal form.  Hence, in order to underwrite a doctrine of persisting
individual substances, Aristotle would at least need to envisage individual
instances of type-identical species forms.
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2.1.3.3 Spatio-temporal histories
Since it appears to be the individual form of Coriscus that persists through a
change, our criterion of diachronic identity will clearly need to be some feature of
this form.  But Michael Frede points out that if individual forms are type-
identical, and the criterion is imagined to serve as a criterion for both synchronic
and diachronic identity (because, as I have argued above, Coriscus and Socrates
are to be diachronically reidentified as the same individuals, not as just the same
type of individual), then it cannot be any feature of the species essence that is our
criterion, since these features are shared by other members of the species.  Frede
suggests that the “feature” of individual forms we are looking for is their spatio-
temporal histories.10  In particular, he claims that it is the continuity of a form’s
spatio-temporal history that secures its diachronic identity.  What I take this to
mean is that an individual form is identical over time if there are no gaps in its
existence, and if the form’s instantiations at different times are “connected” by a
single continuous world line.  Aristotle would, no doubt, accept this sort of spatio-
temporal continuity as at least a necessary condition for diachronic identity.  If a
form is thought of as a particular organization, disposition, or structure, then it
bears a similarity to a hexis, like health.  And at Physics 5.2, 228a6-12, Aristotle
seems to rule out the possibility of hexeis like health returning to existence after a
period of non-existence (i.e., sickness).11
But this seems rather arbitrary.  Surely there is nothing logically
incoherent about supposing that the same individual form could be instantiated at
two times without a continuous world line connecting them.  In fact, Derek Parfit
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has concocted a science fiction scenario that envisages just this.12  He imagines
that at some future time, a teletransportation device is developed that will record
the “exact states of all [one’s] cells” and transmit the information to another
device on Mars.  The latter device will then create a brain and body on Mars with
exactly the same psychological and physical states, and the former device will
destroy the brain and body on earth.  Parfit’s claim is that the individual who
walks into the machine on Earth is the same individual who steps out of the
machine on Mars.  Now if the individual on Earth and the individual on Mars
have exactly the same psychological and physical states, then I would say that
they probably have the same Aristotelian form, and since, according to Parfit, it
takes radio waves about three minutes to travel from Earth to Mars, there is a
discontinuity of both place and time in the existence of the form.13
2.1.3.3.1 Time-indexed properties
Now clearly, Aristotle would not have thought such a scenario to be within the
realm of physical possibility, and he would not have taken the care to
accommodate it.  But I think that a more robust criterion of identity is at hand that
would accommodate Parfit’s scenario, and indeed, one that is no less plausible
than the spatio-temporal continuity of a world line, viz., the spatio-temporal
history itself.  Let us imagine, for instance, that Coriscus has the property of being
in the marketplace at time t, and Coriscus has the property of being in the Lyceum
at time t*.  This is just part of Coriscus’ spatio-temporal history.  But as I have
described it, it is not yet a unique history, and, therefore, could not be used as a
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way to pick out a unique individual at different times.  Coriscus might have been
taking a walk with Socrates, which entails that Socrates too was in the
marketplace at time t and in the Lyceum at time t*.  So let’s be more specific.
Let’s say that Coriscus gets a drink at the Enneacrounos at time t (a well at the
southeast corner of the Agora) and that he is the only one that is doing this at time
t.  I claim that Coriscus at time t is identical to Coriscus at time t* if and only if
Coriscus at time t* has the property of having-been-at-the-Enneacrounos-at-time-
t.
My idea is simple.  To have a spatio-temporal history is just to have a
collection of time-indexed properties.  To have a unique spatio-temporal history is
just to have at least one property contained in that history that is not shared with
any other individual.  What is attractive about this proposal is that at one stroke it
provides a criterion for both individuation and identity over time.  If Socrates and
Coriscus have type-identical species forms that are spatially distinct at any point
in their history, then Socrates and Coriscus are distinct not only at that point in
time, but as long as they exist, since their histories will be distinct as long as they
exist.  And for this reason, they will be able to be reidentified as the individuals
with these distinct histories.  This makes spatio-temporal histories essential
properties, not in the usual Aristotelian sense of the word, which has to do with
what it is to be something, but in the sense of simply a property that a thing has in
every circumstance in which it exists.
Time-indexed properties are close analogues to world-indexed properties,
which Plantinga uses to secure the identity of individuals across possible worlds.
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For instance, if person x has the property F-in-W^ of standing at the corner of
Hollywood and Vine in possible world W^, or the property F-at-t of standing at
the same place at time t, he or she has the property F-in-W^ in all possible worlds
or the property F-at-t for all time.  Moreover, if person x is the only person
standing at the corner of Hollywood and Vine in possible world W^ or at time t,
then he or she will be the only person in any possible world or at any time that has
this property.14
Admitting time-indexed properties like this does not, of course, commit us
to the view that all properties are time indexed.  The claim is only that properties
that are part of one’s spatio-temporal history are time indexed, and that one can
“just have” the property of having-been-at-the-Enneacrounos-at-time-t just as one
might “just have” the property of being pale.  Similarly, one can acquire the
property of having-been-at-the-Enneacrounos-at-time-t just as one might acquire
the property of being pale.  The purpose of time-indexing properties here is not to
allow them to be timelessly (and tenselessly) predicated of a persisting subject,
but to reflect the fact that they are part of a spatio-temporal history.
2.1.3.3.2 An objection
On the view that I have been advocating, one might think that a problem arises of
the following sort:  Remember that the puzzle of Coriscus-in-the-Marketplace and
Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum was solved by distinguishing between Coriscus
simpliciter, who is diachronically identical, and certain accidental unities like
Coriscus-in-the-Marketplace and Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum, which are not.  In
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effect, Aristotle stipulated that accidental properties are to be taken as part of the
context in which a substance appears.  We also saw that Coriscus simpliciter, if
we take him to be analogous to “the man” in the analysis of Physics 1.7, could be
either the form of Coriscus or the form of Coriscus combined with his matter.  But
we found strong philosophical reasons, as well as textual support in Generation
and Corruption 1.5, to prefer Coriscus as a form, and not as a form/matter
compound, because the matter in a form/matter compound is always changing.
So, Coriscus simpliciter is the form of Coriscus, and it is this that Aristotle
exempts from accidental change, in order to claim that it is identical over time.
But now we want to claim that a property like having-been-at-the-
Enneacrounos-at-time-t is a property of Coriscus’ form, and, indeed, a property
that serves as the basis for individuating it as well as reidentifying it at different
times.  And if Coriscus’ form can acquire such a property (presumably, it can
never lose it), then Coriscus simpliciter will fail to be indiscernible, and therefore
identical, before and after the property is acquired.
One strategy that comes to mind is for Aristotle to claim that the time-
indexed properties in a spatio-temporal history are held tenselessly, so that they
are never gained or lost.  Yet, as I pointed out in my discussion of serious tensing
above, Aristotle does believe that propositions change their truth values as time
passes.  Thus, if time t is in the future, “there is a sea battle at time t” will have no
truth value, but will come to acquire one as time t passes.  If this is because there
is no fact of the matter regarding the sea battle until it happens, then the property
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being-in-a-sea-fight-at-time-t cannot be possessed before time t and must,
therefore, be acquired at time t.
But even if we must accept the fact that time-indexed properties can be
acquired, we would do well to consider the nature of properties like having-been-
at-the-marketplace-at-time-t.  Previously, we thought it reasonable that Coriscus
simpliciter remains the same throughout his perambulations because “Coriscus-in-
the-Marketplace” and “Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum” just refer to him in two different
states of affairs or circumstances.  Just as “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” refer to
the same object, but with a different Fregean sense, so too do “Coriscus-in-the-
Marketplace” and “Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum.”  But would it not at least be curious
if the property of being-in-the-marketplace, which when possessed in the present
tense is taken merely to be part of the context in which Coriscus appears, when
possessed in the past tense becomes part of Coriscus himself?  In other words,
why should a history of events of a certain sort be thought to alter an object when
the events themselves do not?
Or consider the implication of generalizing Aristotle’s solution to the
Coriscus-in-the-Marketplace/Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum puzzle to claim that all
accidental properties (whether intrinsic or not) are to be treated like being-in-the-
marketplace and being-in-the-Lyceum.  I mean, if intrinsic as well as relational
properties are to be treated as part of the context in which Coriscus simpliciter
appears, then intrinsic properties are being demoted to the level of relational
properties for the purposes of the analysis.  This, I think, is the rationale for
thinking that the acquisition or loss of an intrinsic property should not impact the
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identity of Coriscus simpliciter.  But if regarding properties like these as on par
with relational properties makes them etiolated enough to regard them as part of
the context in which a substance appears, then their status as past relational
properties should make them even more etiolated.
2.1.3.3.3 Objection answered/The reality of the past
The most reasonable approach, I think, is to suppose that properties like having-
been-in-the-marketplace-at-time-t are etiolated enough to regard them as part of
the context in which a substance appears, but not so etiolated as to be incapable of
serving as criteria of synchronic and diachronic identity for the forms in question.
This accords, I think, with our intuition that the past should be real, but not quite
so real as the present.  If having-been-in-the-marketplace-at-time-t is a real
property of Coriscus that serves to individuate and reidentify him at every
moment thereafter, then time t, in a sense, lives on in the person of Coriscus as
well as in every extant entity that existed at that time.  But, as is the case with
properties like being-prospectively-in-the-marketplace, it does not exist on a
comparable metaphysical footing with properties like being-(presently)-in-the-
marketplace.  Properties like being-prospectively-in-the-marketplace are etiolated
because they are potential properties.  Properties like having-been-in-the-
marketplace are etiolated because they are historical properties.  And it is this
etiolation that allows mutually exclusive past and future states of affairs to hold of
the same individual without contradiction.
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2.2 Growth: The Growing Argument
2.2.1 The puzzle
Another, and much more famous ancient puzzle about persistence is the Growing
Argument.  Although the name “Growing Argument” (^‰g^kÏjbklt iÏdlt)
was coined by the Academics in the 3rd-century BCE, the argument itself
originated with the 5th-century BCE comic playwright Epicharmus, and it survives
in the following fragment:
DEBTOR. If you like to add a pebble to an odd number—or to an even
one if you like—or if you take one away that is there, do you think it is
still the same number? CREDITOR. Of course not. D. And if you like to
add some further length to a yard-measure, or to cut something off from
what’s already there, will that measure still remain? C. No. D. Well,
consider men in this way too—for one is growing, one declining, and all
are changing all the time.  And what changes by nature, and never remains
in the same state, will be something different from what changed; and by
the same argument you and I are different yesterday, and different now,
and will be different again—and we are never the same. (23 B 2 Diels-
Kranz)15
The argument turns on the assumption that the personal identity of an
individual is a strict function of its material composition. Since the material
composition of our bodies, so the argument goes, is in a state of constant flux, and
since our identities are a strict function of this material composition, our personal
identities are also in constant flux.
2.2.2 Aristotle’s solution
While Plato mentions Epicharmus as a flux theorist at Theaetetus 152e, Aristotle
makes no explicit mention of either Epicharmus or his puzzle.  Still, Aristotle’s
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account of biological growth in Generation and Corruption 1.5 shows a
sensitivity to the issues raised in the puzzle and develops a way to deal with them.
As in the Growing Argument,16 Aristotle takes biological growth and diminution
to take place through the accrual and loss of matter to and from the growing
substance, and he devises a way for individuals to persist in the face of this fact.
But unlike the Growing Argument, Aristotle also takes it as a datum that
biological growth means growth in every part of the organism at once.  This,
however, is thought to pose an additional problem, since if growth were to occur
by accrual to every part of the organism at once, then the accruing matter would
need to pass through other matter as it disperses uniformly throughout the body,
and this is thought to be impossible.  Aristotle’s solution is a typical Aristotelian
compromise, one that meets all of his desiderata by distinguishing a way in which
growth takes place, viz., growth in the form, and a way in which it does not, viz.,
growth in the matter.  Matter increases in bulk, but it does not grow in the relevant
sense because it does not grow in every part.  Growth in the form, however, does
occur in every part, but not by the accrual of matter to every part.  Aristotle did
not have rubber balloons at hand, but he seems to imagine that biological
organisms grow as balloons do when they are filled with water, where the balloon
represents the form and the water represents the matter.  The volume of water can
increase by the in-flow of new water, but the new water need not disperse
uniformly throughout the balloon to effect an expansion of the balloon.  Since the
balloon gets larger while retaining the same shape, the form, as the shape of the
balloon, persists.  Aristotle talked of a tube (aulos) instead of a balloon.
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Alexander and Philoponus suggest that the tube is to be expanded by water
running through it, in much the same way as I have suggested with the balloon.17
Here is the passage from Aristotle:
This form, like a tube (aulos), is a force (dunamis) in matter.  If some
matter comes in which is potentially a tube, with its quantity potential too,
these [combined] tubes will be larger.  But if [the matter] can no longer
act, but is like water mixed with wine in ever greater amount which
eventually makes the wine watery or water, then it will produce a wasting
away.  The form, however, persists. (GC 322a28-33)
Sorabji points out that the “form” likened to a tube, here, is quite unlike
the form equated with the soul in De anima 2.1.18  In De anima 2.1, the soul as the
form of the body is defined as “the first actuality of a natural body which has life
potentially” (DA 412a27-8).  A first actuality is a hexis, or a state or disposition
for certain characteristic animate activities.  The form likened to a tube, however,
is a morphê, or a shape.  In Generation and Corruption 1.5, it is the form as a
morphê or a shape that persists through the change, viz., it is the same shape, just
bigger.
Now it may appear that Aristotle has made a mistake, here.  It is the
mistake that we had thought that we had spotted with respect to time-indexed
properties.  In that case, we were able to acquit Aristotle, by claiming that the
properties featured in the history of a form are etiolated enough to regard them as
part of the context in which a substance appears, but not so etiolated as to be
incapable of serving as criteria of synchronic and diachronic identity.  The
mistake would seem to be that in Generation and Corruption 1.5, Aristotle also
has the form undergoing a change, but it is a change that is difficult to see as
being in any way etiolated.  That is, Aristotle makes the form itself grow, and if
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this is permitted, it is difficult to see how the form will not be discernibly different
before and after the change.  And if the form of Coriscus-as-a-boy actually gets
bigger when he becomes Coriscus-as-a-man, and Coriscus simpliciter is Coriscus’
form, then Coriscus simpliciter will not remain diachronically identical through
the change.  In the case of inflating a balloon, we say that a spherical balloon
retains the same shape as we blow it up.  But surely, we mean the same kind of
shape, because token shapes have sizes, and clearly, the size of the balloon is
larger after it is inflated.  Similarly, if the form of Coriscus-as-a-man is larger than
the form of Coriscus-as-a-boy, then the forms are only the same in kind, not in
number.
A possible way out of this is for Aristotle to use the relation x  is
potentially_ y as a criterion for diachronic identity, as I suggested in Section
2.1.3.1 above.  In this case, the form of Coriscus-as-a-man is identical with the
form of Coriscus-as-a-boy, even though it is bigger, because the form of Coriscus-
as-a-boy is potentially_ the form of Coriscus-as-a-man.  And as I suggested above,
this identity could, in turn, be justified by an appeal to time-indexed properties
possessed by the growing form.  The form of Coriscus-as-a-man is identical with
the form of Coriscus-as-a-boy, even though it is bigger, because they share a
unique time-indexed property in their spatio-temporal histories.
2.2.3 Chrysippus’ solution
Another ancient response to the problems raised by the Growing Argument is the
one attributed to the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus by Philo of Alexandria, in his
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De aeternitate mundi 48 (SVF II 397).  Chrysippus, unlike Aristotle, responds
directly to the Growing Argument, and his response is interestingly different.  For
he not only provides a solution to the problem of persistence-in-flux, he also
mounts an attack on the legitimacy of the problem itself.  The passage from Philo
reads as follows:
(1) Chrysippus, the most distinguished member of their school, in his
work On the Growing [Argument], creates a freak of the following kind.
(2) Having first established that it is impossible for two peculiarly
qualified individuals (a·l Ÿa÷st mlfl·t) to occupy the same substance
jointly, (3) he says: “For the sake of argument, let one individual (qÌk
jùk) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (qÌk aù) as minus one foot.
Let the whole-limbed one be called Dion, the defective one Theon. Then
let one of Dion’s feet be amputated.” (4) The question arises which one of
them has perished, and his claim is that Theon is the stronger candidate.
(5) These are the words of a paradox-monger rather than of a speaker of
truth. For how can it be that Theon, who has had no part chopped off, has
been snatched away, while Dion, whose foot has been amputated, has not
perished? (6) “Necessarily,” says Chrysippus. “For Dion, the one whose
foot has been cut off, has collapsed into the defective substance of Theon.
And two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same
substrate. Therefore it is necessary that Dion remains while Theon has
perished.”19
Perhaps the most widely accepted interpretation of this passage is that of
David Sedley in his 1982 article “The Stoic Criterion of Identity.”20 In this
chapter, I will offer an interpretation that leaves intact the most important features
of Sedley’s account, chief among which is his view on the basic purpose of the
puzzle. Like Sedley, I take the fact that the puzzle appears in a work called On the
Growing Argument to indicate that it is a rejoinder to, and indeed, a reductio ad
absurdum of the Growing Argument. Where I diverge from Sedley’s approach, I
do so to shore it up against certain objections to which I think it is vulnerable. My
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chief concerns are to achieve a better fit with the text and to ensure that, since we
view the puzzle as a reductio ad absurdum, we do not take Chrysippus to be
deducing a contradiction by means of premises extrinsic to the Growing
Argument. Otherwise, Chrysippus’ reductio ad absurdum would fail in its
purpose to show that the Growing Argument is internally inconsistent.21
I also follow Sedley on two other significant interpretive points.  First, I
agree that since, from at least Chrysippus’ point of view, the puzzle runs up
against the principle that “two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the
same substrate,” we must suppose that we are dealing with one body at the outset
and that Theon is a part of Dion.  Otherwise, when the foot is chopped off, the
resulting state of affairs would not run up against this principle, and it is apparent
from the text that it must. Besides, as Sedley also points out, Philo essentially tells
us that Theon is a part of Dion several pages later in the same text (Philo, Aet. 49-
51). Prior to Sedley’s 1982 article, the consensus was “that [Dion and Theon] are
supposed to be two numerically distinct individuals who are qualitatively identical
except for the fact that Theon has a foot missing: hence when Dion’s foot is
amputated the two are made completely indistinguishable…”22  Second, the
justification for Dion’s survival Sedley supplies on behalf of Chrysippus seems
right. The amputee who is grieving over his severed foot must be Dion since
“Theon cannot have lost a foot that was never part of him in the first place.”23
Here is a very preliminary paraphrase of how Chrysippus’ argument
appears to run that incorporates these points. At the outset we have one living,
anatomically complete human being named Dion, a region of whose body has
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been named Theon – the whole body except one of its feet. The foot just
mentioned is then amputated, with the result that either Dion or Theon must
perish because, as Chrysippus tells us (and as Philo apparently agrees), “two
peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substrate.”24 A dispute
arises about who should perish. Chrysippus claims that Dion should survive and
Theon should perish, since it cannot be Theon who is grieving over his severed
foot. But Philo claims, on behalf of the Academics, that Theon must survive and
Dion perish, “for how can it be that Theon, who has had no part chopped off, has
been snatched away, while Dion, whose foot has been amputated, has not
perished?” I will argue in the sequel that the result favored by Philo is congenial
to what the Growing Argument would predict – that Theon should survive and
Dion should perish – while the result favored by Chrysippus is not. This, I
believe, supports Sedley’s claim that Chrysippus’ puzzle is a reductio ad
absurdum of the Growing Argument.
2.2.3.1 An interpretation of Chrysippus’ puzzle
If, as seems probable, it was the Academy of Arcesilaus that revived Epicharmus’
puzzle in the third century BCE, then it seems likely that the Academics meant it
to be a reductio ad absurdum of the very notion of personal identity.25 The
conclusion that our identities are in constant flux obviously conflicts with the
common sense view that personal identity is continuous over time. And given
Plutarch’s testimony that the Academy “suspended judgment about everything”
(Plutarch, Against Colotes 1120C, 1121E-1122A), we should probably assume
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that the Academic version of the Growing Argument is meant to be aporetic; that
is, instead of taking the Academics to be committed to one or the other of the
conflicting views – either that matter is the sole principle of identity, or that
identity is continuous over time – we should take them to be exposing a conflict
between these views and then suspending judgment about its resolution.  In light
of this, then, if Chrysippus’ puzzle is itself a reductio ad absurdum, it is a
reductio ad absurdum of a reductio ad absurdum, where Chrysippus exposes
unintended absurdities in the Academics’ Growing Argument.
Sedley says that the target of Chrysippus’ reductio ad absurdum is the
Growing Argument’s assumption that matter is the sole principle of identity26 –
that the personal identity of an individual is a strict function of its material
composition. Even though no such principle is expressed in the puzzle, this view
makes good sense of a premise that would otherwise be quite baffling – the fact
that Theon and Dion are apparently related to each other as part to whole.27
Chrysippus’ reductio ad absurdum comprises, basically, a main argument with a
corollary.  By reducing to absurdity the premise that Theon and Dion are related
as part to whole, it also reduces to absurdity the assumption that matter is the sole
principle of identity, because the former is validly deduced from the latter. Thus,
Sedley says that Chrysippus “borrows from the Growing Argument’s own
presuppositions” to “concoct” a premise in which Theon and Dion are related to
each other as part to whole. “According to the Growing Argument,” he says,
“every material addition to or subtraction from an individual results in his
replacement by a new individual; and since in such cases the old and the new
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individual are related as part to whole or whole to part, the Academic argument
does indeed imply that whole and part constitute distinct individuals – the very
premise that Chrysippus’ own paradox presupposes.”28 The material additions and
subtractions Sedley has in mind are, no doubt, the changes in bodily bulk caused
by the ingestion of food and excretion. I think, however, that Chrysippus has
something a bit more bizarre in mind.29 We are meant, first, to imagine an
individual named Theon, who happens to lack a foot. Then we suppose that for a
certain restricted period, Theon’s body only experiences one material (and quite
miraculous) fluctuation – he grows a new foot. According to the Growing
Argument, since the material composition of Theon has changed, we now have a
new individual. Let us call him Dion. But since the personal identity of each
individual is a strict function of its material composition, and since all of the flesh
that constituted Theon is still present in a particular region of the individual that
we now call Dion, we must still view this region of Dion as a numerically distinct
individual that is related to Dion as part to whole. Therefore, Theon is related to
Dion as part to whole.
But at first sight, there appears to be a problem. Although this seems to be
a valid deduction from the principle that personal identity is a strict function of
material composition, prima facie it is in direct conflict with the conclusion of the
Growing Argument that growth is actually “generation” and “destruction.”
According to Plutarch, the Growing Argument concludes that “the prevailing
convention is wrong to call these [material fluctuations] processes of growth and
decay: rather they should be called generation and destruction, since they
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transform the thing from what it is into something else” (Comm. not. 1083A-
1084A). Likewise, the Epicharmus fragment concludes that as a man grows, his
former self “withers” (23 B 2 Diels-Kranz). Therefore, since old individuals
allegedly “wither” when new individuals come into being as a result of growth,
Theon should have perished when he grew the foot, rather than becoming part of
Dion. Moreover, Plutarch, who is a spokesman for the Academics, seems to think
that the notion of two people being in one body is ridiculous. Plutarch, in fact,
criticizes the Stoic notion of the peculiarly qualified individual precisely because
he says it implies the view that each of us is composed of a multiplicity of entities
— a parcel of matter, and a peculiarly qualified individual. For comic effect,
Plutarch even likens the Stoics to Pentheus, the deranged king of Thebes, who in
seeing double was “going crazy in his arithmetic” (Comm. not. 1083a-1084a).
These considerations raise two questions. First, are there resources within
the Growing Argument, as it is transmitted to us, to resist the conclusion that
Theon is a living part of Dion? If there are, then we will clearly need to rethink
our position that Theon is a living part of Dion and perhaps even our claim that
Chrysippus’ puzzle is a reductio ad absurdum. The reason, of course, is that we
cannot imagine a reductio ad absurdum of the Growing Argument to include
premises that no proponent of that argument would accept. Second, if there are no
such resources and the contradiction we have just discussed is unavoidable, can
one of the conflicting claims be rejected, and if so, which one? Can one reject the
contention that growth is actually “generation” and “destruction” or must one
reject the conclusion that Theon is a living part of Dion?
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These questions can only be answered by taking a closer look at the texts.
The Epicharmus fragment frames the argument as follows:
DEBTOR. If you like to add a pebble to an odd number—or to an even
one if you like—or if you take one away that is there, do you think it is
still the same number? CREDITOR. Of course not. D. And if you like to
add some further length to a yard-measure, or to cut something off from
what’s already there, will that measure still remain? C. No. D. Well,
consider men in this way too—for one is growing, one declining, and all
are changing all the time” (23 B 2 Diels-Kranz).30
It seems fairly clear that this version of the Growing Argument permits the same
inference that allows Sedley to conclude that Theon is a part of Dion. If I add one
pebble to a set of, say, eight pebbles, the number of pebbles would now be nine,
but the original eight pebbles would still be present as a subset of the new total.
Plutarch’s most extended description of the Growing Argument seems to allow
precisely the same inference. Plutarch lists the premises of the argument as
follows: “all particular substances are in flux and motion, releasing some things
from themselves and receiving others which reach them from elsewhere; the
numbers or quantities which these are added to or subtracted from do not remain
the same but become different as the aforementioned arrivals and departures
cause the substance to be transformed.” And from these premises Plutarch
concludes that “the prevailing convention is wrong to call these [material
fluctuations] processes of growth and decay: rather they should be called
generation and destruction, since they transform the thing from what it is into
something else” (Comm. not. 1083a-1084a).31 It seems clear that if we imagine a
case in which something “receives some things from elsewhere” while not at the
same time “releasing some things from itself,” nothing in Plutarch’s account
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would block the inference that “the old and the new individual are related as part
to whole or whole to part.” Just as in the Epicharmus fragment, every change in
the "number or quantity" of material parts in an individual results in a change in
its identity.32 And if growth is simply the augmentation of an existing set of
material parts, then clearly the unaugmented set will persist as a subset of the
augmented set. Granted, an Academic might insist that an individual must be a
discrete body, which would defeat the line of argument I am attributing to
Chrysippus. But this would amount to introducing a new premise that appears
nowhere in our sources and does not strictly follow from the view that matter is
the sole principle of identity.  Indeed, one could imagine Chrysippus’ answer to
the suggestion that individuals must be discrete: “Oh, so material composition is
not the sole principle of identity after all.  Now it seems to be material
composition and discreteness.”  If the Growing Argument did not contain the
requirement of discreteness, then there would have been no reason for Chrysippus
to recognize it in his On the Growing Argument. The Academics may well claim,
in a rejoinder to Chrysippus, that an individual must be a discrete body, but this
should have no effect on how we interpret the text at hand.33  One might also
object that since the Growing Argument envisages diminution, the set/subset
relationship we have been considering would be disrupted when diminution
occurs at the same time as growth. But the Growing Argument does not say that
growth and diminution acting in concert constitute generation and destruction.
Rather, the claim is that growth and diminution each constitute both generation
and destruction, and for this reason it is perfectly legitimate to consider the case
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of growth in isolation. This feature of the Growing argument is quite clear in the
Epicharmus fragment. Whether Epicharmus is describing addition or subtraction,
the alleged outcome is the same: the old number perishes when the new one
comes into being. Plutarch’s language is more ambiguous, but since he ascribes
his argument to Epicharmus without signaling any disagreement, I see no reason
to interpret Plutarch’s account of the Growing Argument differently. When we
consider the case of growth in isolation, there is nothing in the Growing
Argument to block the inference from the assumption that matter is the sole
principle of identity to the possibility that Theon could be a part of Dion.
Since this is the case, and a contradiction is unavoidable between this
result and the view that growth is actually “generation” and “destruction,” we can
now turn to the question of which of the two, if either, can be rejected. The fact
that the claim that growth is actually “generation” and “destruction” appears as a
conclusion of the Growing Argument helps us here. That is, the foregoing
analysis seems to show us that Plutarch and Epicharmus are wrong to claim that
the premises of their argument establish that growth is actually “generation” and
“destruction.” The supersession of successive individuals undergoing growth
results in the incorporation of the superseded individuals instead of their
destruction.  Thus, it appears that one must reject the claim that growth is actually
“generation” and “destruction” because it has not been validly inferred from the
premises of the Growing Argument. This result, I think, implies that Sedley’s
view that Theon is a living part of Dion need only be modified to recognize that
Chrysippus must have undertaken a certain sort of argument in On the Growing
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Argument prior to the passage Philo summarizes – one that that convicts the
Growing Argument of the logical error I have just described, and forces this
premise on the Academics against their will.
2.2.3.2 Interpretative problems
There also appears to be a problem with including, in a reductio ad absurdum of
the Growing Argument, the premise that “two peculiarly qualified individuals
cannot occupy the same substrate.”  I doubt Sedley’s claim, that a proponent of
the Growing Argument would accept this as a “common sense principle,” chiefly
because I find it incredible that the Academics would even acknowledge, much
less think it common sense, that there is such a thing as a peculiarly qualified
individual. This is because the “peculiarly qualified individual” was a Stoic
invention intended to neutralize their own (the Academics’) Growing Argument.
Sedley says that Plutarch, arguing on behalf of the Academics, implicitly accepts
the existence of peculiarly qualified individuals in his treatise "On Common
Conceptions.” But if we consider the nature of the cited passage, it seems that this
cannot be true. The passage Sedley refers to (Comm. not. 1077C-E) is itself a
reductio ad absurdum of another Stoic doctrine – that Zeus and Providence come
to occupy the same aether during the Conflagration. Arguing on behalf of the
Academics, Plutarch supposes that Zeus and Providence are peculiarly qualified
individuals, so that he can draw the unwelcome conclusion for the Stoics that their
story about Zeus and Providence requires two peculiarly qualified individuals to
occupy the same substrate. As in any reductio, Plutarch entertains premises he
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need not accept – that peculiarly qualified individuals exist – in order to bring out
inconsistencies in a contested Stoic theory. Plutarch, in fact, seems to think that
the idea of a peculiarly qualified individual is manifestly absurd.  For as I pointed
out above, it implies a claim that is non-evident, if not obviously false, viz., that
each of us is composed of a multiplicity of entities. It is clear from this that
Plutarch does not countenance the existence of peculiarly qualified individuals,
and it is even clearer that he would not think that any proposition about them
could qualify as common sense.
So, how should we view the premise that “two peculiarly qualified
individuals cannot occupy the same substrate” in light of this difficulty? I think
this obstacle can be overcome as long as we consider that the very definition of
personal identity is in dispute. When a Stoic or a proponent of the Growing
Argument confronts a puzzle like this, each will construe the term "individual"
according to his own definition (granted, of course, that an Academic would take
such a definition dialectically). Consequently, we must keep in mind two points of
view as we run through the argument: The Growing Argument defines the
individual as a particular collection of material parts. Thus, when a proponent of
the Growing Argument is told that Dion and Theon are individuals he will argue
that they are collections of material parts. The Stoics, on the other hand, hold that
if Dion and Theon are individuals, they must be peculiarly qualified individuals.
So they, of course, will think of Dion and Theon as such when they consider the
puzzle. It is important to note that Philo does not explicitly state that Dion and
Theon are peculiarly qualified individuals. And it is also telling that he reports in
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indirect discourse that “it is impossible for two peculiarly qualified individuals
(a·l Ÿa÷st mlfl·t) to occupy the same substance jointly” but then switches to a
direct quotation as follows: “[Chrysippus] says, ‘For the sake of argument, let one
individual (qÌk jùk) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (qÌk aù) as minus
one foot.’” This leads me to suspect that the two premises just stated are not part
of a continuous quotation, and that the qÌk jùk and qÌk aù in line 3 need not
refer back to the a·l Ÿa÷st mlfl·t in line 2. Certainly, at the end of the passage
Chrysippus does say that one of the two must perish because two peculiarly
qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substrate. But this just reflects the
Stoic diagnosis of the problem, and there is nothing to prevent a proponent of the
Growing Argument from interpreting this stipulation in an entirely different way
– that two (not necessarily peculiarly qualified) individuals cannot occupy the
same substrate.
We can also take comfort in the fact that Chrysippus’ reductio ad
absurdum still works, even if we assume that Dion and Theon are not peculiarly
qualified individuals: When Dion’s foot is amputated, the Growing Argument
requires that we call the amputee Theon, because we again have the same
collection of flesh that we initially attached this name to. But, as Sedley suggests,
there is a good prima facie reason to call the amputee Dion.  For why would
Theon be grieving over a foot he never had? Thus, the Growing Argument says
that the amputee is Theon, but common sense says that it is Dion. The amputee
cannot be both Dion and Theon because of the principle that two individuals
cannot share all of their material parts. So since Dion is alive, then Theon must be
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dead just as Chrysippus claims, and the Growing Argument is contradicted
without making use of any propositions about peculiarly qualified individuals.
At first sight, it seems somewhat puzzling that the Academics would
accept the stipulation that “two (not necessarily peculiarly qualified) individuals
cannot occupy the same substrate,” since they might still have escaped the
conclusion that Theon is dead by saying that the amputee is both Dion and Theon
– that Dion and Theon are still numerically distinct individuals, but their spatio-
temporal histories have converged. The stipulation that “two (not necessarily
peculiarly qualified) individuals cannot occupy the same substrate” is designed to
rule out this possibility, and this is why Chrysippus would want it in the puzzle.
But it is unsatisfying to simply claim, as Sedley does, that the Academics should
accept it as common sense, because at this point in the argument, the Academics
would have already been forced to accept that Theon and Dion have some of their
material parts on common. And this is a strange thing to admit indeed, since
Theon and Dion are not related as Siamese twins, for instance, but as part to
whole. In this context – being already so far beyond the pale of common sense – it
seems like a perfectly reasonable strategy for the Academics to bite the bullet and
say that Dion and Theon can share all of their material parts, if by doing so they
can forgo the additional embarrassment of admitting that Theon is dead.
The Academics’ acceptance of this principle makes more sense if we
consider the fact that by insisting that matter is the sole principle of identity they
seem to propose a criterion of identity. The relevant property of a criterion is that
it allows one to make unequivocal judgments. An underlying assumption of the
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Growing Argument is that given a sufficiently precise specification of an object’s
material composition, one should be able to determine that object’s identity
unequivocally. If this were not the case, then some additional principle would be
required and one could not hold that material composition is the sole principle of
identity. The requirement that “two individuals cannot occupy the same substrate”
seems just to reflect the view that one should assign at most one identity to any
collection of matter, which follows from viewing material composition as a
criterion of identity. I tried to capture this earlier by saying that the Growing
Argument assumes identity to be a strict function of material composition, since
when we call a relation a function, we typically mean that every element in its
domain maps to at most one element in its codomain. Thus, the requirement that
“two individuals cannot occupy the same substrate” is simply a uniqueness
requirement that says that if we assign two names to the same collection of
matter, they both refer to a single individual.
I have argued that Chrysippus’ puzzle is a reductio ad absurdum of the
Growing Argument that can be understood without any reference to “peculiarly
qualified individuals.” Why, then, are peculiarly qualified individuals mentioned
at all if the concept seems to serve no purpose in Chrysippus’ reductio ad
absurdum? I suspect that it is because Philo is drawing from a summation of
Chrysippus’ attack on the Growing Argument.  That summation must have
included a Stoic diagnosis of why the argument fails.  My conjecture is that
Chrysippus began by telling the Academics that the Growing Argument fixes on
an apparently commonsensical yet misguided concept of personal identity. This,
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as Chrysippus saw it, is the root of all of the trouble. An entity must be
"peculiarly qualified" to count as an individual because, as we have seen,
attempting to define an individual solely in terms of its matter does not work.
Next in the summation, Chrysippus reminds us of the general principle that he
“established in advance” – that “it is impossible for two peculiarly qualified
individuals to occupy the same substance jointly.” Chrysippus has made it clear
that the Growing Argument, so far from implying that growth and diminution are
really generation and destruction, implies instead that growth results in a
multiplicity of individuals that are related as parts to wholes. Moreover, even if
we allow, per impossibile and just "for the sake of argument," that Dion and
Theon are peculiarly qualified individuals sharing the same matter, it will turn out
that one of them must perish, not because an individual is identical to his matter,
but because of a metaphysical limitation on peculiarly qualified individuals – that
they cannot occupy the same matter jointly. It may be that, according to
Chrysippus, having no material parts in common is a necessary condition for two
entities to be numerically distinct. But, at any rate, it is clear that for Chrysippus
material composition cannot be a sufficient criterion of identity.
The irony must not have been lost on Chrysippus that he had convicted the
Academics of the very absurdity they claimed was implied by the doctrine of
peculiarly qualified individuals — that individuals consist of a multiplicity of
entities. It is the Academics, rather, who have “gone crazy in their arithmetic” by
taking up the Growing Argument. Of course, the peculiarly qualified individual is
not a multiplicity but rather a single individual under different descriptions — as a
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substrate, and as a peculiarly qualified substrate. This is not the way the man in
the street thinks about identity, but the man in the street is often wrong. When the
Stoic talks of “common conceptions” he does not mean “common opinions,” and
indeed, the common opinion that matter is the sole principle of identity is, on this
showing, incoherent. The Academics set out to show that the very notion of
personal identity is incoherent by exposing a conflict between two venerable
items of common opinion – that matter is the sole principle of identity, and that
identity is continuous over time. What Chrysippus’ puzzle shows is that one of
those common opinions is incoherent by itself, and this resolves the Academic
aporia.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1The phrase “becoming different from oneself” also sounds suspiciously Platonic,
since it turns up repeatedly in several aporiai on change in the second part of the
Parmenides. See Parm. 138c1-2, 139b5-6, 139c2-3, 139e4-4, 140a8; see also,
“older/younger than oneself”: 141a2-4,7, 141b1-2, 141c3-4, 141d2-3, 152d5-6,
152e2-3,9.
2 I take the persisting, “underlying something,” here, to refer to “the man” in the
examples of the preceding passage.  The “underlying something,” in this context,
is, therefore, a substance.  Later in the chapter, the term “underlying something”
also comes to refer to the matter that persists through a substantial change, but
this represents a shift in generality.  Thus, from the beginning of the chapter to
190a31, the “underlying something” refers to a substance, since it is a substance
that persists through growth and alteration.
3 David Lewis, “The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics,” in Metaphysics: The Big
Questions, eds. D. Zimmerman and P. Van Inwagen (Oxford: Basil and
Blackwell, 1998), 206.
4 Fred D. Miller, "Aristotle on the Reality of Time," Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie 56 (1974): 135.
5 Owen, “Aristotle on Time,” 20.  Hussey, Aristotle’s Physics III & IV, 139.
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6 On “serious tensing” see Dean Zimmerman, “Temporary Intrinsics and
Presentism,” in Zimmerman and Van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 206-219.  Another
approach is to take all properties, including intrinsic properties, to be relations to
times.  The traditional objection to this approach is that it leaves no room for
having properties simpliciter.  I do not consider this possibility on behalf of
Aristotle because I believe that the possibility of having properties simpliciter
would be a non-negotiable desideratum of any Aristotelian theory of persistence.
7 Sally Haslanger, “Persistence Through Time,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Metaphysics, eds. Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 323 n. 14.
8 Dean Zimmerman, “Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism,” in Zimmerman and
Van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 212.
9 For the way in which the past exists, see Section 2.1.3.3.3 below.
10 Michael Frede, “Substance in Aristotle’s Metaphysics” and “Individuals in
Aristotle” in Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1987), 49-78.
11 In this chapter of the Physics, Aristotle argues that processes must be temporally
unbroken to count as numerically single, and he brings up hexeis like health as an
analogous example.  I take it that when he says “the same argument applies in
each case,” Aristotle is claiming that hexeis also must meet this requirement.
143
                                                                                                                                      
12 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1984),
Chapter 10.
13 Philoponus and Alexander both claim that the matter cannot be replaced in one
go (see Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators: 200-600 AD, A
Sourcebook, Volume 3, Logic and Metaphysics, (London: Duckworth, 2005),
177).  This would rule out Parfit’s teletransportation scenario in advance as a case
of persistence.
14 See Alvin Plantinga, “Actualism and Possible Worlds” in Essays in the
Metaphysics of Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 103-121.
15 Trans. Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1979), 106-7.
16 I will call it the “Growing Argument,” although Aristotle obviously would not
have known it as such.
17 Alexander Mixt. Ch. 16, 235,23 ff.; Philoponus GC 105,22-6, 107, 28.
18 Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, 176.
19 Trans. AA. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume 1,
Translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 171-2.
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20 David Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion of Identity,” Phronesis 27 (1982): 255-75.
21 By an extrinsic premise, I mean a premise that is neither explicit in the
argument nor plausibly ascribed to the arguer as common sense.
22  As parties to the previous consensus, Sedley cites M.E. Reesor, “The Stoic
Concept of Quality,” American Journal of Philology 75 (1954): 40-58; J.M. Rist,
“Categories and their Uses” in Stoic Philosophy, ed. J.M. Rist (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 152-72.
23 Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 269.
24 Philo, who is on the side of the Academics, seems to just assume this principle
when he speaks as if the only problem at issue after the amputation is how to
determine who has died.
25  See Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 272 n. 17.
26 At Comm. not. 1059B ff., Plutarch lays out the dialectical context for the
dialogue in which the account of the Growing Argument is given (at 1083A-
1084A): The interlocutor of Diadumenus has just come from a group of Stoic
friends who have been denouncing the “older Academics.” The interlocutor says
that one of his friends had opined that it was providential that Chrysippus had
come after Arcesilaus and before Carneades, because by means of his rejoinders
to Arcesilaus, Chrysippus had left many aids to sense perception. Given this
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background, I follow Sedley in ascribing the Academic formulation of the
Growing Argument given at 1083A-1084A to Arcesilaus. (See Sedley, “The Stoic
Criterion,” 270.)
27 See above, p. 126-7, for reasons why this premise must be part of the puzzle.
Sorabji on p. 184-5 of his Philosophy of the Commentators, provides an
interpretation that does not include this premise, but I do not see how he can
justify its exclusion from the puzzle, given the reasons in my footnote 61.
28 Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 270.
29 One may cavil that what follows is too bizarre, and that if Chrysippus meant
something like this, he would have had Theon grow a mole instead of a foot. I
will show in the sequel, however, that bringing in the growth of a discrete new
part makes better overall sense of the puzzle, even though it produces a scenario
that is biologically impossible.
30 Trans. Barnes, Presocratic Philosophers, 106-7.
31 Trans. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, 166.
32 Note that this is different from saying that the "number or quantity" of material
parts alone is criterial for identity, which would yield the absurd consequence that
all equally numbered sets are identical.
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33 If one is inclined to insist that discreteness is an ineliminable part of the concept
of individuality, and that it may be assumed as common sense in any discussion
of individuality, then, of course, my solution will not be attractive.  For my part, I
see no reason to regard the claim that individuals are discrete as an analytic truth.
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Chapter 3: Limitations of the Aristotelian Concept of Motion
1.0 INTRODUCTION
We have seen that a central feature of Aristotle’s concept of motion is the idea
that a moving object passes between opposing termini.  The termini of a motion
serve a number of important functions.  They supply key identity conditions of a
motion, and in the case of the terminus ad quem, they also provide a normative
goal, which I have shown can be used to define the order of the motion’s phases.
We also saw that the termini are related to each other by a special teleological
potentiality, which provides the metaphysical basis for this ordering, and which
may also be used as the basis for establishing the diachronic identity of the
moving object.  These are substantial philosophical benefits, and do much to
commend Aristotle’s general approach.  But the approach, I think, is not without
disadvantages, and I will highlight one of these disadvantages in the present
chapter, viz., the idea that motion is simply the traversal from place A at time t to
place B at time t + 1 makes it impossible for Aristotle to account for how motions
come to be and pass away.  For this purpose, I will consider an ancient puzzle
about motion that first appears in Plato at Parmenides 155e-157b.
1.1 The puzzle
The puzzle, as Plato gives it, can be roughly summarized as follows:
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At every time, a given object must either be in motion or at rest; there is
no third possibility.  Also, an object can never be simultaneously both in
motion and at rest.  The only way for an object to be both in motion and at
rest is for it to be in motion and at rest at different times.  But how does a
thing come to be in motion at one time and at rest at another?  It cannot
switch at a time when it is in motion.  Nor can it switch at a time when it is
at rest.  This would seem to exhaust the possibilities for the times when
the switch could occur.  But a thing can not change without changing.
Plato asks, essentially, when and how an object switches between motion
and rest.  Aristotle takes up the puzzle in the sixth book of the Physics (Phys.
234a34-b5), but he recasts it as a problem about what to call an instant separating
a period of motion from a period of rest; i.e., shall we call it an instant of motion,
an instant of rest, an instant of both motion and rest, or an instant of neither
motion nor rest?  Saying that the dividing instant is an instant of both motion and
rest violates the law of non-contradiction, while saying that it is an instant of
neither motion nor rest violates the law of the excluded middle.  But saying that it
is just an instant of motion or just an instant of rest seems arbitrary, since it
bounds both the period of motion and the period of rest.
Plato’s and Aristotle’s versions of the puzzle each focus on different but
important aspects of the transition between motion and rest.  Aristotle inquires
about the status of the instant dividing periods of motion and rest, while Plato
inquires about what is involved in arriving at and departing from this instant.
Plato supposes that the transition between motion and rest involves an
instantaneous event of switching, which has the disadvantage of exacerbating the
problem of what to call the state in which it occurs; i.e., since the switch is itself a
motion, how can the switch be a switch between motion and rest?  Since
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Aristotle’s formulation of the puzzle is unencumbered by this mistake, and it is
surely a mistake, I will concentrate on it, but still honor Plato’s point that it is
essential to give an account of what is involved in arriving at and leaving the
instant of change. As for solutions to the puzzle, I will consider both Aristotle’s
solution, and what I think is the best solution from the modern literature, which is
the one proposed by Richard Sorabji in his Time, Creation and the Continuum.1
1.2 Aristotle’s solution
Aristotle’s exposition of the puzzle is somewhat truncated, compared to the one I
have given above and the one that appears in Sorabji.  Aristotle does not consider
the possibilities of saying that the instant in question is just an instant of motion or
just an instant of rest (the latter option is the one advocated by Sorabji).  Rather,
he assumes that, if one allows motion or rest at an instant, then one must say that
an instant dividing periods of motion and rest must be an instant of both motion
and rest, since “it is the same instant that belongs to both the periods [of motion
and of rest]” (Phys. 234a34).  Aristotle argues that, since, the law of non-
contradiction is non-negotiable, we must reject the assumption that there can be
motion or rest at an instant, and this, he implies, avoids violating the law of the
excluded middle because “the motion of that which is in motion and the rest of
that which is at rest must occupy [a period of] time” (Phys. 234b8-9).  Aristotle’s
point seems to be that the law of the excluded middle does not apply to motion
and rest at instants because they are not the sort of things to exist at instants —
motion and rest are defined over periods of time.  This allows Aristotle to solve
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the puzzle by saying that the instant dividing periods of motion and rest is an
instant of neither motion nor rest, and that this is the case because all instants are
instants of neither motion nor rest.
1.3 Sorabji’s solution
Sorabji proposes to solve the puzzle by giving an argument why the instant
dividing a period of motion and a period of rest should be an instant of rest, or,
what amounts to the same thing, why there should be a first and a last instant of
rest, but no first or last instant of motion.  His key assumption is that deceleration
to and acceleration from a stand be continuous, so that there is no first or last
velocity above zero.  If we also make the natural assumption that something is in
motion if and only if it has a positive velocity, then there will be no first or last
instant of motion, and this at least poses no problem with supposing that there is a
first and last instant of rest; i.e., an instant of rest at the beginning of a motion
which is the last instant of a previous period of rest and an instant of rest at the
end of a motion which is the first instant of a succeeding period of rest, where
each instant of rest is an instant of zero velocity.
1.4 Problems with Aristotle’s solution
A difficulty with Aristotle’s solution is that it creates a mismatch between the
spatial and kinetic termini of a motion, because the spatial termini can be punctual
while the kinetic termini cannot.  By spatial termini, I mean the places at which a
motion begins and ends.  By kinetic termini, I mean the states of rest which the
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moving body passes from and to at the beginning and end of every motion.
According to Aristotle, spatial termini can be punctual while kinetic termini
cannot because, while it is possible to be in a punctual place at a punctual time, it
is not possible to be in a state of rest at a punctual time.  A moving object is not at
rest, according to Aristotle, until some period of time has elapsed at the same
location (Phys. 234a24-b9; 237a14-15; 263b21).  In Aristotle’s account, unlike
Sorabji’s, there is no last instant of rest to bound a motion at the beginning, nor is
there a first instant of rest to bound it at the end (Phys. 234a24-b9; 237a14-15).
The instant bounding a period of motion and rest does not belong to either the
period of motion or the period of rest, because it is an instant of neither motion
nor rest.  The difficulty with this view is that there will be an instant at the end of
every motion in which the spatial terminus has been reached, while the kinetic
terminus has not, because a period of time will need to have elapsed for the body
to be at rest.
Sorabji’s solution to the puzzle solves this problem by envisaging a last
instant of rest to bound a motion at the beginning and a first instant of rest to
bound it at the end.  Thus, he can say that, at the end of a motion, the moving
body will reach the kinetic and spatial termini at the same time.2  But there is
another, and perhaps more important point at which Sorabji’s solution succeeds
where Aristotle’s does not.  The original puzzle, as Plato conceived it, wondered
not only about the status of the instant dividing periods of motion and rest, but
also about what is involved in arriving at and leaving this instant.  Sorabji’s
solution solves this problem beautifully by supposing that there is no first or last
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velocity above zero, and that the velocity increases continuously from a value of
zero at the beginning of a motion and decreases continuously to a value of zero at
the end of a motion.
1.5 What about having no first or last non-instantaneous velocity above zero?
Sorabji’s solution obviously differs from Aristotle’s in that it envisages rest at an
instant.  It is also clear that it envisages motion at an instant, insofar as it makes
an instant of rest a limiting case of instantaneous velocity (i.e., where velocity is
equal to zero).  There is a way, however, to get Sorabji’s condition that there is no
first or last velocity above zero without supposing that there is motion at an
instant.  In the case of coming to a stand at the end of a motion we need only
suppose that there is an infinite sequence of motion subsegments with non-
instantaneous velocities that converge or pass to zero, e.g., with the times and
distances divided into subsegments according to an infinite geometric sequence
such as 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, …, 1/2n, … (n = 1, 2, 3, …).  Similarly, in the case of
accelerating from a stand at the beginning of a motion we need only suppose that
there is an infinite sequence of motion subsegments with non-instantaneous
velocities that pass from zero, e.g., with the times and distances divided into
subsegments according to an infinite geometric sequence such as …, 1/2n, …1/8,
1/4, 1/2 (n  = … 3, 2, 1).  The condition that there is no first or last non-
instantaneous velocity above zero will hold if it is possible for the moving object
to pass through all of the motion subsegments in the course of passing to or from
the instant bounding the end or beginning of the motion.  This solves Plato’s
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problem of explaining what is involved in arriving at and departing from the
instant of change.  It also addresses Aristotle’s problem of reaching the spatial
terminus before reaching the kinetic terminus.  Following this strategy, one can
use the instant at which zero is reached —an instant that coincides with the arrival
at the spatial terminus— as the kinetic terminus.  And one can do this even if the
instant is one of neither motion nor rest.  Thus, for instance, Aristotle could say
that as a train reaches its destination, it passes through an infinite decreasing
sequence of non-instantaneous velocities — i.e., distances traveled over times
elapsed — and that this is what it means to reach the kinetic terminus.
2.0 AN ARISTOTELIAN ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS NO FIRST OR LAST
VELOCITY ABOVE ZERO?
At first sight, there appears to be an account of acceleration and deceleration in
Physics book 6 that fits this description.  Indeed, Aristotle’s argument that there is
no first time of coming to a stand (Phys. 238b23-239a10), since it assumes that
times of coming to a stand are infinitely divisible into subintervals that are also
times of coming to a stand, appears to enable us to construct a scenario from
Aristotelian premises where there is no first or last non-instantaneous velocity
above zero.
The argument in question can be summarized as follows:  Since there is no
motion at an instant (Phys. 234a24-b9; 237a14-15), times of motion must be
periods of time (Phys. 239a3-b4).  Since times of motion are periods of time and
periods of time are infinitely divisible, times of motion must also be infinitely
divisible.  Since times of coming to a stand are times of motion, times of coming
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to a stand must be infinitely divisible as well.  If times of coming to a stand are
infinitely divisible, there is no first time of coming to a stand.
To explain why this is so, Aristotle imagines trying to single out a first
period of coming to a stand.  Since this period can be divided in half, the first half
of the period that was singled out is earlier than the undivided period taken as a
whole.  Likewise, this half period can be divided again, and the first quarter
period will be earlier than the undivided half period taken as a whole.  Thus, the
period initially taken to be first may be divided according to the infinite geometric
sequence …, 1/2n, …1/8, 1/4, 1/2 (n = … 3, 2, 1), where each of an infinite
number of non-overlapping subintervals of time is a better candidate for being the
first time of coming to a stand than its successor (Phys. 238b23-239b4).  Aristotle
should also say that there is no last time of coming to a stand for the same
reasons, since any candidate for the last period of coming to a stand may be
divided according to the infinite geometric sequence 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, …, 1/2n, … (n
= 1, 2, 3, …), where each of an infinite number of non-overlapping subintervals of
time is a better candidate for being the last time of coming to a stand than its
predecessor.
This argument rests on what is probably the unwarranted assumption that
times of coming to a stand are infinitely divisible into subintervals that are also
times of coming to a stand.  This assumption is unwarranted because a thing
might momentarily halt its deceleration within a time that still meets the minimal
condition for being a period of coming to a stand, viz., any time period t which is
a period of coming to a stand must be divisible into at least two non-overlapping
155
subintervals such that for all n, if n > 1, then dn/tn < dn-1/tn-1, where dn is the
distance traveled during subinterval n, and tn is the duration of subinterval n.  But
for Aristotle to argue that there is no first or last time of coming to a stand based
on the infinite divisibility of time and distance, a much stronger condition is
required, viz., times of coming to a stand must be divisible into an infinite number
of non-overlapping subintervals such that for all n, if n > 1, then dn/tn < dn-1/tn-1.
Thus, for any time period t of coming to a stand, to any infinite sequence of non-
overlapping subintervals of this period (e.g., with their lengths determined by the
sequence 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, …, 1/2n, … (n = 1, 2, 3, …)) there must correspond an
infinite sequence of non-overlapping subsegments of distance traversed which
result in an infinite decreasing sequence of non-instantaneous velocities vn = dn/tn
for each of the non-overlapping subintervals of time and subsegments of distance.
On this account, a period of coming to a stand in which the end coincides
with the end of the motion as a whole will be a period in which an infinite
decreasing sequence of non-instantaneous velocities converges or passes to 0 as n
becomes infinitely large.  So it is possible to give an account of deceleration to a
stand where there is no last non-instantaneous velocity above zero using a
common sense definition of what it means to come to a stand combined with
Aristotle’s assumption that times of coming to a stand are infinitely divisible into
subintervals that are also times of coming to a stand.
This is an interpretation of an isolated passage, of course, and the
plausibility of ascribing it to Aristotle depends on whether it can be squared with
the rest of Aristotle’s philosophy.  I am not optimistic that this can be done,
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particularly in the light of certain aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy of
mathematics.  By saying that an infinite sequence of non-instantaneous velocities
converges or passes to 0 as n becomes infinitely large, we have attributed to
Aristotle the idea that one can traverse the whole of an infinite sequence.  There is
good reason to doubt, however, that Aristotle believed that this could be
accomplished.  And I will argue that Aristotle must accept that the whole of this
sequence must be traversed, otherwise, he cannot claim that that the moving body
ultimately arrives at a state of rest.  If the whole of the infinite sequence is not
traversed, one is entitled to ask when and how, precisely, does the transition from
motion to a period of rest take place?
3.0 ARISTOTLE AND INFINITE SEQUENCES AND SERIES
Aristotle discusses infinite sequences and series in connection with two different
sorts of applications: geometrical applications having to do with the exhaustion of
magnitudes by means of inscription or partial summation, and kinematic
applications relating to the Zenonian paradoxes of motion.  An example of a
geometrical application is found in book 3, chapter 6 of the Physics:
If we take a determinate part of a finite magnitude and add another part
determined by the same ratio (not taking in the same amount of the
original whole), and so on, we shall not traverse the given magnitude.  But
if we increase the ratio of the part, so as always to take in the same
amount, we shall traverse the magnitude, for every finite magnitude is
exhausted by means of any determinate quantity however small. (Phys. 3.6
206b6-12)
“A determinate part of a finite magnitude” is just some fraction of a finite
magnitude; e.g., one half.  So to take “another part determined by the same ratio”
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just means to take, for instance, half (i.e., the same ratio) of what is left, e.g., one
quarter.  “Not taking in the same amount of the original whole” means, e.g.,
taking one quarter in the second step instead of taking one half again.  “And so
on” means that we extend this process ad infinitum (i.e., 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + …) so
that the sum will approach, ad infinitum, the “finite magnitude” which I have
assumed to be 1 unit in size for illustration.  Aristotle would have been familiar
with this notion of infinite approach from the geometry of his day, and in
particular, from the problem of squaring the circle.  Aristotle showed a keen
interest in the problem of quadrature, mentioning it in six passages by my count,3
three of which addressing proofs of specific geometers (Bryson, Antiphon, and
Hippocrates).  These proofs undertook to “exhaust” the area of a circle by
inscribing, one after another, successively larger polygons within it, a strategy that
relies on a type of infinite approach very similar to what we just saw in Aristotle,
where the areas of successively larger inscribed polygons were taken to tend, ad
infinitum, toward the area of a circle.
An example of a kinematic application of infinite sequences and series is
found in Aristotle’s discussion of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox.  The paradox is
addressed in four places: Topics 160b7-9; Physics 233a21-31; Physics 239b9-14;
Physics 263a4-b8.4  At Physics 239b9-14, we are told that Zeno argued for “the
non-existence of motion on the ground that that which is in locomotion must
arrive at the half-way stage before it arrives at the goal.”  “The non-existence of
motion” is glossed as “it is impossible to move or to traverse the stadium” at
Topics 160b8-9 and “it is impossible for a thing to pass over or severally to come
158
in contact with infinite things in a finite time” at Physics 233a22-3.  This is
usually5 taken to mean that the paradox envisages a runner running from point A
to point B in some finite time, but that the run is thought to consist of an infinite
number of sub-runs in which the lengths of the times or distances traversed are
determined by the infinite geometric sequence …, 1/2n, …1/8, 1/4, 1/2 (n = … 3,
2, 1).  On the assumption that it would take an infinite amount of time to complete
an infinite number of sub-runs, Zeno draws the paradoxical conclusion that the
runner can never finish the race.  At Physics 233a21-31, Aristotle gives the
answer that we would expect, viz., that traversing the distance does not take an
infinite amount of time because running across ever- reduced distances takes
ever-reduced amounts of time.  But then at Physics 263a4-b8, he makes the
further claim that the ultimate, and philosophically correct answer to the puzzle, is
that the runner can finish the race because there are only a finite number of
segments in the race course in actuality, even though there may be as large a finite
number as one likes.
This seems like an odd and unnecessary move unless we take into account
an assumption behind both the geometrical and kinematic applications of infinite
series just outlined.  In each of these cases, Aristotle is working with the
assumption that passing through an infinite series is a concrete step-wise process,
and is, therefore, indefinitely extendable, and therefore always incomplete.  Thus,
the infinite approach in the geometrical application is not only infinite in that it
involves an infinite series, but in that it would require an infinite amount of time
to complete.  This is what Aristotle means when he says, at Physics 3.6 206b6-12,
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that “we shall not traverse the given magnitude.”  And in the case of the kinematic
application, the implication of Physics 263a4-b8 is that if the runner were actually
required to pass through an infinite sequence of half-distances, he would indeed,
never have finished the race.  What saves him from this fate is not a way of
passing through the infinite sequence that is not concrete and step-wise, but a way
to avoid going through the sequence altogether.
3.1 Constraints on geometrical concepts
But why should anyone think that passage through an infinite series or sequence
must be accomplished in a step-wise manner?  To see Aristotle’s motivation for
this in the geometrical application, we will need to understand Aristotle’s
concepts of geometrical objects and geometrical reasoning.  For Aristotle,
geometrical objects are just concrete physical objects under a certain description.
In Aristotle’s view, when a geometer talks about circles, he is actually talking
about concrete things like shields; he is talking about shields qua circular, just not
about circles qua properties of shields.  Put another way, geometers focus on one
aspect of shields — their circularity — (or at least this is what Aristotle thinks
that they should do if they see things aright) but they do not suppose that circles
exist apart from the shields of which they are properties (Phys. 193b31-33).  As
for geometrical reasoning, Aristotle tells us in Metaphysics book W chapter 9
1051a21-31 that geometrical facts are discovered by literally constructing
geometrical figures (e.g., performing operations like dividing a magnitude) in
one’s mind.6  Thus, the character of geometrical figures, such as infinitely
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segmented geometrical magnitudes, is constrained by the process by which they
are imagined to have come about. And this process, while it need not involve the
physical manipulation of magnitudes and shapes, nevertheless depends on our
intuitions about these physical sorts of operations.
3.2 Ancient geometers and infinite series
Although geometers in antiquity were probably not motivated or even exercised
by philosophical concerns of this nature, they also conceived of passage through
an infinite sequence as a concrete step-wise process.  Infinite series were a central
feature of the “method of exhaustion,” which was used in attempts to square the
circle, among other things, from the 5th century onward.  In the many instances
where this method was employed, exhaustion was invariably conceived of as the
process of inscribing, one after another, successively larger rectilinear polygons
within a curvilinear figure.  For example, in the proof that is generally attributed
to Eudoxus, appearing in book 12, proposition 2 of Euclid’s Elements, we find the
claim that we can exhaust any proper sub-area of a circle “by bisecting the
remaining circumferences and joining straight lines, and by doing this
continually” (Elements 12.2.33-37).7  The justification for this claim is the
principle that
if unequal magnitudes be set out, and if from the greater there be
subtracted a magnitude greater than the half, and from that which is left a
magnitude greater than the half, and if this process be done continually
(h^◊ ql„ql äb◊ d÷dkeq^f), there will be left some magnitude which will
be less than the lesser magnitude set out. (Elements 12.2.37-41)8.
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This principle is simply the “converse” of what was later to be called the
axiom of Archimedes,9 but which we have just seen Aristotle express at Physics
3.6 206b6 as
But if we increase the ratio of the part, so as always to take in the same
amount, we shall traverse the magnitude, for every finite magnitude is
exhausted by means of any determinate quantity however small. (Phys. 3.6
206b6)
3.3 The impossibility of squaring the circle
Aristotle seemed to think that squaring the circle was impossible (EE 2.10
1226a28-30) or at least not yet accomplished (Cat. 7 7b27-33), and that allegedly
successful quadratures either contained various fallacies (Soph. Ref. 11 171b13-
18; Post. An. 1.9 75b37-76a3) or were based on erroneous first principles (Phys.
1.2 185a14-17).  His attitude seems to be that if one takes into account the
principle that magnitude is infinitely divisible, then one should realize that the
indefinitely extendable step-wise process of inscription can never be completed.
In book 1 of the Physics, for instance, Aristotle mentions Antiphon’s attempted
proof:
Moreover, no man of science is bound to solve every kind of difficulty
that may be raised, but only as many as are drawn falsely from the
principles of the science: it is not our business to refute those that do not
arise in this way: just as it is the duty of the geometer to refute the
squaring of the circle by means of segments, but it is not his duty to refute
Antiphon’s proof. (Phys. 1.2 185a14-17)
The ancient commentators interpret Aristotle to mean that Antiphon’s
proof of the squaring of the circle is based on false first principles, rather than on
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a fallacious deduction from true first principles.  Simplicius describes Antiphon’s
quadrature as directly attempting to exhaust the area of a circle by means of
successively doubling the number of sides of an inscribed polygon: “and doing
this always, so that at some time, the area being exhausted, a certain polygon
would be inscribed in this manner in the circle whose sides on account of
smallness would coincide with the arc of the circle.” (In phys. 9.55.4-8)10
Eudemus (apud Simplicium), thought that the false first principle at issue
involved the denial of the infinite divisibility of magnitude, and that given the (in
his view, correct) Aristotelian assumption that magnitude is infinitely divisible,
Antiphon’s quadrature will never result in the exhaustion of the area of the circle.
3.4 Finitism in ancient geometry
Aristotle is right, of course, since exhaustion is impossible, as long as it is
conceived of as direct exhaustion, viz., as the actual, step-wise inscription of an
infinite sequence of regular polygons within a circle.  Eudoxus was later able to
prove that continually inscribing successive regular polygons within a circle will
leave segments of the circle which will be less than any given area.  But this does
not amount to the claim that one can exhaust the area of a circle by actually
inscribing an infinite sequence of polygons in it.  Without knowledge of this use
of exhaustion, one can see how Antiphon’s proof could have become emblematic,
for Aristotle, of its impossibility, as well as of the impossibility, in general, of
passage through an infinite sequence by means of an indefinitely extendable step-
wise process.
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But even if Aristotle had known of the proofs of Eudoxus and,
anachronistically, of those of Archimedes, they would have given him no reason
to change his mind about the impossibility of passing through the whole of an
infinite sequence.  For the conception of exhaustion is just as discrete and
process-bound in Eudoxus as it is in Antiphon.  In fact, as Knorr points out, the
description of the process of exhaustion in Elements 12.2 — “cutting the
remaining circumferences in two and joining straight lines and doing this
continually” —  is almost a verbal echo of the description that Simplicius gives of
Antiphon’s quadrature — “cutting the sides of the 16 sided figure, and joining the
straight lines and doubling the inscribed polygon and doing this continually.”11
Moreover, the proofs of Eudoxus and Archimedes took care to avoid
traversals of infinite series by stating their infinite series in finite forms.  As Knorr
points out, “Archimedes, in Quadrature of the Parabola, prop. 23, established in
finite form the equivalent of the summation 1 + 1/4 + 1/42 + 1/43 + … = 4/3.”  The
“finite form” that Knorr refers to is the theorem that for any finite n ≥ 1, the area
A bounded by a straight line and a section of a right-angled cone is equal to the
series A + A/4 + A/16 + A/64 + … + A/4n + 1/3(A/4n) = 4A/3.  Note that instead
of ending with “…” Archimedes’ series ends with the plug “1/3(A/4n)” that
eliminates the discrepancy between the nth partial sum and the area of the conic
section.  Archimedes’ idea here is that when one leaves off summing the areas of
inscribed polygons, as one inevitably must, one must always round up the
discrepancy between the nth partial sum and the area of the conic section.  By
contrast, the sense of putting “…” at the end of a series is that as n becomes
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infinitely large, this discrepancy may be neglected.  But since the step-wise
process of inscription will never literally exhaust the area under the parabola,
Archimedes does not feel entitled to talk about a case where an infinite number of
inscriptions have been completed.
3.5  Verb tense and infinite series
This same attitude can also be seen in Aristotle, in his resistance to admitting that
there is any genuine sense in which the runner in Zeno’s dichotomy paradox can
be said to have completed an infinite number of runs.12  From this, I believe that
one can make a general point about verb tense in describing passage through an
infinite sequence:  In Aristotle’s opinion, one can say that something is passing
through an infinite sequence, but one can never say that something has passed
through an infinite sequence.  Nor can one say that something will pass through
an infinite sequence in an infinite amount of time, even though from a certain
modern perspective, a perfectly intelligible sense may be given to such a claim.
Thus, Knorr complains of Aristotle’s argument in Physics 6.7 for the claim that it
is impossible for a thing to undergo a finite motion in an infinite time: “Having
admitted nonuniform motion, we might easily construct a decelerating motion
which requires some fixed time to traverse each successively diminishing
proportional part of the distance; then the time to traverse the whole will indeed
be infinite.”  What Knorr misses, I think, is that since passage through an infinite
sequence is conceived of in terms of an indefinitely extendable step-wise process,
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it is essentially incomplete, and to say that it will be complete in an infinite
amount of time would have struck Aristotle as simply incoherent.
4.0 ARISTOTELIAN INFINITY
In Section 1.6, I suggested that Plato’s and Aristotle’s puzzle about stopping and
starting might be solved by supposing that there is no first or last non-
instantaneous velocity above zero, and that, in the case of deceleration to a stand,
for instance, the moving body traverses an infinite sequence of non-instantaneous
velocities that converges or passes to 0.  And indeed, in Section 2.0, we saw that
Aristotle’s argument that there is no first time of coming to a stand seemed to
suggest that this solution would have met with his approval.
But we just saw that Aristotle thinks of an infinite sequence as something
that we can never pass through in its entirety, and this clearly conflicts with any
solution that supposes there is no first or last non-instantaneous velocity above
zero.  I have suggested a reason why Aristotle takes this view, viz., he allowed, as
did every geometer of his day, his notion of passage through an infinite sequence
to be constrained by intuitions about the manipulation of physical magnitudes and
shapes.  If this constraint were unconscious, as I think it was for Aristotle, it is
easy to see how passage through an infinite sequence would seem unavoidably,
and even axiomatically incomplete.
This goes a long way toward explaining why Aristotle could not have
thought passage through an infinite sequence to be a viable option for explaining
the kinematics of starting and stopping.  But there is, perhaps a deeper reason why
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Aristotle thinks of infinite sequences in this way, and it has to do with his concept
of infinity.  It is almost an analytic truth for Aristotle, that the infinite, properly
understood, is untraversable.  “What we are interested in,” he says, “is ‘infinite’ in
the sense of ‘untraversable.’” (Phys. 204a14)  And in fact, when he surveys the
possible senses of “infinite” at Physics 204a2 ff., his chief concern is which sense
of untraversable to settle upon, not whether or not the infinite is traversable.
Why is the infinite so obviously untraversable to Aristotle?  Again, in the
light of what I have said above, one might say that it is because he thinks of
traversal in terms of discrete, step-wise processes, like dividing and counting.
This is certainly part of it, but even if Aristotle had been working with another
concept of traversal, it is unlikely that he would have changed his mind, since, in
a sense, he did not even think that the infinite is there to be traversed.  What I
mean is that Aristotle does not think that an infinite sequence pre-exists an
attempt to traverse it, and even while such an attempt is in progress, the sequence
is never more than a finite number of stages long.  This might seem like just an
elaborate way to say that there are no infinite sequences, but the motivation
behind it is clear.  In Physics book 3.4-8, Aristotle wants to reserve some sense of
“infinite” to ensure that magnitudes are divisible ad infinitum, that time has no
limit, and to accommodate the fact that the natural number series does not give
out in thought.  In other words, he needs a sense of infinite to allow that some
processes can (like counting or dividing a magnitude), and other processes do
(like the advance of time) go on and on indefinitely.  But our present problem is
not why processes can go on and on but how they manage to start and stop, and it
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is not surprising that a solution devised for the former problem will be unsuitable
for the latter.
4.1 The traditional interpretation
The sense of infinity in question is what Aristotle calls “potential infinity.”  The
traditional interpretation of this concept emphasizes a passage where, after
concluding that the infinite has a potential existence, Aristotle says:
But the phrase “potential existence” is ambiguous. When we speak of the
potential existence of a statue we mean that there will be an actual statue.
It is not so with the infinite. There will not be an actual infinite. The word
“is” has many senses, and we say that the infinite “is” in the sense in
which we say “it is day” or “it is the games,” because one thing after
another is always coming into existence. For of these things too the
distinction between potential and actual existence holds. We say that there
are Olympic games, both in the sense that they may occur and that they
are actually occurring. (Phys. 206a18-25)
Simplicius takes Aristotle to be distinguishing, here, between senses of
actuality and potentiality that attach to two distinct modes of existing, viz.,
existing “as a whole … like a man or a house” on the one hand, and existing “as
what has its being in becoming, like a contest and a day” on the other (In phys.
492, 23-5).  The distinction is roughly the same as the one that endurantists make
between “continuants” and “occurrents” respectively, where “continuants” are
three-dimensional objects like men or houses that have only spatial parts, and
wholly exist at each moment of their existence, and “occurrents” are four-
dimensional events or processes like days or games that have temporal parts, and
only partly exist at each moment of their existence.  The senses of potentiality and
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actuality that Aristotle warns us not to associate with potential infinity are the
senses associated with continuants like statues and pieces of bronze.  The reason
for this warning is that a piece of bronze is a potential statue, which can become
an actual statue if it is molded into a certain shape.  Something that is potentially
infinite, however, can never become actually infinite.  The senses of potentiality
and actuality that are appropriate to the infinite, rather, are the senses associated
with occurrents like days and Olympic games.  Days and Olympic games are
actual while they are occurring, but they are also always potential in the sense that
some of their temporal parts are always in a time other than the present.
Likewise, all but a finite number of the infinite succession of past days and
generations of men are in the past and have ceased to be, and this allows Aristotle
to account for their infinity by saying that their number is potentially, but not
actually infinite.  What this means, Simplicius implies, is that we may have
infinitely many successive things, but not infinitely many simultaneous things.
4.2 The problem of infinite precession13
This is the main thesis of Simplicius’ interpretation, and the text seems to confirm
it, since at the end of book 3 of the Physics, Aristotle claims that time, change and
thought avoid being actual infinities because their parts do not persist (Phys.
208a5-6; 20-1).  But if this is Aristotle’s view, he is guilty of a serious mistake;
the mistake first pointed out by Philoponus in the 6th century A.D.  Philoponus,
who as a Christian, was trying to disprove the Aristotelian doctrine that time and
the world had no beginning, argued that if this were the case, then the sun would
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have already gone around the earth an infinite number of times.  Aristotle,
however, stresses that the infinite is untraversable (Phys. 204a14), and that it is
impossible, for instance, to divide a magnitude an infinite number of times or to
count to infinity; impossible, that is, not because no one has the requisite physical
or mental capacity to carry out these tasks, but “because it is not in the nature of
the infinite to be traversed (the sense in which the voice is ‘invisible’)” (Phys.
204a3-4).  In other words, the infinite cannot be traversed because to do so would
be inconceivable.  But it is hard to see how the sun going around the earth an
infinite number of times is any less a traversal of an infinite sequence than the
making of an infinite number of divisions or counting to infinity.  What this attack
made clear is that while the failure of past years to persist may exempt them from
being included in a set of simultaneous existents, their succession nonetheless
implies the traversal of an infinite sequence, at least if Aristotle wishes to
maintain that time and the world had no beginning.14
4.3 An ad hoc response
In the light of this problem, if all that the distinction between the potential and the
actual in Aristotle’s account of infinity amounted to was a distinction between the
successive and the simultaneous, it would be a disappointing theory.  As it
happens, however, I believe this doctrine (that the failure of times and generations
of men to persist solves the problem of infinite precession) is a mere appendage,
developed as an ad hoc response to an objection much like the one raised by
Philoponus.  The only clear endorsement of it comes in the passage at the end of
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book 3 where Aristotle takes himself to be disposing of objections to his theory.
In the light of this, my guess is that Aristotle first formulated his theory of the
potential infinite with a view to accounting for indefinitely long succession, and
then in response to an objection involving indefinitely long precession (perhaps
from someone else, or perhaps from himself), he retrofitted his theory to address
this problem.  I concede that it was a disappointing and inadequate retrofit to a
very serious and difficult problem, but I wish to show, contrary to what the
traditional interpretation would seem to suggest, that there is more to the theory
than this.
4.4 Infinite succession
As I argued earlier, Aristotle was mainly interested in finding a sense of infinity
to accommodate the fact that some processes can, and other processes do go on
and on indefinitely.  He speaks of “dividing ad infinitum” (Phys. 206b5-6), where
the “ad” translates bŸt, which with the accusative implies a movement toward but
not an arrival at infinity.  And when he elaborates on the sense in which the
infinite exists as occurrents do, like days and Olympic games, he describes this
existence in terms of succession, not precession: “one thing after another (åiil
h^◊ åiil) is always coming into existence” (Phys. 206a22); “one thing is always
being taken after another (åiil h^◊ åiil)” (Phys. 206a27-8).  The examples of
infinities Aristotle is trying to account for are disparate (e.g., time, generations of
men, divisions of a magnitude), and, indeed, major differences exist between
them: in spatial magnitudes, what is taken persists; in time and the generations of
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men it does not.  But Aristotle emphasizes that, even so, they all exist as “one
thing is always being taken after (åiil h^◊ åiil) another” (Phys. 206a27-8).
4.5 The future-bias of potential
This focus on succession over precession in Aristotle’s exposition of potential
infinity reflects a future-bias in the concept of potentiality.  “No potential relates
to being in the past,” Aristotle tells us, “but always to being in the present or
future.” (Cael. 1.12 283b13-14)  This is because, in Aristotle’s view, though what
is past is necessary (EN 1139b7-9), necessity does not imply possibility.  Rather,
Aristotle’s notion of possibility, as he defines it in De interpretatione, is of a
mode of neither impossibility nor necessity; that is to say, it is a mode of
contingency.  Now one might think that this is all the worse for Aristotle, since,
the infinite past sequence of celestial rotations is on this account not only actual,
but necessary.  And one would be right to think this, but my point is that, given
the future-bias of the notion of potentiality, the concept of potential infinity could
not have been originally intended to solve Philoponus’ problem of precession.
4.6 Existing potentially
Indeed, sentences like “one thing after another (åiil h^◊ åiil) is always
coming into existence” (Phys. 206a22) suggest the existence of an inexhaustible
store of unfulfilled future possibilities for dividing, counting, and etc., and it
appears that this is what it means for the infinite to exist arkájbf (Phys. 206b13).
“The infinite” denotes what is infinite or what has the property infinity, viz.,
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processes of dividing, counting, and etc.  For the infinite to exist arkájbf is for
processes to have these unfulfilled potentialities.  Charlton objects that this cannot
be so.15  If all there is to existing arkájbf is to have unfulfilled potentialities, “we
should all exist arkájbf.”  But since we are told that infinity exists as processes
exist, this objection ignores a relevant difference in the way in which substances
and processes have potentialities.  Aristotle tells us at the beginning of book 3 of
the Physics that a motion only exists insofar as, and as long as, it has the
unfulfilled potentiality of being completed by the arrival of the moving thing at a
goal state that is intrinsic to the motion.  A motion is an actuality of a potentiality
for a moving thing to be en route to a goal, but as long as the moving thing is en
route, the motion is an actuality qua existing potentially since it is potentially, but
not actually completed.16  Once this potentiality is realized, the motion no longer
exists, but as long as it does exist, the motion has this unfulfilled potentiality.  So
one could say that a motion always has an unfulfilled potentiality, but this is
different from saying that someone always has the potential to be a concert
violinist.  Substances, of course, always have unfulfilled potentialities, including
potentialities to achieve states that are uniquely determined by their natures, but
they do not exist insofar as, and as long as they have these potentialities, as
changes do.
4.7 Existing incompletely
Moreover, substances are not incomplete by virtue of having unrealized
potentialities, whereas processes are.  “Change,” says Aristotle, “is thought to be a
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sort of actuality, but incomplete, the reason for this view being that the potential
whose actuality it is is incomplete” (Phys. 201b31-33).  Aristotle refers back to
this conclusion a number of times, at Physics 257b6-9, De anima 417a16-17, De
anima 431a6-7, and Metaphysics 1048b29-30, but at Nicomachean Ethics
1174b2-5 he gives the reason for this incompleteness, viz., “the whence and
whither give [changes] their form.”  Change is not simply the actuality of a
potentiality to be in any state, but rather, it is the actuality of a potentiality to be in
a state that is the incomplete realization of a particular goal (i.e., the “whither”).
If manhood is the goal, for instance, change is the actuality of the potentiality to
be en route to manhood.  It is the actuality of the potentiality to be a teenager, for
instance.  But while the process of growth may be said to be incomplete, the
teenager himself is not.  He has the same form or species essence as the grown
man, and none of his constitutive parts are missing.  A thing is incomplete if it has
some of its constitutive parts missing, and indeed some of the temporal parts of a
process are always absent.
Commentators have often assumed that this is what Aristotle means when
he says that the potential infinite exists as processes do and then describes the
potential infinite as incomplete, as he does in the following passage:
A quantity is infinite if it is such that we can always take a part outside
what has been already taken. On the other hand, what has nothing outside
it is complete and whole. For thus we define the whole—that from which
nothing is wanting, as a whole man or a whole box. What is true of each
particular is true of the whole as such—the whole is that of which nothing
is outside. On the other hand that from which something is absent and
outside, however small that may be, is not “all.” “Whole” and “complete”
are either quite identical or closely akin. Nothing is complete (qùibflk)
which has no end (qùilt); and the end is a limit. (Phys. 207a7-15)
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But processes are not incomplete simply because some of their temporal
parts are missing.  Processes are incomplete because they are actualities that fall
short of a goal state.  Now what is unusual about processes that go on and on
indefinitely is that they have no goal state.  In the passage just quoted, Aristotle
argues that what is incomplete always has something outside it, and “nothing is
complete (qùibflk) which has no end (qùilt); and the end is a limit” (Phys.
207a14-5).  The absence of a goal or end, then, is a sufficient condition for a
process to always have something outside of itself, which is, in turn, a sufficient
condition for the infinite to be suspended in a perpetual state of potentiality.
Thus, as Aristotle says about the process of dividing a continuous magnitude, “the
fact that the indefinitely extendable process of dividing never comes to an end
ensures that this activity exists potentially.” (Metaph. book W chapter 6 1048b14-
7)
4.8 Existing potentially as matter does
I turn now to an aspect of Aristotle’s account of the potential infinite that is
ignored by the traditional interpretation.  At Physics 206b14-6, Aristotle says that
“[The infinite] exists potentially as matter exists, not independently as what is
finite does.”  If the point is just that the infinite does not have the ontological
independence of a substance, we have seen this theme before, when Aristotle
claimed that the infinite exists as a process exists, and one might think that
Aristotle is merely making the same point with a different analogy.  But he
elaborates by telling us that the infinite “is the matter of the completeness which
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belongs to magnitude.”  Since Aristotle takes a magnitude to be a bounded
extension, or a form/matter composite consisting of a bounding surface (form)
and a spatial extension (matter),17  the matter of the completeness which belongs
to magnitude would seem to be just the matter that is contained and limited by a
form.  And indeed, Aristotle tells us that the infinite is contained, as matter is
contained by form, and it is a part in the way that matter is a part of a form/matter
composite.  According to the analogy, then, the infinite is unbounded, or
åmbfolt, in the sense that it is unlimited by anything intrinsic to it.  But it is also
“a whole and limited; not, however, in virtue of its own nature, but in virtue of
what is other than it,” viz., the form of a form/matter composite.  In this sense, it
is potentially, but not actually a whole, and potentially, but not actually infinite.18
What this means, in more concrete terms, I believe, is that potential
infinity is a property of the material element in a form/matter composite, such as a
bounded magnitude.  Or rather, it is a property that the material element
contributes to the form/matter composite, viz., its infinite divisibility, or
conversely, its being filled out by a potentially infinite number of material parts.
4.9 Existing potentially as both processes and matter do
At first sight, we seem to have competing accounts of potential infinity, one
where infinity exists as a process, and one where it exists as a property of matter.
Recent commentators have generally tried to promote one of these accounts at the
expense of the other.  Hintikka, who favors the traditional interpretation, claims
that the analogy of infinity to matter is a remnant of a superseded earlier line of
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thinking.19  Jonathan Lear takes the opposite extreme by locating potential infinity
entirely in the “structure of the magnitude,” and demoting process to the role of
merely “bearing witness” to the potential infinite.20
But potential infinity is not predicated solely of a process or solely of a
magnitude.  That is, it does not pertain only to the structure of a magnitude, or
only to the nature of a process that divides it.  There is a potentially infinite
number of material parts and a potentially infinite number of acts of division.  Or,
perhaps, a more accurate way to say it is that there can be an ever larger number
of divided parts as well as an ever larger number of acts of division, and it is clear
from the following passage that the possibility of the former depends upon the
possibility of the latter:
But in the direction of largeness it is always possible to think of a larger
number: for (dáo) the number of times a magnitude can be bisected is
infinite. Hence this infinite is potential, never actual: the number of parts
that can be taken always surpasses any assigned number. But this number
is not separable from the process of bisection, and its infinity is not a
permanent actuality but consists in a process of coming to be, like time
and the number of time. (Phys. 207b10-15)
The infinity of the number of parts is inseparable from the infinity of the
number of acts of divisions because infinite divisibility is a property of a
magnitude that is defined in terms of a process of division.  The potential infinity
of the number of parts relies on a process of coming to be in the sense that it
depends on the possibility of the process of division going on and on.  And, at the
same time, the possibility of the process of division going on and on can be said
to rely on the structure of the magnitude to supply it with a potentially infinite
number of points of division.
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4.10 Goalless changes?
I have suggested that potential infinity exists as a process exists, and in particular,
a process that has no goal or end.  But how can this be?  In Physics book 3 chapter
1, Aristotle seems to define change as such as something that involves a goal or
qùilt.  Aristotle even goes to some trouble in Physics book 6 chapter 10 to prove
that there can be no infinite or goalless changes (cf. Phys. 8.2 252b7-12).  The
potential associated with an occurrent process is the potential to reach some
specific goal, not the potential to go on indefinitely.
But perhaps the infinite “processes” that do go on and on indefinitely can
be classed as accidental changes and, as such, will fall outside the class of
teleological change considered in the rest of the Physics.  Perhaps the procession
of time owes its lack of teleology to the fact that time is at once a property of all
teleological change, and thus lacks any teleology of its own.  It is an accidental
and goalless composite property of all of the changes in the universe.  Likewise,
the propagation of mankind as a species is perhaps the accidental sum of the
teleological strivings of all individual men and women, and as such, it has no
ultimate goal of its own either.
4.11 h^v~ ^ÂqÌ prj_b_ehÏq^
Dividing a magnitude according to a geometric sequence such as 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, …,
1/2n, … (n = 1, 2, 3, …) is different, however, since it is clearly a genuine change.
But one will find, as a matter of fact, that any attempt to accomplish this task will
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end after a finite number of divisions.  Perhaps, then, the potential infinity of the
task is reflected in the counterfactual possibility that the task could have gone on
longer.  And perhaps one might generalize to say that all genuine changes are, in
fact, finite, but it is just an accidental property of some of them that they could,
counterfactually, have gone on indefinitely.  This view finds support in Physics
book 5 chapters 4 and 5, where Aristotle refers to the potential infinite first as a
prj_b_ehÌt h^v~ ^ÂqÏ of number and magnitude (Phys. 203b33), and then,
equivalently, as a h^v~ ^ÂqÌ mávlt qf (Phys. 204a18-19).21  The concept of a
prj_b_ehÌt h^v~ ^ÂqÏ is introduced at Metaphysics 1025a30-1, as “all that
attaches to each thing in virtue of itself but is not in its essence, as having its
angles equal to two right angles attaches to the triangle.”  A triangle is
presumably defined as “a three angled figure,” and this is its essence.  But certain
other properties not in the definition of a triangle may be deduced from this,
which hold eternally and necessarily, e.g., that its angles sum to two right angles,
and these properties are prj_b_ehÏq^ h^v~ ^ÂqÏ.  Likewise, since Aristotle
defines change in terms of definite goal states, the processes of dividing a
magnitude and counting its divisions are, like all processes, essentially finite.  But
perhaps it is a prj_b_ehÌt h^v~ ^ÂqÏ of some of these processes that they
could, counterfactually, have gone on indefinitely.  And perhaps it is the structure
of the magnitude being divided that gives these processes this peculiar property.
What Aristotle actually says is that potential infinity is a h^v~ ^ÂqÌ
mávlt qf of number and magnitude in a manner analogous to the way in which
speech is incidentally invisible (Phys. 204a14-17).  Just as “the invisible is not an
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element in speech, though the voice is invisible,” so the infinite is not an element
in number or magnitude, though number and magnitude are infinite.  The invisible
is not an element in speech in the sense that invisibility is not part of the definition
of speech, yet speech is, of course, invisible, and necessarily invisible.  Likewise,
if it is in the essence of a magnitude to be a bounded extension, or a form/matter
composite consisting of a bounding surface (form) and a spatial extension
(matter), perhaps it is a h^v~ ^ÂqÌ mávlt qf of a magnitude to have a potentially
infinite number of material parts, i.e., a property which is not specified in the
definition of magnitude, but is deducible from the mention of matter in its
definition.  Similarly, if it is in the essence of each and every number to be some
finite and countable plurality of units, perhaps it is a h^v~ ^ÂqÌ mávlt qf of each
such number to be a member of the class of numbers (referred to generically as
“number,” instead of “a number”) that can be increased indefinitely.
4.12 Why potential infinity must be a prj_b_ehÌt h^v~ ^ÂqÏ of number and
magnitude
Thus, taking potential infinity as a prj_b_ehÌt h^v~ ^ÂqÏ seems to explain the
infinite increasibility of number and the infinite extendibility of certain types of
changes.  But given that infinity is a property of number and magnitude, and
given the way that Aristotle defines these things, it is inevitable that infinity must
be this sort of property.  Aristotle clearly thinks that infinity exists as a property.
Physics book 3 chapter 5 proceeds as a disjunctive syllogism: The infinite either
exists as a substance or as a property.  The infinite does not exist as a substance.
Therefore, the infinite exists as a property (h^qà prj_b_ehÌt åo^ Âmáoubf qÌ
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åmbfolk (Phys. 204a29-30)), and, indeed, as a property of number and magnitude
(Phys. 204a18-9).  Since number and magnitude are the sole members of the
genus quantity (Metaph. 1020a7-14), infinity is a property of quantity.  Quantity
is, by nature, measurable or countable because it is divisible into units by which it
is measured or counted, viz., parts which are “by nature a ‘unit’ and a ‘this’”
(Metaph. 1020a7-32; 1057a2-4).  This is why Aristotle says that a quantity is
always “a particular quantity, e.g., two or three cubits; quantity just means these”
(Phys. 206a3-5).  Since it is impossible to count an infinity of units, and since
quantities are, by definition, measurable or countable, there is no infinite quantity
(Phys. 204b8-10; 204a28-9).  But how can Aristotle claim that infinity is a
property of number and magnitude if number and magnitude cannot be infinite?
To say that there is no infinite quantity is also to say that there is no quantity in
whose definition the term “infinity” appears, or as Aristotle puts it, “if the infinite
is not a substance, but an accident, then it cannot be, qua infinite, and element in
things” (Phys. 204a14-16).  Infinity, then, must be a property of number and
magnitude which does not appear in the definitions of number and magnitude, and
it must be a necessary and eternal property, since it is a necessary and eternal fact
that number does not give out in thought, and that continuous magnitudes are
infinitely divisible.  Infinity must be, in other words, a prj_b_ehÌt h^v~ ^ÂqÏ
of number and magnitude (Phys. 204a29-30; cf. Phys. 204a14 and 28-29).22
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5.0 THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF MOTION: CONCEPTUAL CONSTRAINTS
The fact that Aristotle takes quantity to be essentially measurable or countable
puts a constraint on the way he conceives of motions as things having quantities.
For instance,  Aristotle believes that if it were necessary, in order to give an
account of the quantity of a motion, to also give an account of an infinite quantity
of submotions into which the motion is divisible, then the quantity of the motion
would be unknowable.  This is because quantities are known by either
measurement or by counting (Metaph. 1052b20; 1053a7-8), and to give an
account of an infinite quantity of submotions would involve measuring and
counting each of the motions in turn.  Since this is impossible, then the quantity of
the motion must be unknowable.
This constraint on the way Aristotle conceives of motions as things having
quantities can be seen at work in his discussion of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox.
Aristotle concedes to Zeno at Physics 233a26-8 that motion would indeed be
impossible if, in order to run the race, the runner would need to “come in contact
with things infinite in quantity (h^qà qÌ mlpÏk),” but, as Zeno fails to realize
(and this is Aristotle’s point), the reason for this is that there can be no things
“infinite in quantity” to come in contact with.
The term “quantity” (qÌ mlpÏk) is significant, since for Aristotle,
quantities are, by nature, measurable or countable.  Thus, a thing must be
measurable or countable if it is to be called a quantity, and if it is neither
measurable nor countable it is not a quantity.  At Physics 263a4-b8, Aristotle
attempts to establish that the reason why it is impossible to come “in contact with
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things infinite in quantity” is that there can be no “things infinite in quantity” to
come in contact with, and he does this by reducing the term “infinite in quantity”
to absurdity.  Aristotle supposes, per impossibile, that the infinite collection of the
run’s subsegments is a quantity, i.e., something that is definite, countable, and
knowable, then he imagines an attempt to verify this by means of a process of
dividing the motion into an infinite number of units and counting them.  Failing at
this, he concludes that the infinite collection of the run’s subsegments is not a
quantity, and, therefore, that it is impossible to come “in contact with things
infinite in quantity.”
Thus, since an infinite quantity cannot be measured or counted, and one
must measure or count a quantity if one is to give an account of it, if a motion had
an infinite quantity, one could neither give an account of it nor know it.  And
insofar as having a quantity is an essential property of a given motion, if the
quantity of the motion were unknowable, then the motion itself would be
unknowable, but given Aristotle’s assumption that quantities are knowable, there
are no such motions.
5.1 What is real must be thinkable
One might object that Aristotle has simply legislated this result by defining a
quantity as something that is countable or measurable.  But if this reflects a
prejudice, Aristotle is at least consistent about it.  As Jonathan Lear points out,
“Throughout Aristotle’s work this theme recurs: the possibility of philosophy—of
man’s ability to comprehend the world—depends on the fact that the world is a
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finite place containing objects that are themselves finite.”23  This attitude can be
seen clearly at Posterior Analytics 82b37-9, where Aristotle argues that accounts
of the essence of a substance must be finite because the essential predicates of a
substance are finite, and this follows from the facts that “definition is possible, or
in other words, […] essential form is knowable, and an infinite series cannot be
traversed.”
Aristotle’s commitment to a knowable and finite world, is also reflected,
as Hintikka notes, in the fact that “realisability in thought” is a necessary
condition for “actual physical realisability.”24  Thus, if thought is knowable and
finite, so is the world.  Hintikka points out that in De anima 3.6, 431a1-2,
Aristotle claims that “the thinking mind is formally identical with the object of
which it is thinking,” or in Aristotle’s words, “Actual knowledge is identical with
its object.”  So for Aristotle, the conceivability of something also entails its
actualizability qua form.  This does not mean that conceiving of a unicorn or of a
“goat-stag” entails that it can be instantiated in a form-matter composite.  It
merely entails that it can be instantiated in the mind.
Two additional principles go a long way toward ensuring that physical
realizability presupposes mental realizability, both formally and materially.  First,
in the case of artifacts, the principle of synonymy advanced in Metaphysics book
X chapters 7-9 ensures that a form in the mind is no less actual than a form in an
artifact, since the source and cause of the form in an artifact is a form in the mind.
Second, in the case of geometrical objects, not only is the geometer’s thinking an
“actuality” (Metaph. book W chapter 9 1051a30-1) in that his mind is formally
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identical with the form of geometrical objects, but (and Hintikka does not note
this) intelligible matter provides an analogue in thought to sensible matter, so that
geometrical objects can have not only the formal characteristics, but also the
material characteristics of physical objects (Metaph. 1036a9-12, 1037a2-5).
It is controversial whether intelligible matter exists in the world as well as
in the mind, or strictly in the mind.  For my purposes here, it only matters that, in
any event, it exists in the mind.  Mueller, Annas, and Hussey have argued that,
due to the discrepancy arising, for instance, “when one draws a line on the ground
and calls it a foot long when it is not” (Metaph. 13.3 1078a19-20), mathematical
objects must be created by the thought of the mathematician out of intelligible
matter, and this makes them mind-dependent and cut off from the material world.
Jonathan Lear, however, argues, in “Aristotle on Mathematics,” (pages 175-183),
that at Physics 193b23-194a12 and Metaphysics book 13.3, 1077b18-1078a31,
Aristotle holds that the geometers study physical objects but not qua physical
objects, so that, the mathematical objects are the physical objects under some
description.  It seems that the correct way to reconcile the views of Lear on one
hand and Mueller, Annas, and Hussey on the other, is to take Aristotle to
countenance both mind-dependent and mind-independent geometrical objects.
Thus Aristotle is not talking about the same activity “when one draws a line on
the ground and calls it a foot long when it is not” and when one studies a body
qua a foot long.  In other words, when there are perfect circles instantiated in the
universe, such as a heavenly body, for instance, the geometer studies the body qua
geometrical object.  However, when such a perfect instantiation is not at hand, it
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is possible for the geometer to use any available imperfect circle as a symbolic
proxy for a circle that he creates mentally in intelligible matter.  In fact, since at
Metaphysics 1036a11, Aristotle says that intelligible matter is “present in sensible
objects but not insofar as they are sensible,” it appears that intelligible matter is
not “in” the mind in any literal sense, but seems to represent an ability of the mind
to make a geometrical object out of an imperfect sensible object by correcting the
imperfections in it.
5.2 Constraints on the concept of infinity
The key material characteristic for the concept of infinity is, of course, infinite
divisibility, and Aristotle tells us at Metaphysics book W chapter 9 1051a21-31
that the infinite divisibility of intelligible matter is essentially equivalent to the
infinite divisibility of sensible matter.  This is one of the reasons why Aristotle
tells us in his analysis of Zeno’s paradox that “counting out halves is no different
from dividing into halves” (Phys. 263a25-6), viz., a mental act of division is
metaphysically commensurable to a physical act of division.  Moreover, a mental
act of division is numerically equivalent to a mental act of counting when the
purpose of the division is to divide a magnitude into units for the purpose of
measuring it.
A negative aspect of assuming that physical realizability presupposes
mental realizability is that our intuitions about physical objects will tend to
constrain the way we conceive of things like infinity.  If our concept of infinity is
based on the infinite divisibility of a magnitude, and the infinite divisibility of a
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magnitude is conceived of in terms of a process of counting divisions, or more
generally, in terms of a process of going step-wise through a sequence that has
some first element, then we will naturally be limited to thinking of infinity as
something untraversable, as Bertrand Russell points out:
The difficulty, like most of the vaguer difficulties besetting the
mathematical infinite, is derived, I think, from the more or less
unconscious operation of the idea of counting.  If you set to work to count
the terms of an infinite collection, you will never have completed your
task. … But it is not essential to the existence of a collection, or even to
knowledge and reasoning concerning it, that we should be able to pass its
terms in review one by one.  This may be seen in the case of finite
collections; we can speak of “mankind” or “the human race,” though many
of the individuals in this collection are not personally known to us.  We
can do this because we know of various characteristics which every
individual has if he belongs to the collection, and not if he does not.  And
exactly the same happens in the case of infinite collections: they may be
known by their characteristics although their terms cannot be counted.  In
this sense, an unending series may nevertheless form a whole, and there
may be new terms beyond the whole of it.25
The “whole” in the last sentence presumably refers to an infinite collection
with a Cantorian transfinite cardinality of `0 or higher.  The least infinite limit
cardinal `0 and the corresponding least infinite limit ordinal s0 represent the
possibility of passing through the whole of a denumerably infinite sequence and
reaching “new terms” (such as s1, s1 + 1, s1 + 2, etc.) beyond it, despite the fact
that the sequence has no last term.  This possibility, which Aristotle expressly
denies when he says that “Nothing is complete (qùibflk) which has no end
(qùilt)” (Phys. 207a14), is only made intelligible by the abandonment of
counting the members of a denumerably infinite collection in favor of making
generalizations over them (e.g., that the members of a collection with a cardinality
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of `0 may be paired off with the natural numbers while the members of a set with
a cardinality of `1 or higher may not).
One might argue that it is inappropriate to make counting an infinite
sequence equivalent to traversing it, since it is possible to imagine a
counterexample of an infinite sequence which cannot be counted, but which can,
nonetheless, be traversed.  If one assumes, as Aristotle does, that the world had no
beginning, one must admit the existence of a beginningless traversal of an infinite
sequence of celestial rotations, as Philoponus claims in his De aeternitate mundi
contra Proclum.26  But one cannot even begin to count this sequence, since
counting requires a first item to be counted, and there is no first celestial rotation
by assumption.  But Aristotle, perhaps mistakenly, as I argued in Sections 4.2 and
4.3, would think that he could rule out this counter-example by pointing out the
fact that past years and celestial rotations no longer exist, and, therefore, do not
constitute an actual infinity.  Therefore, I see no reason not to equate the
Aristotelian notion of traversal with counting, or at least, more generically, with a
process of going step-wise through a sequence that has some first element, even
though, perhaps, he should not have thought of traversal in this way, given the
problem raised by Philoponus.
5.3 Constraints on the concepts of motion and spatial magnitude
Limitations on the concept of infinity, in turn, limit the concepts of motion and
spatial magnitude, in regard both to their analyzability and to the manner in which
we must apprehend them.  Aristotle holds that the concept of a denumerably
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infinite sequence as a traversable whole is inconceivable — there is no form of
infinity that the mind can grasp.  So, assuming that what is real must be
conceivable, if the parts of a physical magnitude are infinite, they cannot be
formal parts.  Hence magnitude must be apprehended as formally simple (or, at
least, formally finite) so that its form is not analyzable into things like infinite
point-sets.  And since kinetic magnitude is formally derived from spatial
magnitude,27 motion is not formally analyzable into motion segments or into
being at certain positions at certain instants in time (i.e., the “at-at” ontology of
motion).28
5.3.1 The apprehension of a magnitude
Since the infinite parts of a magnitude are material and not formal, and a
magnitude is bounded by a single unifying form, a magnitude will be
apprehended all at once, rather than piecemeal, i.e., by means of apprehending its
parts.  This doctrine is present in the passage immediately preceding the line I just
quoted:
For [the account of a line is not infinite], to whose divisibility there is no
stop, but which we cannot think if we do not make a stop (for which
reason one who is tracing the infinitely divisible line cannot be counting
the possibilities of section), but the whole line also must be apprehended
by something in us that does not move from part to part.—Again, nothing
infinite can exist; and if it could, at least the notion of infinity is not
infinite. (Metaph. 2.2 994b23-7)
That “the whole line” is “apprehended by something in us that does not
move from part to part” means that it is apprehended all at once instead of
piecemeal.  The same idea is further elaborated at De anima 430b6-20:
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Since the undivided is twofold, either potentially or actually, nothing
prevents one thinking of the undivided when one thinks of a length (for
this is actually undivided), and that in an undivided time; for the time is
divided and undivided in a similar way to the length.  It is not possible to
say what one was thinking of in each half time; for these do not exist,
except potentially, if the whole is not divided.  But if one thinks of each of
the halves separately, then one divides the time also simultaneously; and
then it is as if they were lengths themselves.  But if one thinks of the
whole as made up of both halves, then one does so in the time made up of
both halves.  That which is thought and the time in which it is thought are
divided incidentally and not as those things were; for there is in these too
something undivided, although surely not separate, which makes the time
and the length unities.  And this exists similarly in everything which is
continuous, both time and length. (DA 430b6-20)
The point, here, seems to be that since a line is a form/matter composite, it
is divisible potentially, but the mental act that grasps the form of the line, i.e.,
“something undivided, although surely not separate, which makes the time and
the length unities,”  is indivisible.  One does not apprehend the form of a line by
mentally traversing it, so that part of it is apprehended first, and another part
second.  As at Metaphysics 1051b24 ff., the mental act of apprehending a form is
non-discursive and instantaneous, like grasping or touching — it happens all at
once.  One may contemplate a form for a period of time, of course, but the act of
beginning to contemplate it is instantaneous.  One might think of a half length
first, and then the other half second, but this amounts to two mental acts instead of
two half mental acts.  One might also think of a line as divisible, but, since
divisibility is an incidental property of a line, Aristotle would argue that the form
of the line has already been grasped prior to the predication of “divisibility,”
which is just the serial concatenation of the concepts “line” and “divisibility.”29
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5.4 Dividing up a motion
The fact that motions are to be apprehended all at once has a specific implication
for how we must conceive of the infinite divisibility of motions.  Aristotle argues
in Physics 5.4 that motions for a given moving body are numerically distinct if
and only if they are divided by periods of rest, so whereas in the case of spatial
magnitudes a division is an act of cutting, in the case of a motion a division is an
act of coming to a halt.  But since magnitudes are to be apprehended all at once,
instead of piecemeal, what we are envisaging when we talk about the infinite
divisibility of a motion is the counterfactual possibility of having stopped at any
of an infinite number of places along the course of a journey.  This is because, in
order to apprehend a motion all at once, we must imagine it in the perfect tense.
The process of infinitely dividing a motion, then, will be a process of imagining a
series of pauses that might have been made on a given journey, but have not.
Since thought is as infinitely extendable as change and time (Phys. 208a20-1), a
motion may be divided ad infinitum as well as a spatial magnitude can.
6.0 THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF MOTION: ARISTOTLE’S SOLUTION
We have seen that Aristotle believes that if it were necessary to admit that in
performing a motion one has to perform and infinity of sub-motions, then the
motion would be impossible.  But Aristotle does allow that one may pass through
“a [potentially] infinite number of half-distances” incidentally but not essentially
in the course of a continuous motion. “For though it is an incidental characteristic
of the distance to be a [potentially] infinite number of half-distances, this is not its
191
real and essential character” (Phys. 263b7-9).30  What I take this to mean is that it
is unnecessary, in order to move from point A to point B, also to complete an
infinite quantity of submotions into which the motion is divisible.  This is because
it is not a necessary condition for completing a continuous motion to complete an
infinite sequence of sub-motions.  Rather, one may complete a potentially infinite
sequence of sub-motions only incidentally, in the sense that after a motion is
completed, one may imagine that the motion had been segmented as many times
as one likes (by means of an indefinitely extendable imaginative process of
enumerating, counter-factually, the places at which one might have stopped but
did not).  But this possibility does not figure into the account of how the motion
was actually completed.
This follows straightforwardly from the fact that the parts of the distance
traversed in the sub-motions are material parts of the total distance traversed, and
that only formal parts are salient for definition and understanding (Metaph.
1035b31 ff.).  This seems perfectly reasonable in the context of Zeno’s dichotomy
paradox, where not only the choice of segmentation seems arbitrary, but the
segmenting itself seems optional and ex post facto.31  This is because, in the
dichotomy paradox, segmentation of the time, the distance, and the motion does
not enter into, and is not implicit in, the motion as it is described — as a simple
traversal of a distance without a reference to any other properties of the motion.
In fact, Aristotle’s solution to the dichotomy paradox relies on the fact that the
temporal and spatial magnitudes need not be segmented at all to make sense of
the motion of the runner.  Aristotle and Zeno, of course, are free to make different
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assumptions about what it means for the segmentation to be optional.  Zeno can
hold that segmentation is optional because no matter whether one chooses to
segment or not, the magnitude is, in a sense, already segmented.  Aristotle, on the
other hand, can take precisely the opposite view, that segmentation is optional
because the magnitude is not, and need not be segmented.  According to Aristotle,
if one chooses not to divide up the magnitude, one need not recognize the
traversal of its parts.  And if one chooses not to (or cannot) divide up the
magnitude into an infinite number of parts, one need not (or must not) recognize
the traversal of an infinite number of parts.
7.0 A DIFFICULTY
In Section 1.6, I suggested that we might achieve Plato’s objective of explaining
what is involved in arriving at and departing from the instant of change, and
address Aristotle’s mismatch between spatial and kinetic termini, by imagining
that there is no first or last non-instantaneous velocity above zero.  But since this
requires the moving body to pass through an infinite decreasing sequence of non-
instantaneous velocities, this option would appear to be ruled out, if the sequence
of velocities is an actual infinity, and since, as we have seen, Aristotle does not
countenance actual infinities.
Two considerations would seem to indicate that this sequence of velocities
is an actual infinity.  First, velocity would seem to be a real or actual property of a
motion.  At any rate, it is hard to imagine an argument to the effect that it is not,
and as a result, it follows that accelerations and decelerations represent real
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changes in the character of a motion.  Second, as I said before, Aristotle’s
solution to the dichotomy paradox relies on the fact that the temporal and spatial
magnitudes need not be segmented at all to make sense of the motion of the
runner.  But this is not the case if we want to invoke an infinite sequence of
discrete decelerations to explain how the motion passes into and out of existence.
These decelerations must be accounted for if they are to figure into the account of
how the motion comes to be or passes away.  If one is committed to the claim that
there is no first or last non-instantaneous velocity above zero, then, unless one
acknowledges the traversal of an infinite sequence, one will have the paradoxical
result that a moving object will never come to a stop — its velocity will just keep
decreasing ad infinitum.
On the other hand, if in coming to a stand, a moving body can only go
through a finite number of decelerations, then it seems that Aristotle’s only
recourse is to conceive of the ultimate stage of the transition between motion and
rest, i.e., the coming to be or passing away of motion, as being discontinuous, or
as involving a step-change in velocity (i.e., where there is some last positive non-
instantaneous velocity before rest).32  In other words, however much Zeno’s
runner slows down on his approach to the finish line, Aristotle must hold that his
ultimate coming to rest is abrupt and instantaneous.  The same phenomenon will
happen in reverse, of course, at the beginning of a change, viz., there must also be
a step-change in velocity at the inception of a motion.  In order to reach a period
of zero velocity, either a moving body must traverse the whole of an infinite
sequence of non-instantaneous velocities, or it must traverse a finite sequence of
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non-instantaneous velocities and then transition to the period of zero velocity
discontinuously.  But recognizing the traversal of an actually infinite series is not
really an option because it would violate one of Aristotle’s most basic
philosophical commitments — a commitment that finite human minds are up to
the task of understanding the universe, because the universe, in its essence, is a
finite place containing finite things.  So Aristotle would appear to have no choice
but to recognize a discontinuous change in velocity at the beginning and end of a
motion.
Now if something is in motion if and only if it has a positive velocity, and
the acquisition or loss of a positive velocity constitutes the coming to be or
passing away of a motion, a discontinuous change in velocity at the beginning or
end of a motion will constitute a discontinuity in its coming to be or passing
away.  And as it happens, Aristotle claims that there is no process of coming to be
in motion in Physics book 5, chapter 2, on the grounds that it involves an infinite
regress:
Again, if there is to be change of change and becoming of becoming, we
shall have an infinite regress. Thus if one of a series of changes is to be a
change of change, the preceding change must also be so: e.g. if simple
becoming was ever in process of becoming, then that which was becoming
simple becoming was also in process of becoming, so that we should not
yet have arrived at what was in process of simple becoming but only at
what was already in process of becoming in process of becoming. And this
again was sometime in process of becoming, so that even then we should
not have arrived at what was in process of simple becoming. And since in
an infinite series there is no first term, here there will be no first stage and
therefore no following stage either. On this hypothesis, then, nothing can
become or be moved or change. (Phys. 225b33-a6)33
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Of course, acceleration is a “change of a change,” and a less than generous
reading of this passage might take it to deny the existence of acceleration
altogether, but I am inclined to think that it is only meant to deny acceleration
from a stand, insofar as this is equivalent to the coming to be of a motion.34  Thus,
we may speculate that Aristotle was aware that a step-change in velocity at the
beginning and the end of a motion was required on the assumption that the
traversal of an actual infinity is impossible.
There are two reasons why we might be disconcerted with step-changes in
velocity, but they would not have bothered Aristotle.  First, from a modern
perspective, i.e., one that assigns a sense to instantaneous velocity, step-changes
in velocity look paradoxical in that it appears as though the decelerating object
has two velocities at once.   This is not a problem for Aristotle since an object
cannot have an instantaneous velocity.  The second reason has to do with
Newton’s Second Law of Motion, which effectively prohibits step-changes in
velocity by making force directly proportional to acceleration.  If acceleration
were infinite, then an infinite force would be required to cause it, but an infinite
force is impossible.  Aristotle does not have this problem, however, since in his
discussion of dynamics in Physics 7.5 he makes what we would call force
(a·k^jft) directly proportional to velocity instead of acceleration (which makes
his notion of a·k^jft in a local motion analogous to Newton’s definition of
“quantity of motion”).  For Aristotle, a·k^jft is needed to sustain as well as to
initiate motion, and a·k^jft must be continuously applied as the object moves;
more a·k^jft if the object is moving faster, less a·k^jft if it is moving slower.
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But with no concept of inertia, however, change in velocity will be as sudden as
the application and the withdrawal of a a·k^jft.35  And, if the application of
a·k^jft is as sudden as the coming in contact of the mover with the thing moved
(see Cael. 280b6-9), then, by this reasoning also, the change in velocity at the
beginning and end of a motion will be instantaneous.
8.0 A MORE FORMAL ACCOUNT OF HOW ARISTOTLE MIGHT HAVE
CONCEIVED OF THE PHENOMENON OF COMING TO A STAND
In the following section, I will sketch a more formal description of how Aristotle
might have conceived of the phenomenon of coming to a stand using certain
features of Archimedes’ Quadratura Parabolae  as a model.  I use the phrase
“might have” counterfactually, both in the sense that Aristotle apparently did not
attempt such an exposition, and that, even if he did, he probably would not have
couched his account in the more formal idiom of a geometer.  Nonetheless, I
believe that it may be permissible, because, as I argued in Section 3 above,
Aristotle’s mathematical finitism, and his conception of infinite series are
consistent with, if not informed by, 5th and 4th century attempts at quadrature, of
which Archimedes’ attempt, though it post-dates Aristotle, is still representative.
I believe that it may be desirable to attempt such an exposition since it will clarify
exactly what is implied by the combination of Aristotle’s concept of motion and
his strong mathematical finitism.
Archimedes proves that for any finite n ≥ 1, the area A bounded by a
straight line and a section of a right-angled cone is equal to the series A + A/4 +
A/16 + A/64 + … + A/4n + 1/3(A/4n) = 4A/3.  Notice that the nth member of the
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series contains the plug 1/3(A/4n), which bridges the gap between the area of the
nth partial sum and the area under the right-angled cone.  Let us, for the sake of
illustration, take a case of coming to a full stand over a given unit of distance, and
assume that to the infinite sequence of non-overlapping subintervals of time 1/2,
1/4, 1/8, …, 1/2n, … (n = 1, 2, 3, …), there corresponds the sequence of non-
overlapping subintervals of distances 7/8, 7/64, 7/512, …, 7/8n, … (n = 1, 2, 3,
…)36, which results in the sequence of velocities 7/4, 7/16, 7/64, …, 7/4n, … (n =
1, 2, 3, …).  Normally, this would imply that as n approaches infinity, the non-
instantaneous velocity of the moving body within each subinterval of time (vn =
7/4n) approaches 0 as a limit, while the sequences of partial sums of the times
(expressed by Sn = (2n-1)/2n) and the distances (expressed by Sn = (8n-1)/8n) each
approach 1 as a limit.  But we can make the series finite by introducing plugs at
the end, as Archimedes does. Thus, the finite time series would be: 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8
+ … + 1/2n + 1/2n for any finite n ≥ 1.  The finite distance series would be 7/8 +
7/64 + 7/512 + … + 7/8n + 1/8n for any finite n ≥ 1.  And finally, the velocity
sequence would be 1/4n, i.e., 7/4, 7/16, 7/64, … 7/4n, 1/4n for any finite n ≥ 1.
These sequences describe a rectilinear displacement plot, which will remain









And since velocity is constant over a linear segment of a displacement
plot, the velocity will decrease abruptly at each of the points where the segments
join.  But the change that interests us is the last step-change, since it must occur at
the instant dividing the periods of motion and rest.  In my example, the moving
object will decelerate instantaneously at this instant from a velocity of 1/4n to a
velocity of 0.
9.0 DISCONTINUOUS CHANGE IN ARISTOTLE
Sorabji points out that Aristotle seems to recognize only four kinds of “genuine”
or non-incidental changes, viz., change of quality, change of place, change of size,
and generation and destruction.  Sorabji cites Physics 3.1, 200b32-201a16,
Physics 5.2, and Metaphysics 11.12.  He also notes that in each of the four kinds
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of “genuine” changes, change is alleged to be continuous, citing Physics 6.6,
237a17-b3 and b9-21.  Yet Aristotle seems to allow a variety of exceptions to this
rule.  At De sensu 446b28-447a6, Aristotle allows that some qualitative changes
may, but are not required to occur all at once, as in the simultaneous freezing of
all of the parts of a pond.  And a few lines earlier, at De sensu 446a18-20, he
admits the discontinuity of transitions between colors, tastes, and sounds, due to
what he assumes is the limited number of discriminable colors, tastes, and sounds
in existence.  He also allows discontinuity in the force needed to move an object,
positing a threshold force, below which a motion will not occur (due to friction,
presumably) (Phys.  7.5 250a15-19).  But, by far, the largest number of
discontinuous changes are found under the heading of “generation and
destruction,” in the form of comings to be or passings away that do not require a
process.
Among the things that Aristotle allows to come to be and pass away in this
manner, one can make a very rough distinction, i.e., some of them are indivisibles
while the rest are relations.  Things may stand or fail to stand in relations to other
things, but there is no process of coming to stand in a relation, or coming not to
stand in a relation (Phys. 225b11-13; 246b11-12; 247b4).  Relational changes are
accidental (Phys. 225b11-13), and, indeed, the coincidence of states of affairs,
since coincidence is a sort of relation, comes into and go out of existence in a like
manner (Metaph. 1026b22; 1027a29).
And if we construe indivisibility very broadly, I believe that we can
include as indivisibles, in addition to things such as lines, points, surfaces, and
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instants, things like forms and †kùodbf^f.  Physically indivisible things like lines,
points and surfaces pass in and out of existence without a process of transition
because they have no parts to allow them to be in both the terminus a quo and
terminus ad quem while the object is changing, and Aristotle insists on this as a
condition of continuous change (Phys. 234b10-20).  But it is the same with forms
and †kùodbf^f such as pleasure, seeing, and knowing.  Substantial forms cannot
come into or go out of existence piecemeal (Metaph. 1039b26; 1043b14;
1044b21), since the unity of a substance is irreducible to the unity of any of its
parts.  †kùodbf^f, on the other hand, cannot come into being piecemeal because
they involve no distinction between a terminus a quo and terminus ad quem.
They are whole and indivisible, like points and units since they have no parts (i.e.,
phases) which could be missing (EN 1174b10-13).  Processes like taking a walk,
however, assuming that the walk has some destination, do have parts (phases)
which must come into existence serially for the walk to be complete, and this is
why Aristotle insists that one cannot complete a walk without walking (Phys.
232a10-11).
10.0 CONCLUSION
But what about the coming to be and passing away of motion, which has been the
main focus of this chapter?  Does it fit into either of these categories?  Sorabji and
Niko Strobach make a distinction which I believe can be used to suggest that the
coming to be and passing away of motion might be a relational or accidental
change.  Sorabji makes a distinction between changes involving what Strobach
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has later dubbed “comparative” and “non-comparative” properties.37  Non-
comparative properties are termini of the four kinds of genuine change —
qualities, positions, sizes, and states of existence and non-existence.  Comparative
properties are “properties which are assigned to an object by comparing its states
at different instants between which there is always a certain period of time.”38
Motion and rest are comparative properties.  Motion is the property of being in
the process of traversing a continuum from one non-comparative property to
another.  Rest is the property of possessing the same non-comparative property
for a continuous period of time.  Since motion and rest mention non-comparative
changes in their definitions, i.e., a motion is always a motion with respect to
quality, place, size, or existence, the change between motion and rest is, in a
sense, derivative of non-comparative changes.  Perhaps this second order or
derivative character would make the change between motion and rest relational
and incidental in Aristotle’s view.
Or perhaps, while change between motion and rest is discontinuous in one
sense, it is continuous in another.  Perhaps the derivative character of motion and
rest would give changes between the two what Aristotle calls a “not per se
continuity” (qÌ j™ h^v~ ^ÂqÌ prkbuùt+ De sensu 445b21-9; 446a16-20), which
Sorabji interprets to mean, in the case of a discontinuous change between
discriminable pitches, for instance, “that a change to the next discriminable pitch,
in the discontinuous series of discriminable pitches, may proceed by a continuous
movement of a stopper along a vibrating string.”39  Aristotle certainly does think
that the continuity of change of place is derived from the continuity of place.
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However, there is an important disanalogy with the case of the moving stopper,
which I mentioned in Section 1.4 — whereas the discontinuous change in
discriminable pitch coincides with the arrival of the stopper at a particular
position along the vibrating string, the transition from motion to rest does not
coincide with the arrival of the train at the station.  At the instant of arrival, the
train is not yet in a state of rest because rest takes time.
Now it may be tempting to conclude, based on the foregoing, that Aristotle
has a problem, but it is a rather minor one that may be classed as just an isolated
exception to his theory.  But this appearance is false, since admitting discontinuity
into the heart of his metaphysics of motion is just as objectionable as conceding
that an actually infinite series is traversable.  This is because, if passing to and
from a period of zero velocity is discontinuous because Aristotle cannot account
for how the transition between motion to rest ultimately takes place, so too must
the passage to and from any period with some positive velocity.  Suppose that a
moving body traveling at 6 miles per hour decelerates to a velocity of 5 miles per
hour.  If the number of decelerations that the body undergoes is finite, how will
the body ultimately decelerate to 5 miles per hour without undergoing a
discontinuous drop in speed?  No matter how close the velocity gets to 5 miles per
hour (e.g., 5.1, 5.01, 5.001, 5.0001 m.p.h., etc.), if the number of decelerations is
finite, then the ultimate deceleration to 5 miles per hour must be discontinuous.
In other words, the problem with stopping and starting is perfectly generalizable
to transitions between any two velocities.  If this is so, then motions will be
discontinuous not only at their beginnings and endings, but at any time at which
203
they change their speed.  It will not do to simply say that a decrease or increase in
velocity is continuous if and only if for any period at a given velocity, adjacent
periods will differ in velocity by less and less as shorter periods are taken,
because, no matter how short a period one takes, the velocity will always differ
from the given velocity by some positive amount.
Calling motion a “comparative property,” I think, highlights a basic
shortcoming of Aristotle’s concept of motion.  The idea that motion is simply the
traversal from place A at time t to place B at time t + 1 makes it not only
impossible for Aristotle to account for how motions come to be and pass away,
but also for Aristotle to conceive of continuous changes in velocity.  For Aristotle,
the velocity associated with the traversal of an object between spatial termini is
always a non-instantaneous velocity, and an non-instantaneous velocity always
masks the variation in the velocity over the period of change.  Aristotle can divide
the motion up as finely as he likes, but unless he embraces the concept of
instantaneous velocity, there will always be jumps or drops in speed as the object
moves from one motion subsegment to the next.
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1 Sorabji, Time, Creation And The Continuum, 403-421.
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and A. Pst. 1.9 75b41 (Bryson), Phys. 1.2 185a16 (Antiphon), SE 171b15
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4 See section 5.0 below.
5 For an alternative reading, see Gregory Vlastos, “Zeno’s Race Course,” Journal
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become obvious once a suitable figure has been constructed, discovery of a
geometrical fact must presuppose the construction of a suitable figure.  The
fallacy is one of affirming the consequent, i.e., “If a geometrical construction c
has been made, geometrical fact ` becomes known.  Geometrical fact ` becomes
known.  Therefore, a geometrical construction c has been made.”
7 Euclid Elements 12.2.33-37: qùjklkqbt a™ qàt Âmlibfmljùk^t mbofcbob÷^t
a÷u^ h^◊ †mfwbrdk·kqbt b‰vb÷^t h^◊ ql„ql äb◊ mlfl„kqbt h^q^ib÷`ljùk
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by such a magnitude as, when added to itself, can be made to exceed any assigned
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book 1, “On the Sphere and the Cylinder” in The Works of Archimedes, trans. T.
L. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897).
10 In phys. 9.55.4-8: h^◊ h^qà qÌk ^‰qÌk máifk iÏdlk qùjksk qàt mibroàt
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Ancient And Medieval Thought, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca: Cornell
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12 See section 5.0 below.
13 Precession is the fact of preceding in time.  Infinite precession is the fact of an
infinite number of past events preceding one another in time.
14 Richard Sorabji points out another weakness in Aristotle’s strategy:  Since
Aristotle is willing to countenance collections of objects that exist less than fully
(such as points and potential entities), then there is no reason why infinite
collections of non-present events or things should escape being actual infinities
simply because they are not present. (Sorabji, Time, Creation And The
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207
                                                                                                                                      
18 The foregoing paragraph paraphrases Phys. 207a20-28.
19 Jaakko Hintikka, “Aristotelian Infinity,” Philosophical Review 75 (April 1966):
207.
20 Jonathan Lear, “Aristotelian Infinity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
80 (1979): 191.
21 Cf. Phys. 204b30-
22 In the case of number, this also follows from the fact that numbers are either
odd or even and that infinity is neither odd nor even (Metaph. 1084a2-4).  In the
case of magnitude, this also follows from the alleged fact that there is no infinitely
large body or collection of bodies of which an infinite magnitude can be a
property (Phys. 204a34-206a7).
23 Lear, “Aristotelian Infinity,” 202.
24Hintikka, “Aristotelian Infinity,” 208.
25 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1929), Lecture 6, 182-198.
26 See section 4.2 above.
27 See Physics 4.11.
208
                                                                                                                                      
28 Michael White suggests (White, Continuous and Discrete, 112) that Aristotle
might think that being in distinct positions at distinct instants is an incidental
property of continuous motion.  This seems plausible, especially in light of the
fact that Aristotle thinks that a point can only be in motion incidentally.
29 Discursive thought or cápft.ämÏc^pft.h^qác^pft, characteristically
involves accidental predication (see DA 430b26ff.).  Apparently Aristotle’s idea is
that when we assert “The x is F” where “is F” is an accidental predication, two
forms succeed each other in our souls.  (Aristotle thinks that essential predications
do not involve the concatenation of distinct forms.)
30 I am assuming, here, that Aristotle is not abandoning his doctrine that an
actually infinite quantity is untraversable in favor of the view that an actually
infinite quantity is traversable incidentally, mainly because the latter doctrine
would imply the existence of actual infinities, and because Aristotle’s denial of
actual infinities is amply attested.  At the end of this paragraph, I give the sense in
which an incidental traversal of a sequence is a traversal of a potential sequence.
31 This is not to claim that Zeno’s paradox relies of the segmentation not being
optional, as I explain below.
32 A step-change in velocity is one where there is an instantaneous shift between
two velocities without passing through any intermediate velocities.  Of course, the
shift would not itself represent a change to Aristotle, since he does not allow
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change at an instant.  Rather, the step-change is understood in terms of periods of
time that span this instant.
33 Cf. Phys. 247b13
34 At any rate, Aristotle is problematizing something that should be quite simple.
If acceleration from a stand is conceived of as simply the traversal of a continuum
of instantaneous velocities starting from zero, then it should be no more
problematic than the traversal of a spatial continuum from any given point of
origin.  Of course, Aristotle denies the existence of instantaneous velocities, so
this simple approach is closed to him.
35 At Physics 7.5 250a15-19, Aristotle adds the caveat that, due to friction,
presumably, there will be some threshold force below which motion will not
result.  The example given is ship-hauling, where if it takes 100 men to move a
ship 100 feet, it does not follow that one man can move a ship one foot.
36 The sequence dn = 7/8n (n = 1, 2, 3, …) was selected because it is consistent
with a simple non-linear (parabolic) velocity function [i.e., v(t) = 3(t - 1)2], and a
simple distance/time function that passes through the points (0,0) and (1,1) [i.e.,
d(t) = (t - 1)3 + 1].  The acceleration function is a(t) = 6(t - 1 ).
37 Sorabji, Time, Creation And The Continuum, 410-3.
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38 Niko Strobach, The Moment of Change, A Systematic History in the Philosophy
of Space and Time (Dortrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 52.
39 Sorabji, Time, Creation And The Continuum, 411.
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